I’ve gotten a lot of questions recently about how the #ANDSF might fare after the US withdraws from #Afghanistan. I’m going to put some thoughts on that in this THREAD. 1/n
First, a recap, as I’ve written about this before. In JAN, I published this net assessment of the #ANDSF vs the #Taliban, in which I concluded the latter would have a slight military advantage after US advisors left. 2/n ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-s…
That conclusion was largely due to the #Taliban’s advantages of cohesion & financial self-sustainability, & not being as numerically outnumbered as most people think. But I acknowledged some key #ANDSF advantages, the most notable of which is air power. 3/n
That assessment, combined w/#Afghanistan’s current govt starting the post-withdrawal period in a better mil pos’n than Najibullah had + considerations of what it would take for the #Taliban to militarily overthrow the govt, led me to conclude in this @Diplomat_APAC article... 4/n
...that if @ashrafghani’s govt failed, that failure would come politically, not militarily.
But as I’ve told those who have asked, my conclusion that the #ANDSF could likely prevent a full #Taliban takeover by force is predicated on three caveats. 5/n
First, that US $ keeps flowing to the #ANDSF. @POTUS’s FY22 budget request included slightly more $ for the #Afghanistan Security Forces Fund than FY21, which means Congress will prob fund about the same amount. That $ is good through FY24. So, I’m not worried about this one. 6/n
2nd, that the #ANDSF (esp the ANP) don’t just melt away. We’ve seen this happen before, w/reasons cited as lack of pay, corrupt leaders, lack of food/ammo, etc. We’ve seen recent notable instances of this around Kandahar, in Helmand + other areas. I worry about this somewhat. 7/n
3rd, that the #ANDSF won’t be able to get adequate contractor support for logistics, maintenance & asset management. The US did #Afghanistan no favors by building a security force wholly reliant on contractors, but so it is. 8/n
It’s been pretty clear from @PentagonPresSec’s twice-weekly grilling on #Afghanistan that #DOD hasn’t had a good plan to deal w/this. But then came this revelation by AMB (ret.) Neumann yesterday 👇 9/n
That’s not particularly surprising, given the US-#Taliban Agreement requires all US non-diplomatic contractors to leave the country. But what’s distressing is this + the speed of the US withdrawal (~40% completed in 1 month according to @CENTCOM) + no clear plan to backfill. 10/n
The implications of a failure to sufficiently backfill those contractors is well described by @dandeluce in @NBCNews today: effectively, an Afghan Air Force w/rapidly degrading capabilities & an Afghan Army w/rapidly degrading mobility & log support. 11/n nbcnews.com/politics/natio…
To those who disagree w/this, the AAF assessment comes straight from @ResoluteSupport advisors (via @SIGARHQ) & that for the ANA is empirically grounded in the plummeting vehicle readiness rates that accompanied the few times the US tried to cut back contract support. 12/n
All of which is to say, while I still assess that the #ANDSF could stave off the military overthrow of #Afghanistan’s govt in the immediate term, I am getting increasingly worried about the veracity of that assessment based on concerns about the 3rd caveat above. 13/n
(And this is before even taking into account other concerning reports such as this @NPR article by @diaahadid suggesting the #Taliban are purchasing Russian-made SAMs now) 14/n npr.org/2021/06/05/100…
All of which is to say, the US & Afghan govts need to get this contract support issue figured out & *quickly*. Failure to do so will not only negate my 3rd caveat but likely my 2nd as well (via domino effects). Systemic collapse of the #ANDSF then becomes a real possibility. 15/n
Here’s hoping this was at the top of the list of agenda items for the US interagency team that was led by @US4AfghanPeace in Kabul today—it’s not an understatement to call this a topic of crisis at the moment. 16/16
Q: Considering that @CENTCOM is saying they're not going to provide % any longer on #Afghanistan troop & equip withdrawal, I was wondering if there's any progress on getting us either DLA or some type of briefing on some of the things that can be discussed about the w/drawal? 2/n
And my second Q is has @SecDef had any discussions with #Turkey about security at the airport in #Afghanistan and do you see negotiations progressing on that issue? 3/n
ICYMI, last week I published an article with @Diplomat_APAC titled “Will #Afghanistan Collapse When the US Withdraws?” Since the article is behind a paywall, I’ll summarize some of my main points in this THREAD. 1/n
For the article, I was asked to explore what might happen in #Afghanistan in the year after the US withdraws. To do so, I found it instructive to revisit the years immediately following the Soviet withdrawal & to compare/contrast to the situation today. 2/n
I’ve seen people making superficial comparisons of these two eras to predict impending doom, but a detailed comparison reveals both striking similarities and distinct differences between the two, which should inform our thinking about the future of #Afghanistan. 3/n
Q: Gen Milley has recently mentioned that securing Kabul Airport will be essential for keeping embassy presence not just for the US but for other countries after the withdrawal is completed & that there could be an int'l force assembled to do that... 2/n
...I wondered whether @SecDef agrees w/this & whether he's been talking to @NATO partners or others about organizing such a force.
MR. KIRBY: Certainly the secdef recognizes the key hub that is the airport there in Kabul & the impact that will have... 3/n
.@SecDef spoke w/#Pakistan's COAS, Gen Bajwa, to discuss shared regional interests & objs. During the call, the sec reiterated his appreciation for PAK's spt for the #Afghanistan peace negotiations & expressed his desire to cont to build on the US-PAK bilateral relationship 2/n
Q: Getting back to #Pakistan, its Foreign Ministry put out a statement today ruling out the possibility of any US mil bases for the post-withdrawal from #Afghanistan#counterterrorism effort. Is there anything that the US is looking for right now from PAK... 3/n
Q: In @US4AfghanPeace's testimony today, he said that the withdrawal is proceeding w/o any sig interference from the #Taliban & that he expects that to cont to be the case. You said you assumed there would be attempts by the TB to interfere. Have you changed your assessment? 2/n
MR. KIRBY: We would agree that thus far, the retrograde continues at pace, the withdrawal continues at pace with nothing more than some minor harassing attacks that have had no impact, so we agree w/that assessment. We certainly hope that that remains the case, going forward. 3/n
I attended #SOFIC today, at which GEN Rich Clarke, the commander of @USSOCOM spoke. My notes from his speech (paraphrases, not quotes unless specified) are in this THREAD. 1/n
- #COVID19 has impacted @USSOCOM's operating culture—caused #SOF to look at where they need to be, how they interact, etc
- The withdrawal from #Afghanistan will bring changes. SOF were first ones in, will be the last ones out. Will spark a new era of opportunity for SOF. 2/n
- #SOF today are almost unrecognizable from SOF that invaded #Afghanistan in 2001. 20 years of the necessity of combat has been the mother of all inventions. SOF have had urgent warfighting needs for 20 years, and will continue to have these going forward. 3/n