One of the issues in the provisional measures hearings in #Ukraine v #Russia this week is how the parties and the #ICJ deal with the requirement of plausibility of rights. Ultimately, I do not think this should pose a barrier to the ICJ indicating some form of measures. 1/11
Recall that #Ukraine is asking the #ICJ in the main case to find that Ukraine itself has not committed any acts of genocide, contrary to Russia’s accusations. This type of request is novel at the ICJ. 2/11
Even in ‘non-violation’ cases such as US Nationals in Morocco or the Lockerbie cases, the applicant was still asking the ICJ to declare that the applicant’s own actions/decisions were in accord with its international legal obligations. 3/11
No matter. The novelty of #Ukraine’s claim doesn’t change the fact that Ukraine has identified a dispute w/Russia (that is, about whether Ukraine has committed acts of genocide) falling within #GenocideConvention Art IX. 4/11
But under ICJ Statute Art 41, provisional measures may be indicated ‘to preserve the respective rights of either party’. What are the rights at issue in the case, arising from the Genocide Convention, that face irreparable harm and for which #Ukraine seeks urgent relief? 5/11
#Ukraine refers to a right ‘not to be subjected to a false claim of genocide, and not to be subjected to another State’s military operations on its territory’ in 'brazen abuse' of Article I. This has intuitive appeal but these are not express rights granted by the treaty. 6/11
However, the flipside of that description of #Ukraine’s rights is that #Russia’s Art I obligation to prevent & punish genocide must be carried out in good faith, including by the means provided for by the treaty (recourse to UN organs, art XIII, or to the ICJ, art IX). 7/11
#Russia’s obligation to fulfil Article I in good faith is an obligation owed to all contracting parties, including #Ukraine (which is also specially affected here). In other words, Ukraine has a right to see Russia act in accordance with Article I in good faith. 8/11
In my view this right meets the plausibility threshold, and the measures requested are directly linked to preventing further irreparable harm (death & destruction) flowing from #Russia’s alleged failure to have respected that right. 9/11
Finally, I note that the #ICJ sometime shows flexibility on PM requests in situations involving genuine risk of loss of life, even where that risk is linked only indirectly to the underlying legal dispute. Consider the 2011 order in the Preah Vihear interpretation case. 10/11
What this means is that even if the risk of irreparable harm in #Ukraine v #Russia is linked only indirectly to the underlying legal question, the gravity of the potential harm may be enough to soften the ‘plausibility’ and ‘link’ requirements. END #UkraineRussianWar#ICJ
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
As expected, the UN Human Rights Council (@UN_HRC) has established an international commission of inquiry for #Ukraine. The structure & mandate of the new body combines aspects typical of commissions of inquiry with elements of the new ‘investigatory mechanism’ model. #HRC49 1/11
By that I mean that the #Ukraine COI has a typical structure (a three-member panel) and a typical mandate: to investigate all violations and abuses of IHRL & IHL, to examine factual circumstances and the root causes of violations, and to recommend accountability measures. 2/11
But it also has elements of an ‘investigatory mechanism’ mandate: to collect, preserve, and analyse evidence with a view to supporting future criminal trials at domestic or international level (akin to the existing IIIM (Syria), IIMM (Myanmar) and @UNITAD_Iraq). 3/11
Well that didn't take long. After #Armenia initiated an #ICJ case against #Azerbaijan last week re #CERD violations, Azerbaijan said it would respond in kind. Yesterday, Azerbaijan filed its own case against Armenia, also under the CERD and also seeking provisional measures. 1/35
Since I summarized #Armenia’s claims last week, it seems only fair to provide an overview of #Azerbaijan’s claims now. Another #CERD case, another long thread from me (sorry). 2/35
Azerbaijan’s application attributes a “policy of ethnic cleansing and systematic violations of CERD” to Armenia—namely, discrimination based on national or ethnic origin aimed at achieving a mono-ethnic state. 3/35
We finally have the long-awaited decision in #TheGambia’s lawsuit in US federal court against #Facebook seeking disclosure of material for use in its pending case against #Myanmar at the #ICJ (alleging genocide against the #Rohingya). Here's an overview. 1/30
In brief, the federal magistrate judge handling this matter rejected #Facebook’s statutory & policy arguments and granted an order compelling Facebook to produce to #TheGambia the bulk of the material requested, but denying its request to depose a Facebook representative. 2/30
I previously tweeted about the party arguments in this litigation last year when the parties were filing their briefs. Those summaries can be found here:
An overview (w/some preliminary observations) of the new #ICJ case by #Armenia against #Azerbaijan based on alleged violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (#CERD). This is the fourth CERD-based case at the ICJ since 2008. 1/20
#Armenia alleges that #Azerbaijan has subjected individuals of Armenian ethnic/national origin to racial discrimination for decades and fosters hatred towards Armenians as a matter of state policy. (Both parties acceded to the CERD in the 1990s.) 2/20
Armenia further alleges systemic discrimination, mass killings, and torture directed at ethnic Armenians by Azerbaijan, and specifically alleges grave CERD violations during the 2020 armed conflict re #NagarnoKarabakh 3/20
The #ICJ has named the four experts that it has commissioned to produce a report on #DRC’s damages claims in the #ArmedActivities case. I previously discussed the decision to seek this opinion. Now we have the list of names, which is very interesting. 1/14 icj-cij.org/public/files/c…
Recall that the expert opinion is supposed to address three heads of damages sought by the #DRC from #Uganda: (i) civilian deaths and compensation due; (ii) quantity and valuation of natural resources plundered; and (iii) scale and cost of property damage. 2/14
Questions have been raised within and beyond the Court about whether the task assigned to the experts amounts to derogation of the judicial function, unduly assists the DRC, or represents a prudent move on the Court's part to seek technical expertise in pursuit of justice. 3/14
Recall that in its 2005(!) judgment, the Court found that Uganda bore responsibility for unlawful use of force, unlawful intervention, atrocities inflicted upon the Congolese that violated IHRL and IHL, and the unlawful exploitation of natural resources. #ArmedActivities 2/19
For its part, the DRC bore responsibility for attacks on Ugandan diplomatic premises and personnel and for other conduct in breach of #VCDR obligations (but this will not be the subject of the expert opinion). 3/19