2. His #LDPR's victory, with 22.92% in the first post-Soviet multi-party parliamentary elections in December 1993, was an insufficient but necessary pre-condition for Moscow's military intervention in #Chechnya one year later. @russian_monitor@ElectionsCenter@russia_matters
1. Die Überschrift dieses Artikel hätte partiell für das semireguläre #AsowBatallion von 2014 gepasst. Es ist jedoch nicht mehr für das heutige reguläre Regiment der ukrainischen Nationalgarde geeignet. tagesanzeiger.ch/die-neonazis-d…
2. Im #AsowRegiment gibt es offenbar etliche #rechtsextrem eingestellte Soldaten. Sein Bestand und seine Natur kann jedoch nicht insgesamt als "#ultrarechts" klassifiziert werden.
3. Das AsowRegiment ist seit Ende 2014 keine politische, sondern eine militärische Einheit, dessen laute Militanz, martialischen Rituale und demonstrativer Bellizismus eher konkreten Gewalt-, Kampf-, Verlust- und Todeserfahrungen als faschistischen Ideen entspringen.
#NATO and the New World 1. Counterintuitively, conventional defense issues have become, since 24 February 2022, secondary to the national security of the countries of the North Atlantic alliance (with the exception of the Baltic republics and Poland). nato.int/cps/en/natohq/…
2. More urgent questions are now: What are the plans of NATO when its member states will face evermore millions of East European, Asian and African refugees fleeing from instability and hunger in their home countries, as a result of Russia's war?
1. One of the strange features of #German-#Russian relations during the last 20 years was the physical contact of German politicians with #Putin & Co. To be sure, similar photographs of #VladimirPutin hugging Berlusconi, Modi, Macron, & other non-German leaders exist too.
2. But the range of politicians on both sides who, over the years, went beyond diplomatic handshakes is surprising. One suspects continuation of a #KGB practice in these physical approaches from the Russian side. @RusVerstehen@deruforum@russlandRU@TerekMedia@Konflikt_Sicher
3. Yet one wonders why various German politicians, like Matthias Platzek below, would allow or even initiate such embarrassing scenes with representatives of an authoritarian regime. Political instinct & expert advice should have warned German politicians against such encounters.
2. Western audiences are fed stories about escalating human-rights violations by Kyiv. The internal war propaganda instead is informed by the idea of standing up against a Western and Ukrainian assault on Russian cultural traditionalism. @4freerussia_org@vneshpol@russia_matters
3. Here individual human rights are to be limited rather than defended. Whereas #Putin presents Ukraine with reference to Germany's Nazis who annihilated homosexuals, #PatriarchKirill sees #gayparades in #Ukraine as an issue demanding Moscow's military intervention in the Donbas.
Warum kein Embargo russischer Energie jetzt? 1. Die deutsche Begründung eines nur graduellen Ausstiegs aus russischen Gas- und Ölimporten ist widersprüchlich. Ein Embargo bereits heute könnte wahrscheinlich den Krieg schnell beenden. @Konflikt_Sicher@osteuropaverein@diegruenen