Thread by @DinoMahtani

1/ A thread with links to reports and other media relating to a panel hosted today by @CrisisGroup and the @mailandguardian, where we will be discussing how to prevent a new jihadist front in #Mozambique.
When: today at 15.00 CEST/SAST
Register bit.ly/3gsVW8G

2/ Fears are mounting that Mozambique's northern province of #CaboDelgado could become the next frontier for prolonged jihadist rebellion on the continent. @CrisisGroup has just published a report on this, available here:

bit.ly/3xtX6ry

3/ Violence involving militants calling themselves "al-Shabab" (not #Somalia's Al-Shabaab) and government forces has spiked since a small group of attackers fired first shots in 2017. When they attacked the town of Palma in March 2021, militants came in their hundreds. See maps:

4/ About 3000 people have died and the number of displaced people has risen steeply, with some 750,000 fleeing their homes in total. That is about a third of the population of the province. Half the province, itself the size of Austria, has been affected by conflict. See map:

5/ Islamic State (#ISIS) says that it is now backing the insurrection. As you can see from this table prepared by @Ex_Trac, ISIS celebrated dozens of al-Shabab attacks since mid-June 2019. However ISIS said nothing between October 2020 and March 2021 despite ongoing attacks.

6/ That makes us wonder how strong the communication channels are between ISIS and al-Shabab. In general, we think that ISIS does not have much sway with al-Shabab for now. For more, see a Q&A we did on the US designation of the group as "ISIS-Mozambique". bit.ly/3wB1Qvc

7/ This is not to say that Cabo Delgado couldn't one day become a frontier for the next ISIS-backed rebellion in #Africa, like those in #Nigeria or the #Sahel (follow @ICG_Sahel account). For more on how ISIS tunnels in see this piece by @VincentFoucher: bit.ly/35sIpZA

8/ However, for the most part, the instability on the ground in Mozambique is a result of local grievances gone bad, which have been taken advantage of by jihadists from #Tanzania who have plugged into the insurrection and taken leadership positions within it.

9/ Mozambique can't do much about the Tanzanians on its own, but it can deal with the grievances of the local Mozambican militants, who often join and stay with al-Shabab because of the material benefits they gain from doing so.

10/ I summarise this briefly in this video

https://twitter.com/CrisisGroup/status/1403824428597878784?s=20

11/ While the government should prepare a robust security response - after all, al-Shabab militants are violent and predatory - it should however be measured. Officials admit the government can't defeat this group, but what it can do is pressure its rank and file to surrender.

12/ The government should then also use around $1 billion in donor funds that are being prepared to redevelop local communities in the province, and in doing so soothe local tensions and develop back channels to negotiate more surrenders of militants.

13/ How that would work is contingent on the relationship between civilians and militants. I go into some depth on that in episode 38 of Hold Your Fire, the @CrisisGroup podcast. crisisgroup.org/hold-your-fire…

14/ Military operations and dialogue with militants that are dovetailed with each other can impact on this very serious crisis. We think international partners should assist Mozambique redevelop its weak security forces rather than opt for a heavy deployment of regional forces.

15/ That said, Southern and East Africa (@SADC_News and @igadsecretariat) should have a role to play in stopping transnational jihadists tunnelling in. Member states should work with Mozambique and Tanzania to share intelligence and police this law enforcement problem.

16/ I've tried to summarise our analysis and policy lines on this thread, but please do read our report for more detail. I'm posting it again here. bit.ly/3xtX6ry

And for those who missed the @CrisisGroup and @mailandguardian event here is the YouTube recorded link where we unpack many more issues related to #Mozambique’s #CaboDelgado crisis.