Yesterday, #Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi put forth a Four-Point Proposal for peace in the #Israel-#Palestine conflict.
Why this "plan" offers nothing new and on #China's use of rhetorical support for #Palestinians
(Or, why do I have such a sense of deja vu?)
a thread🧵1/
Wang’s comments resurrected the Four-Point Proposal made by Xi Jinping in 2017, which itself was a repackaging of the Four-Point Plan for Peace of 2013. While the language has varied, the content has remained the same. All 3 versions endorse the international consensus... 2/
...that calls for a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state, condemn human rights violations and aggression on both sides, calls for an end to the Gaza blockade, and call for mediated negotiations. 3/
Mohammad al-Sudairi has argued that these calls are all “within the framework of the global consensus and the principles accepted and voiced by the “moderate” Arab camp” and exhibits an “essentially conservative disposition” towards the conflict. merip.org/2016/01/chinas…
4/
These earlier attempts all failed to strike a chord. Although Mahmoud Abbas is fond of trips to China, Palestinians are unlikely to see the Chinese as a neutral partner due to their close relationship with Israel. Israel imports more goods from China than anywhere else... 5/
...while China is the second-largest importer of Israeli products. Their bilateral trade stands at ~$15 billion. While just a drop in the bucket of China’s total trade, Israel has historically been an important source of military tech that the U.S is unwilling to share... 6/
According to a report from the U.S-China Security Review Forum, as of 2010 “Israel ranks second only to Russia as a weapons system provider to China and as a conduit for sophisticated military technology, followed by France and Germany.” 7/
This relationship has often drawn the ire of the United States, which occasionally pressures Israel. Most recently, the U.S prevented Israel from selling advanced AWACS aircraft to China. But despite this, the tendency has been to share technology. 8/ eurasiantimes.com/israels-push-t…
Israel has also been seen as the “R&D lab” of China in recent decades. China and Israel have hosted many reciprocal business events that facilitate cooperation between Chinese and Israeli firms, usually with Israel providing technology to an established Chinese company... 9/
Starting in 2016, Chinese investors became especially interested in online businesses based in Israel’s “Silicon Wadi,” which offers less regulation than its US counterpart. These companies bring advanced technology and experience to these projects to meet needs in China... 10/
...which local firms then borrow and integrate. While again, US pressure sometimes prevents important connections from materializing – most recently by blocking Israel’s use of Huawei 5G tech – the relationship has been steadily trending upwards. 11/ reuters.com/article/us-isr…
In short, the Four-Point Plan is a rehash of the international consensus, with no real chance of bringing either the Israelis or the Palestinians to the negotiating table. China’s interests in maintaining positive relations with Israel preclude it from offering anything... 12/
that will threaten the status quo. Any progress would be contingent on Israel agreeing to allow China to act as a mediator, which it has every incentive to avoid. When Xi Jinping offered to mediate a meeting between Abbas and Netanyahu during a state visit in 2013... 13/
...Netanyahu unsurprisingly sidestepped the offer in favor of discussing economic issues and China’s relationship with Iran.
In short, China's support for the Palestinians is essentially diplomatic tool. While an important part of their engagement with the Arab world...14/
China only needs to embrace the international consensus to win the support of the Arab states, which are themselves content to make only just enough noise about Palestine to satisfy their populations. 15/
For more on the history of these ties, and China's anti-Israel rhetoric between 1955 and the early 1990s, have a look at this thread:
We are now starting to get some of the details of the #Iran-#Saudi normalisation deal, thanks to this excellent report from @WSJ. Some important take-aways:
1.The report confirms that much of this was the culmination of a regional peace process: years of negotiations and both sides agreeing it was in their best interests. China entered late, as the train was pulling out, but…
2.Chinese diplomacy did play a larger role than it has in previous attempts to get involved in regional politics. Significantly, China agreed to allow Iran to access some frozen funds. This was less likely incentive and more likely the price Iran asked to hand China this win.
Officials tried to avoid mentioning the issue specifically, but stressed that future development would be done with Iranian companies and investment. "It is quite clear that the National Oil Company has reached a dead end in negotiations with the Chinese."
"Over the years, they have been indifferent to all of the ultimatums of the National Oil Company...at the beginning [of the Raisi gov't], they were optimistic that the Chinese would invest...but strangely, Beijing has no intention of investing at this time."
Recently, #IranChina ties have faced faux pas, criticism, and stagnation. Tomorrow, President Raisi will visit #Beijing to try and jump-start #Sino-#Iranian cooperation. 🇨🇳🇮🇷
In March of 2020, #Iran and #China signed the fabled "Iran-China Deal", in which China reported pledged massive cooperation with and investment in Iran over the next two-and-a-half decades. The deal ostensibly called for $400 billion in investment...
But as you may be able to guess from the number of qualifiers, the deal was, much like China's espionage efforts, full of hot air. Many experts, myself included, pointed out that the $400 billion number was almost completely fabricated...
So what can you expect from this article? It fill a gap in the literature by sketching a narrative of RoC-#Iran relations between 1920 and 1949, by analyzing the factors behind #Sino-Iranian cooperation and competition in the #tea and #silk trades and at the League of Nations.
What did I find? Unofficial commercial interests, including Iranian merchants in Shanghai, played a large role in driving Sino-Iranian relations. Iranian companies were well established in China and Hong Kong, mostly shipping tea. See for example this advert in an expat paper.
#China and #Iran have agreed to expand their military ties. Of course, Fox News and the usual suspects are sounding the alarm. What does that mean, and is there anything noteworthy here?
First, this is nothing new. Chinese military have visited Iran before. They ALREADY cooperate by holding joint military exercises and collaborating on international crime, like drug trafficking and terrorism. China also does this with Saudi Arabia and other ME countries.
They’re likely to continue to deepen these ties, but they’re not particularly strategic or significant. That’s exactly what Bagheri said they’re doing, “expand bilateral cooperation in joint military drills, exchange of strategies, training issues and other common fields”.
The #Iran-#China deal has entered the "implementation" phase. This has triggered a new, yet not unexpected round of #Sino-#Iranian "alliance" panic.
But recent events hint at the limits of the Sino-Iranian partnership. Let's review... (a #ForeignPolicy#IranChina#thread) 1/
First, it's worth repeating that many aspects of the promised deal are overblown and exaggerated, including the fabled "$400 billion" investment. The deal was, and remains, aspirational and with no specific details. 2/
Iran may be forced to “Look East” in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, but the Chinese government continues to look in many directions at once. China has substantial relations with Saudi Arabia, Israel, and a number of other Iranian neighbors and/or rivals. 3/