As expected, the UN Human Rights Council (@UN_HRC) has established an international commission of inquiry for #Ukraine. The structure & mandate of the new body combines aspects typical of commissions of inquiry with elements of the new ‘investigatory mechanism’ model. #HRC49 1/11
By that I mean that the #Ukraine COI has a typical structure (a three-member panel) and a typical mandate: to investigate all violations and abuses of IHRL & IHL, to examine factual circumstances and the root causes of violations, and to recommend accountability measures. 2/11
But it also has elements of an ‘investigatory mechanism’ mandate: to collect, preserve, and analyse evidence with a view to supporting future criminal trials at domestic or international level (akin to the existing IIIM (Syria), IIMM (Myanmar) and @UNITAD_Iraq). 3/11
Whether these overlapping functions should be combined in one inquiry body for #Ukraine is a fair question. COIs are a form of public diplomacy, their work is high profile, and they can focus on facts/violations not necessarily covered by int’l criminal law. 4/11
By contrast, investigative mechanisms have different priorities & many details of their work may need to be confidential. Unlike COIs, they are not necessarily trying to establish an authoritative factual narrative or acting as a policy advisor to states and int'l orgs. 5/11
There are also big differences between COIs and IMs in terms of budgetary needs and staffing. Arguably, an IM may have concerns about ‘chain of custody’ and other evidentiary standards that exceed what a ‘normal’ COI will be concerned with. 6/11
Some people may also question whether all of this feels premature. How will a COI help the situation on-the-ground right now? Why put resources into this rather than directly funding #Ukraine’s defenses against the on-going aggression by #Russia? 7/11
These are fair questions. One argument is that accountability mechanisms are not only about obtaining results at some uncertain & distant future time. They're also part of a broader effort to delegitimize the regime in Moscow, right now, and to reinforce a rules-based world. 8/11
Finally, just a reminder that there already is a fact-finding/monitoring body in Ukraine: the #OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (@OSCE_SMM) which has operated since 2014 but is currently attempting to evacuate (osce.org/special-monito…). 9/11
The @OSCE_SMM (with a very large staff drawn from many OSCE nations) has had a very different type of mandate since 2014: to gather info and report on facts relating to on-going security issues throughout #Ukraine, with the goal of reducing tension & facilitating dialogue. 10/11
Those types of goals are hardly feasible under current circumstances, but it bears asking how the @OSCE_SMM (with all of its experience and local knowledge) might also play a role going forward (alongside the COI) in terms of documenting violations & promoting a resolution. 11/11
I should add that there is also the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), which has also operated since 2014. Its future role in combination with the COI should also be considered. 12/11 ohchr.org/EN/Countries/E…
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One of the issues in the provisional measures hearings in #Ukraine v #Russia this week is how the parties and the #ICJ deal with the requirement of plausibility of rights. Ultimately, I do not think this should pose a barrier to the ICJ indicating some form of measures. 1/11
Recall that #Ukraine is asking the #ICJ in the main case to find that Ukraine itself has not committed any acts of genocide, contrary to Russia’s accusations. This type of request is novel at the ICJ. 2/11
Even in ‘non-violation’ cases such as US Nationals in Morocco or the Lockerbie cases, the applicant was still asking the ICJ to declare that the applicant’s own actions/decisions were in accord with its international legal obligations. 3/11
Well that didn't take long. After #Armenia initiated an #ICJ case against #Azerbaijan last week re #CERD violations, Azerbaijan said it would respond in kind. Yesterday, Azerbaijan filed its own case against Armenia, also under the CERD and also seeking provisional measures. 1/35
Since I summarized #Armenia’s claims last week, it seems only fair to provide an overview of #Azerbaijan’s claims now. Another #CERD case, another long thread from me (sorry). 2/35
Azerbaijan’s application attributes a “policy of ethnic cleansing and systematic violations of CERD” to Armenia—namely, discrimination based on national or ethnic origin aimed at achieving a mono-ethnic state. 3/35
We finally have the long-awaited decision in #TheGambia’s lawsuit in US federal court against #Facebook seeking disclosure of material for use in its pending case against #Myanmar at the #ICJ (alleging genocide against the #Rohingya). Here's an overview. 1/30
In brief, the federal magistrate judge handling this matter rejected #Facebook’s statutory & policy arguments and granted an order compelling Facebook to produce to #TheGambia the bulk of the material requested, but denying its request to depose a Facebook representative. 2/30
I previously tweeted about the party arguments in this litigation last year when the parties were filing their briefs. Those summaries can be found here:
An overview (w/some preliminary observations) of the new #ICJ case by #Armenia against #Azerbaijan based on alleged violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (#CERD). This is the fourth CERD-based case at the ICJ since 2008. 1/20
#Armenia alleges that #Azerbaijan has subjected individuals of Armenian ethnic/national origin to racial discrimination for decades and fosters hatred towards Armenians as a matter of state policy. (Both parties acceded to the CERD in the 1990s.) 2/20
Armenia further alleges systemic discrimination, mass killings, and torture directed at ethnic Armenians by Azerbaijan, and specifically alleges grave CERD violations during the 2020 armed conflict re #NagarnoKarabakh 3/20
The #ICJ has named the four experts that it has commissioned to produce a report on #DRC’s damages claims in the #ArmedActivities case. I previously discussed the decision to seek this opinion. Now we have the list of names, which is very interesting. 1/14 icj-cij.org/public/files/c…
Recall that the expert opinion is supposed to address three heads of damages sought by the #DRC from #Uganda: (i) civilian deaths and compensation due; (ii) quantity and valuation of natural resources plundered; and (iii) scale and cost of property damage. 2/14
Questions have been raised within and beyond the Court about whether the task assigned to the experts amounts to derogation of the judicial function, unduly assists the DRC, or represents a prudent move on the Court's part to seek technical expertise in pursuit of justice. 3/14
Recall that in its 2005(!) judgment, the Court found that Uganda bore responsibility for unlawful use of force, unlawful intervention, atrocities inflicted upon the Congolese that violated IHRL and IHL, and the unlawful exploitation of natural resources. #ArmedActivities 2/19
For its part, the DRC bore responsibility for attacks on Ugandan diplomatic premises and personnel and for other conduct in breach of #VCDR obligations (but this will not be the subject of the expert opinion). 3/19