Today, the House Armed Services Committee held a full hearing for "An Update on #Afghanistan."
Witnesses were ASD David Helvey (OSD) & BGen Matt Trollinger (Joint Staff). It was a *long* hearing. I'll post a summary in this THREAD. 1/n
(If you'd like to watch the whole thing, here's the link: armedservices.house.gov/2021/5/full-co…. Note that what follows aren't quotes, but my paraphrases of their comments). 2/n
Chairman Smith opening remarks: This hearing will focus on key questions, such as: What is the process for US withdrawal from #Afghanistan & what’s our strategy going forward? Also, what our lessons learned from the past 20 years? 3/n
Smith: Absolutely support @JoeBiden's decision to withdraw. Things are likely to get worse in #Afghanistan going forward. But there are many countries around the world where bad things are happening to people who live there. 4/n
Smith: The decision to withdraw from #Afghanistan is a bipartisan one. President @JoeBiden is implementing the plan begun by President Trump. 5/n
Ranking Member Rogers opening remarks: W/o any US troops in #Afghanistan, how will we conduct CT ops “over the horizon” (OTH)? @JoeBiden has said we’ll do this but has offered no details of how. 6/n
ASD Helvey opening remarks: We condemn the recent attack on schoolgirls, which seems likely to have been the work of #ISIS-K. We’ve determined that we can secure our interests in #Afghanistan w/o troops in the country going forward. 7/n
ASD H: We’re working to reposition CT capabilities in the region. We’ll hold the #Taliban accountable for their CT commitments. & we’re re-looking our CT strategy overall to address globally-dispersed terrorist threats. 8/n
ASD H: We’ll continue support to the Afghan Air Force (AAF) & Special Mission Wing (SMW), paying salaries for #ANDSF, and delivering critical military supplies. We're developing mechanisms for oversight of security assistance & #DOD contracts. 9/n
ASD H: #DOD continues to support efforts toward a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Will provide support to efforts to take care of Afghans who have supported military ops & to @StateDept personnel in #Afghanistan. 10/n
[No opening statement from BGen Trollinger] 11/n
Q1: What’s your vision for what transnational terrorist group containment looks like in South Asia after we leave #Afghanistan? 12/n
ASD H: Think of 3 concentric circles: 1st is cont diplomatic presence in #Afghanistan & spt to #ANDSF. 2nd is regional US mil presence. Looking at poss pos'ns in regional states. 3rd is global capabilities, eg coop actions w/partners, efforts to address terrorist financing. 13/n
Rep Smith: That’s a really good answer. Congress needs to hear that more. #DOD needs to support the Special Immigrant Visa (SiV) program as well. 14/n
Q2: Do you trust the #Taliban to adhere to the commitments they’ve made?
T1: The #Taliban are capable of adhering to agreements, if they choose to do so. 15/n
Q3: Can’t imagine #China or #Russia allowing us to have troops in countries around #Afghanistan. What are the details of OTH CT? 16/n
ASD H: The details of that would be classified. We’re exploring options closer to #Afghanistan than our Gulf bases. Discussion on overflight rights & basing are ongoing. 17/n
Q4: Is the intent that the withdrawal won’t be complete until those plans for regional basing are complete?
ASD H: Our plan is to ensure close coordination of these efforts. The withdrawal & regional posture efforts are being done in parallel, but are not linked. 18/n
Q5: The #AfghanistanStudyGroup said terrorist groups could reconstitute within 1-2 years. If that happens & #Afghanistan’s govt asks for our help, how would we handle it? 19/n
ASD H: We have a Bilateral Security Agreement w/Afghan govt that won’t change. Will continue working together to counter those threats. But can’t answer hypotheticals. 20/n
Q6: Are you at least wargaming and planning for likely options?
ASD H: We are planning against a number of contingencies. 21/n
Q7: To what extent has massive US funding contributed to #Afghanistan govt corruption? If the #Taliban come to power, would they be involved in distribution of US aid? 22/n
ASD H: We’ve tried to do better at aid distro to ensure it gets to the right people, as designed. If the #Taliban joined the govt, we’d have to look at how to provide assistance (eg to the #ANDSF) in ways that Congress is okay with. 23/n
Q8: What has been #DOD’s role in the negotiations w/the #Taliban so far? What can DOD do to help secure the gains of the past 20 years, especially WRT rights of women & girls? 24/n
ASD H: #DOD’s role is to support @US4AfghanPeace's efforts to negotiate w/the #Taliban. We do want to secure those gains. Protection of them will be a critical metric for #Afghanistan’s continued acceptance by the int’l community. 25/n
Q9: Have there been any direct attacks by the #Taliban on US forces since May 1? How do you differentiate murder by TB, #alQaeda, or #ISIS-K?
T1: There have been no attacks by the #Taliban on US or coalition forces since May 1. 26/n
Q10: The 9/11 attacks were conducted from a cave in #Afghanistan. How do we prevent that from happening again?
T1: We’re working through how best to position our capabilities to prevent that. 27/n
Q11: Do you agree w/Gen McKenzie’s [CDR of @CENTCOM) assertion that the US military could evacuate threatened personnel from #Afghanistan if directed to do so? Which US govt agency would be lead for this? 28/n
ASD H: We could do that if ordered to do so. @StateDept is the lead for the SiV program. 29/n
Q12: Would the establishment of an interagency task force for this be helpful?
ASD H: Yes. We’re currently having multiple interagency meetings per week on this now. Increasing the quotas & resources for SiV would be helpful. 30/n
Q13: How will we know if some tripwire has been crossed to require the US to go back into #Afghanistan? Like another terrorist attack or collapse of the govt? We didn’t have that for #ISIS in #Iraq. 31/n
ASD H: We need persistent intelligence on #Afghansitan to watch the evolution of the terrorist threats after we leave. 32/n
Q14: We all believe the US military is likely to have to go back into #Afghanistan. To what extent are you planning w/the Afghan govt for facilities & logistics to go back in, if required? 33/n
ASD H: We are turning over facilities to Afghan partners & we’ll continue support to the #ANDSF to maintain a willing & capable partner. This planning is on #DOD’s “to do” list. 34/n
Q15: To what extent are you coordinating ops of our allies to ensure security of people during the withdrawal?
ASD H: We are doing significant coordination w/our allies & partners. Aware of concerns that some allies are leaving w/o backfills for critical functions. 35/n
Rep Smith: The SiV program is “mandatory spending,” which is complicated. To accommodate all of the visas required, Congress will have to waive this requirement. 36/n
Q16: If Biden has chosen to not withdraw, we would've had to send more troops back to #Afghanistan? 2500 would’ve been insufficient for the mission?
ASD H: At 2500 troops, we had a lethal capability to protect ourselves/NATO partners, do CT, & provide support to the #ANDSF. 37/n
Q17: But the #Taliban agreement to not attack US troops was significant and would have changed had we stayed, right?
ASD H: We assume the #Taliban would not have seen themselves as bound by their commitments if we had stayed. 38/n
Q18: About $4B was appropriated for the #ANDSF last year. Do you see a similar requirement this year?
ASD H: This year might be a little bit less, but keeping funding for salaries, supplies, and the AAF is critical. 39/n
Rep Smith: The fact the #Taliban agreed not to attack us over the past year allowed us to go to 2500. No way that force structure would've been enough had those attacks started again. 40/n
Rep Smith: More troops would’ve been required & more of our constituents would be dead/injured. We’d be asking people to die to not accomplish anything. 41/n
Q19: #Turkmenistan, #Uzbekistan, and #Tajikistan are the most likely countries for OTH basing. Do we have any agreements w/them to enable that?
ASD H: No. But we are working options ICW @StateDept to establish arrangements to address terrorist threats OTH. 42/n
Q20: How can stop any “bloodbath scenarios” in #Afghanistan w/capabilities that will be >300 miles away?
ASD H: We have to work w/Congress to ensure we have the capabilities to respond to any situation like that. & we have to support cont’d negotiations to end the conflict. 43/n
Q21: Do you agree that the #Taliban have not yet upheld their commitments?
ASD H: They have been participating in the intra-Afghan negotiations, though those haven’t completed yet. 44/n
Q22: Wasn’t it a mistake to say the withdrawal will be done by Sep 11? Won’t the #Taliban just declare victory that day? Isn’t this an unforced error?
ASD H: I’ll leave it to the #Taliban to decide on what they want to do that day. 45/n
Q23: What’s the value of the equip & weapons we have in #Afghanistan right now? What’s your intention about destroying such equip?
T1: Don’t have a specific number but will provide it. We’ll be retrograding equip, transferring some to the Afghan govt, & destroying some. 46/n
Q24: What kinds of military presence is required to protect our diplomatic & tech support presence post-withdrawal?
T1: That planning is ongoing, but no decision yet on what that would look like. We’ll have a commensurate military presence to secure the Embassy. 47/n
Q25: How can we ensure the #Taliban upholds its commitments?
ASD H: We’ll maintain capabilities to do that while we retrograde. @POTUS intent is to maintain OTH capabilities to do that post-withdrawal. #Taliban’s desire for legitimacy & recognition creates leverage. 48/n
Q26: How do you know that #ISIS attacked the school this week? & how do we know that ISIS isn’t a proxy for the #Taliban?
ASD H: Didn’t say it was definitely an #ISIS attack, but that it resembled past attacks by that group. 49/n
Q27: In a scenario in which we cont’d to support the Afghan govt, would anything be different in 5-10 yrs?
ASD H: The best outcome would be a peaceful settlement in #Afghanistan. That’s how security would improve, econ would grow & no terrorist safehaven. That’s the focus. 50/n
ASD H: The #ANDSF have improved. Doing the bulk of fighting & dying in #Afghanistan. The AAF is especially noteworthy & we’ll continue to support it. 51/n
Q28: Do the #ANDSF know that as we pull out, that US air support goes away? What happens as we subtract that part of our support?
T1: The #ANDSF are absolutely a capable fighting force & they have capable air support. 52/n
Q29: Can you tell us how your scenario planning is going to fully withdraw by Sep 11?
ASD H: The more planning & assessments we do, the more confident we become. Allows us to ID potential blindspots & vulnerabilities. Have more work to do, but #DOD does planning very well. 53/n
Q30: Do we have enough time to get the withdrawal & associated post-withdrawal planning done by Sep 11? Are you prepared to extend the timeline if need be? 54/n
ASD H: Planning didn’t begin on Apr 14—it began long before that. Looking at various options post-withdrawal, but can’t say how they interface with the timeline for withdrawal. 55/n
Q31: What does the future of Afghan women look like w/o US troops in #Afghanistan? How will they be protected?
ASD H: This is a Q that Afghans have to answer & solve. We have an obligation to help & need to do so. Need to encourage all parties to reach a peace agreement. 56/n
ASD H: But we went to #Afghanistan to address the terrorism threat & @POTUS has determined we don’t need a military presence there to do that. 57/n
Q32: What implications does the withdrawal decision have WRT the AUMF? For OTH operations, wouldn’t the admin need to come back to Congress for such authorizations?
ASD H: Don’t believe there are direct implications of this for the AUMF, but will follow-up in written form. 58/n
Q33: How do we maintain persistent intelligence w/only a diplomatic mission & no authority to base in any surrounding country?
ASD H: We’d have to discuss that in a closed session. 59/n
Q34: Is there a coord effort between our partners regarding future security to diplomatic missions? What impact would #Turkey pulling out of Kabul have?
ASD H: @StateDept's leading discussions of that kind. We’re in consultations w/#Turkey on what their intentions are. 60/n
Q35: After withdrawal, what will training support to #ANDSF look like? In or out of country? Uniform or contractors?
ASD H: We’re still doing planning for OTH support. Details remain classified. Some support could be provided via teleconferences, etc. 61/n
Q36: In #Iraq we had an office of security cooperation, is that being considered for #Afghanistan?
ASD H: We’re looking at different models for future support. A security assistance office is one option. OTH support is another. 62/n
Q37: Should we be concerned that the govt of #Afghanistan might terminate the Bilateral Security Agreement? What if the #Taliban join the govt?
ASD H: Intent of both sides is to cont the BSA. Can’t speak to what the #Taliban might do about that if they joined the govt. 63/n
Q38: Does the Bilateral Security Agreement allow for continued raids in #Afghanistan if we needed to do that? Has @POTUS said those are off the table?
ASD H: Don’t want to speculate on that. POTUS has not ruled those out. 64/n
Q39: What’s your level of confidence that we’ll meet the benchmark of withdrawal by Sep 11? Is @CENTCOM’s estimate that we’re 12% done w/the withdrawal accurate?
ASD H: We have planning underway to meet that target. Not sure about that number. 65/n
Q40: In #Iraq, we saw tanks that provided painted black & used by #ISIS. How do we prevent that outcome in #Afghanistan?
T1: Taking a hard look at what we can transfer to the #ANDSF. We can do that w/infrastructure. Also w/some equipment. 66/n
Q41: The Afghan govt could become the #Taliban! How do you analyze the risk of whether that equip could go to terrorist groups? Can we get a copy of your decision tree?
T1: We make that risk assessment at the outset, before we turn that equipment over to the #ANDSF. 67/n
Q42: What exactly will we be funding for the #ANDSF? How will that compare to what it cost to have US troops in #Afghanistan? 68/n
ASD H: 3 classes of support: 1) maintain salaries for #ANDSF; 2) cont providing certain types of supplies & equipment; 3) cont support to the AAF/SMW. Planning for that support now, to include OTH means & security assistance office in the Embassy. 69/n
ASD H: Working w/Congress on their oversight requirements as well to make sure we can meet those. Reduction in US presence won’t impact requirement for #ANDSF salaries, AAF/SMW support, etc. Sig $$ will still be required. 70/n
Q43: Do you think the withdrawal will affect our relationships w/@NATO countries?
ASD H: This was a decision we took together. @POTUS consulted w/NATO allies directly on the decision. We will withdraw together. 71/n
Q44: Will our soldiers in #Afghanistan be coming home or will they be deployed elsewhere?
ASD H: Would have to answer that in a closed session. 72/n
Q45: Is there anything preventing #DOD from evacuating threatened Afghans to some other location at which they could be processed for a SiV?
ASD H: We’re working w/interagency partners to look at different tools/mechanisms to address this. 73/n
Q46: Can you discuss some non-military tools that #DOD will use to advance our interests in #Afghanistan?
ASD H: We’ll work to support our interagency partners, and to continue support to the #ANDSF. USAID & State have lots of tools as well--#DOD will support their efforts. 74/n
Q47: Has #DOD made any special demands that extend protection for women during ongoing communications w/#Afghanistan?
Q48: How do we ensure that our withdrawal from #Afghanistan doesn’t result in increased instability there?
ASD H: The key is supporting the Afghan govt & Afghans in achieving a durable political settlement. That will accomplish the outcomes you’re looking for. 76/n
Q49: Can you give a sense of what % of #Afghanistan’s land mass is controlled by the #Taliban? & where are they particularly strong?
T1: I can answer that in a closed session. 77/n
Q50: What challenges would the US face if we had to take action in #Afghanistan if we had to intervene post-withdrawal?
T1: Clearly, we’ll face greater challenges than we currently do. Could take very quick action if we had to. Can provide more details in a closed session. 78/n
Q51: How long do we need to have an a/c carrier in the region to spt the withdrawal & what’s the impact of that on US interests in the S. Pacific?
T1: We’ll consider the req't for the carrier on an ongoing basis. ASD H: Involves weighing the needs of various combatant CDRs. 79/n
Q52: Several times, you’ve said that you won’t consider hypotheticals—but isn’t the consideration of hypotheticals technically what planning is about?
ASD H: When we say hypotheticals, we mean not getting in front of decisions that have yet to be made by @POTUS or @SECDEF. 80/n
Q53: Is there a risk that we’ll have to do in #Afghanistan what we did in #Iraq, when we had to go back in to fight #ISIS?
ASD H: We intend to continue to plan for contingencies & support Afghan partners to monitor & assess terrorist threats in #Afghanistan. 81/n
Q54: Are we confident that the #Taliban have broken their alliance w/#alQaeda?
ASD H: I can address that in the closed session. 82/n
Q55: Do I have your pledge of support to efforts to speed up processing of Special Immigrant Visas?
ASD H: Yes, we will work w/the interagency to do this. 83/n
Q56: What are the capabilities of the #ANDSF to hold their own on the battlefield?
T1: I believe the #ANDSF can perform. They’re a capable fighting force. They have sound ground forces, air forces & #SOF. 84/n
Q57: In the absence of a peace agreement, is it the position of the administration to stand by the Afghan govt?
ASD H: Yes, that’s our position. Cont’d assistance to the #ANDSF is one aspect of that. #DOD envisions asking for cont’d funding for them. 85/n
Rep Smith closing: #DOD needs to move support to SiVs up its priority list. Everyone needs to recognize that the #Taliban were killing people in #Afghanistan before the US intervened, so the narrative that the US created this problem is false. 86/n
Rep Rogers closing: We heard lots of “we’re working on it” today. The stuff you’re working on should’ve been figured out a long time ago. Hope you have more details in the closed session. END. 87/87
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Very excited to post this report by my team @CNA_org from a congressionally-mandated study led by @Pamela_Faber on whether DOD policies & activities adequately account for the roles of #women & #gender in #terrorist groups.
For the study, the team researched & ID'd the roles of women & gender in terrorist groups; assessed whether current DOD counterterrorism (CT) & countering violence extremism (CVE) strategy, policy, & activities incorporate gender considerations; ... 2/n
... and identified gaps, risks & opportunities for DOD in the areas of strategy/policy/doctrine, training & education, operations & programs, and conceptual understanding. 3/n
The debate contained within these tweets is a critical one: the question of to what extent the #Taliban will try to seize Kabul by force—as opposed to using force in support of a political track—is one I see many people grappling with here. 1/n
My view is that the #Taliban will press the mil front in 2022 but in a calibrated way—ie, they won’t “empty the madrassas” in a Tet style offensive, but will likely cont surrounding & pressuring provincial capitals. If the opportunity presents to seize 1/more, they’ll take it 2/n
But they know they can’t win militarily so long as the AAF/Commandos are in tact & the #ANDSF doesn’t fracture—neither of which are likely to happen so long as US security assistance $$ continues at scale. I assess it will until at least 2024. 3/n
I’ve been asked a number of times the past couple of days what I think of @joebiden’s announcement to withdraw all US troops from #Afghanistan by September. I haven’t had the time to write a proper op ed, so instead I’ll give you my thoughts in this THREAD. 1/n
My top-line take is this: What choice did @joebiden really have? If you examine his situation through the lenses of #Afghanistan, terrorism risk, credibility, domestic politics, & global US priorities, you’ll see the answer is “he had to do it.” 2/n
Let’s start w/#Afghanistan. Recognize first that the US isn’t in South Asia! We were always visiting, which means at some point, we would leave. Only Q has been when that would happen. That Q was answered in the US-#Taliban Agreement: We would leave by 1 May. 3/n
Some key points of @JoeBiden's speech on #Afghanistan withdrawal in this THREAD. 1/n
- Only Afghans have the right & responsibility to lead their country
- War & endless US mil force could not create or sustain a durable Afghan govt
- We brought bin Laden to justice 10 yrs ago…our reasons for staying in #Afghanistan have since become increasingly unclear 2/n
- Terrorism threat has metastasized around the globe…makes little sense to keep thousands of troops in one place
- We can’t keep deploying troops to #Afghanistan hoping for the right conditions for withdrawal & expecting a different result 3/n
Lately I’ve had a bunch of people coming at me to say that I’m wrong about various things pertaining to #Afghanistan. So, a brief THREAD about being wrong. 1/n
I *wish* I was wrong about the things I write here & elsewhere about #Afghanistan. I *wish* the Afghan govt wasn’t a kleptocracy. I *wish* the #ANDSF weren’t failing operationally & institutionally. I *wish* the #Taliban weren’t ascendant. I *wish* the US was good at COIN. 2/n
Tonight, in my @ElliottSchoolGW class on military power & effectiveness, we discussed @RyanBaker51's excellent thesis on the relationship between logistics & military power. One of the interesting aspects he identifies is the notion of "log sufficiency." 1/n
An implication of which is: if you give more things (vehicles, etc.) to a log-*sufficient* force, it will make that force better. BUT, if you give more things to a log-*deficient* force, it'll make that force worse--b/c the force now has even more things that it can't sustain 2/n
An example of a log-*deficient* force is #Afghanistan's Army. As I discuss in this @CTCWP Sentinel paper (& as DOD has admitted for years in its assessments), the ANA (& #ANDSF broadly) cannot logistically maintain or sustain its forces independently. 3/n