1. #Russia now still controlls less or not much more than 20% of #Ukrainian territory. When, in 2008, Russia captured 20% of #Georgia's territory, no economic sanctions whatsoever were applied. Instead, Russian-Western relations IMPROVED after Russia's 5-day war and occupation.
2. As Medvedev's short speech at the public Russian Security Council meeting last week indicated, the Kremlin's decision to officially invade Ukraine was based on Russia's 2008 experience as well as subsequent developments, & on an assumption of consistency in Western behaviour.
3. The 2014 #sanctions imposed for the annexation of #Crimea & intervention in #Donbas have been mild & manageable for Russia. The most significant EU sanctions adopted on 29 July 2014 were an obvious response to #Russia's downing of #MH17 rather than invasion of #Ukraine itself.
4. Had the Kremlin assumed in advance that the now adopted Western "monster sanctions" are likely, its strategic planning may well have been different. The aim of regime survival would have trumped any other goals. Yet, now massive sanctions are approved & will kick in soon.
5. Sticking to and implementing into practice the West’s proclaimed principles in its reaction to aggressive #Russian foreign behaviour in 2008 and 2014 would have not only been more ethical. It would have also been clearer to & more useful for all sides - including the #Kremlin.
NEW APPROACH NEEDED 1. Russia's is now massively targeting civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. It is engaged in military operations in the vicinity of nuclear materials locations, e.g. near the defunct #Chornobyl_NPP and operational #Zaporizhzhia_NPP with its six active reactors.
2. New developments of the last 24 hours mean that the nature of the war is evolving & that the stakes for the West are increasing. Momentous changes on the ground call for congruent changes in the West's approaches to, & policies towards, Russia and Ukraine in at least two ways.
3. First, in view of Russia's now explicitly terroristic war conduct vis-a-vis the civilian population, limiting arms deliveries for Ukraine to only defensive weapons is neither ethically nor strategically justifiable any more. The Kremlin wants to reach its aim via open terror.
Lots of reporting by journalists full of empathy for #Ukraine. Yet, some hard Western national interest issues remain under the radar screen: 1. Europe's largest #NuclearPowerPlant at Zaporizhzhia in South-East Ukraine is now very close to the combat zone. forbes.com/sites/craighoo…
2. Its six reactors provide electricity for large parts of Ukraine, and cannot be switched off. They need a functioning personnel support and infrastructure. Otherwise their operation becomes risky.
3. #Ukraine has ca. 40 million inhabitants. If electricity, heating, water supply, etc. stop working, those who can will run westwards. How exactly is the EU going to distribute and deal with millions of such #refugees?
1. Putin claims to be "denazifying" a country that has a president with a Jewish family background. In 2019, the Russian-speaking Ukrainian Jew Zelenskyy won free elections with a result of 73%. tass.com/politics/14091…
2. He replaced a non-Jewish incumbent who suffered, from a Jewish challenger, the worst defeat of a presidential candidate in Ukrainian history. Ukraine's united far right gained 2.15% in the 2019 parliamenrary elections.
3. Hundreds of Western "antifascist" journalists and even some scholars have helped Putin since 2014 with their alarmist statements warning about the surprisingly weak Ukrainian far right.
RUSSIA'S EXPANSION 1. While most analysts see primarily a crime, I see primarily an error in Putin’s recognition of the two Russia-created East Ukrainian pseudo-states. This and the entry of regular Russian troops into the occupied territory are doubtlessly criminal & worrisome.
2. Yet, the East Ukrainian reality on the ground has so far not changed much with this "illegal legal" act and additional military presence. Instead, the larger political constellation of the conflict is arguably shifting to #Russia's disadvantage.
1. Western politicians have not yet understood that they need to find adequate answers to an escalation of not only & not so much Russian traditional warfare, but also of Moscow's already intense hybrid war (economic, cyber, etc.) against #Ukraine, e.g.: researchgate.net/publication/29…
2. The Ukrainian state can collapse not only following a large Russian armed invasion, but also as a result of its continued subversion, destabilization & sabotage. Putin may choose the second option in order to avoid Western "monster sanctions" while achieving the same effects.
3. The repercussion for the EU of a Ukrainian collapse as a result of Russian hybrid warfare could be similar to those of an "ordinary" military offensive. The Kremlin primarily wants a destruction of rather than necessarily a war against a pro-Western Ukrainian state.
My five kopecks on the current "correlation of forces" here in #Ukraine, building on @jhzachau's and my rough scenarios outline for the @SCEEUS_UI@UISweden below: 1. It is now increasingly likely that some kind of #Russian escalation will happen. ui.se/forskning/cent…
2. This could, for instance, aim to bring the borders of the so-called "people's republics" in the #Donbas in line with their "constitutions" which claim that the entire #Donetsk and #Luhansk#oblasts belong to these pseudo-states.
3. Intensified shelling by the “republics” of government-controlled locations as well as an array of non-kinetic attacks on #Ukraine have already begun. kyivindependent.com/national/over-…