Pro-#Russia voices started by outright denying it, but by the end of the day, guided by strategic disinformation from the #Kremlin, they were blaming it on #Ukraine.
2. Initially, proponents of the invasion said it was all a lie, citing a clip of the mayor of #Bucha purportedly celebrating the liberation of the town days earlier but not mentioning any massacres.
3. Then, the preferred framing shifted to one that blamed the deaths on #Ukraine artillery fire.
The "supporting evidence" for this claim was a clip of a purported #UKR soldier talking about indiscriminate mortar fire against #RUS positions in the southeast a few weeks ago.
4. When it became clear that people had been executed, not “just” killed by artillery, the framing morphed again—now it was all about staging.
This was pinned to a single clip in which Russian activists claimed corpses could be seen “moving” and were the "wrong colour.”
5. Eventually, it became impossible to keep the "staging" narrative up as more images and clips streamed out.
At that point, the #Kremlin's preferred framing shifted to the idea that #Bucha was a "false flag" and, accordingly, a "#Ukrainian war crime."
6. There are two variants of this narrative building off just three bits of "evidence":
- First, that #UKR forces were overzealous and indiscriminate when pushing the #Russia|ns out.
- Second, that they were genocidally "cleansing" #Bucha of supporters of the Russian war.
7. This is just one vivid example of how the #Kremlin and its supporters are now navigating through the #Ukraine information space.
The subject matter varies, but it’s this same formula of selective framing and audacious disinfo that we’re seeing repeat time and again.
8. Interestingly, pro-#Kremlin feeds are remarkably devoid of any images from #Bucha that are being circulated by parties other than #Russia|n state media.
#Moscow's supporters appear to be completely siloed, cut off from anything other than their own misinformation.
9. For more information on the work we’re doing at @Ex_Trac, visit extrac.io and sign up.
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1. This week’s issue of al-Naba’, which was published last night, took #IS's campaign to legitimise its new leader in a new, quite surprising direction.
Directly comparing the legacy of #IS's 'caliphs' with that of the Rashidun caliphs, it pushed back on criticism—seemingly from within #IS's own circles—of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi and played down the strategic significance of his loss.
3. #IS also pushed back on criticism about how long it had taken it to confirm that Abu Ibrahim had been killed and replaced by Abul Hasan.
Per al-Naba’, everyone who needed to had pledged allegiance within less than 48 hours of the #Atmeh raid.
1. Earlier this month, we reported that #IS comms activity had fallen off a cliff in recent weeks.
In the last few days, the reason for that has become clear: its media team was putting everything into prepping for a global campaign drumming up support for the new caliph.
2. The campaign started on 10 March, when #IS published a statement from new spox Abu ‘Umar al-Muhajir declaring that Qurashi had died and been replaced by Qurashi 2.0.
This came after a week-on-week drop in comms that left #IS supporter activities at a historic low.
3. It wasn’t enough to just publish a statement. #IS needed to show that its new leader was credible.
Accordingly, in the days that followed, it published hundreds of photographs showing fighters from West Africa to Southeast Asia pledging allegiance to the new caliph.
1. Recent pronouncements from #Moscow about its ‘concerns’ around the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (#CBRN) weapons systems in #Ukraine are having a direct and sustained impact on the pro-#Russia information landscape.
2. @Ex_Trac data shows that #Moscow’s comms re #CBRN have been normalising it as ‘reasonable’ justification for war among pro-#Kremlin communities.
To track this, we visualised the frequency with which #CBRN-related terms have been referenced by pro-#Kremlin voices over 2021/22.
3. The regularity of posts including the word ‘биолаборатория’ (‘biolaboratory’) increased by a factor of more than four hundred after the #Kremlin’s claim it was targeting bioweapons facilities at the end of February.
1. #IS has started reporting attacks from #CaboDelgado again.
This follows a three-month pause in its comms from #Mozambique.
Specifically, in the last three days alone, it’s claimed 16 operations.
2. After the recapture of Mocimboa da Praia three months ago by #Mozambique, #Rwanda & #SouthAfrica (among others), #IS’s comms went dark.
However, its network there was far from inactive, as these latest data, combined with what @ACLEDINFO has been reporting, indicate.
3. From a geographic perspective, #IS’s self-reported activities in recent months have been confined to the Mocimboa da Praia district of #CaboDelgado.
No attacks were reported from Palma, even though @ACLEDINFO data (displayed in yellow) suggests otherwise.