Thread by @JJSchroden

ICYMI, last week I published an article with @Diplomat_APAC titled “Will #Afghanistan Collapse When the US Withdraws?” Since the article is behind a paywall, I’ll summarize some of my main points in this THREAD. 1/n

thediplomat.com/2021/05/will-a…

For the article, I was asked to explore what might happen in #Afghanistan in the year after the US withdraws. To do so, I found it instructive to revisit the years immediately following the Soviet withdrawal & to compare/contrast to the situation today. 2/n

I’ve seen people making superficial comparisons of these two eras to predict impending doom, but a detailed comparison reveals both striking similarities and distinct differences between the two, which should inform our thinking about the future of #Afghanistan. 3/n

As an @RANDCorporation analyst in 1991, @US4AfghanPeace identified three assumptions that underpinned predictions of Najibullah’s hasty overthrow in the wake of the Soviets' departure. 4/n
rand.org/content/dam/ra…

1. His regime was brittle & likely to fragment once the Soviets left.
2. The departure of Soviet advisers would decisively shift the mil balance to favor the mujahideen.
3. The Soviets cared only abt securing a “decent interval” between their departure & the govt’s collapse. 5/n

These assumptions proved to be incorrect. 6/n

1) Najibullah’s govt proved to be flexible. The combination of continuous personal and governmental reforms, a time-tested strategy, and constant political dealing showed Najibullah to be considerably more dexterous and resilient than many had assumed. 7/n

2) The mil balance of power didn't shift decisively in favor of the muj. One reason was that #Afghanistan’s security forces proved more capable than the Soviets believed they would be. Another was the muj weren't as pol & mil astute (nor as cohesive) as many believed. 8/n

The muj also had difficulty adjusting their tactics from guerrilla attacks designed to bleed the Soviets & convince them that #Afghanistan was ungovernable, to the massed, conventional assaults required to capture the country’s cities (see: Jalalabad csmonitor.com/1989/0315/ojal…). 9/n

3) Contrary to expectations, the Soviets provided Najibullah w/substantial support after their withdrawal, as part of a well-crafted exit strategy that jettisoned idealistic objectives & instead aligned Soviet resources w/a de minimus goal–the survival of the Afghan govt. 10/n

Since the Soviet patron and its Afghan client had the same goal of regime survival, the Soviets trusted Najibullah to use their aid to influence audiences to support (or at least not undermine) his government and gave him unprecedented latitude to do so. 11/n

Thus, the common assumptions that Najibullah’s govt would be fragile, decisively outgunned, marginally supported – and would collapse within a year – turned out to be false. What can this example teach us about the future of #Afghanistan today? 12/n

Q: Is @ashrafghani's govt fragile? Today, the war has intra-Afghan & extra-regional components, but it’s not purely one of proxy conflict. This has created a complex set of patron-client relations, which sometimes result in discrepancies between patron/client goals. 13/n

The most notable example is the gulf between the US goal of a power sharing peace deal that includes the #Taliban & may involve substantial governmental restructuring (tolonews.com/pdf/pdf.pdf) & Ghani’s goal of the survival of the Republic, as well as his presidency. 14/n

While @ashrafghani will start the post-withdrawal period w/a stronger popular mandate than Najibullah, Ghani has less firm backing from his patrons & has found himself increasingly isolated, as the US has prioritized ending the conflict over the preservation of his govt. 15/n

Q: Will the #Taliban have a decisive mil advantage post-withdrawal? Unlike the muj, the TB lack conv wpns (aircraft, tanks & anti-air missiles) & are less capable of massed assaults on cities & vulnerable to attacks by air. But, the TB are more cohesive than were the muj. 16/n

These differences are why I recently concluded that in the absence of US advisers, the #Taliban would have a slight military advantage, but not a decisive one. 17/n

ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-s…

Militarily, @ashrafghani's govt will start its post-withdrawal situation controlling all of #Afghanistan’s major cities—a much better position than Najibullah had when the Soviets left. 18/n

Q: Will support from the US & the international community be insufficient to prevent collapse? The Soviets crafted a well-synchronized and resourced exit strategy in support of a capable client with a free hand to use that support as he saw fit. 19/n

The US & @NATO have pledged $$ spt for #Afghanistan (most notably, the #ANDSF) through 2024, but what’s not clear is whether the US has a well-crafted & synchronized post-withdrawal strategy (recent #DOD pressers & @US4AfghanPeace congressional hearings suggest it doesn't). 20/n

And because of the extremely high levels of corruption in his govt, the U.S. is unlikely to give @ashrafghani a free hand to employ that assistance purely in support of his goals of governmental and political survival. 21/n

Thus, @ashrafghani will enter the post-withdrawal period with a high degree of confidence for sustained funding for at least two more years, but his ability to use that funding in direct support of his own political strategy will be highly circumscribed. 22/n

What does all of this mean for #Afghanistan post-US withdrawal? Two observations.

1) As was the case with Najibullah’s government, those predicting the quick demise of the @ashrafghani government are likely to be wrong. 23/n

The #Taliban are likely to press their military advantage in 2022, to see how far they can get. But the TB likely don't have the manpower or the conventional military resources to seize & hold more than a few provincial capitals. 24/n

The #Taliban are also likely to struggle with at least some splintering of their forces once the unifying theme of driving out foreign infidels is gone--something about which they are clearly worried. 25/n

2022 is likely to be another violent year for #Afghanistan, but the #Taliban are more likely to lay siege to the country’s cities IOT generate pol concessions in #Doha than they are to “empty the madrassas” in #Pakistan for a Tet-style gambit to seize the country by force. 26/n

2) It's unlikely that @ashrafghani's government will be overthrown purely militarily in the next couple of years. Rather, political dynamics--such as the re-arming of some warlord militia networks--will decide his future and that of his government. 27/n

How will things unfold in 2022? The attrition rates of aircraft & heavy weapons will be key metrics to follow, as will trends in #ANDSF recruitment and retention. 28/n

The extent to which the US & its @NATO allies continue to provide security assistance funding & replacements for combat attrition of aircraft & weapons, as well as their ability to provide or entice contracted support for the #ANDSF will also be key. 29/n

The extent to which the #Taliban choose to directly threaten or attack provincial capitals–& the extent to which they are successful if they do–as opposed to laying siege to them, will be critical to gauging the relative dominance of their political and military wings. 30/n

But the extent to which elites currently aligned w/or supportive of @ashrafghani stay that way or realign to other political blocs (incl the #Taliban), will be the key indicator as to whether #Afghanistan's govt will survive or collapse after the US withdraws. 31/31