Thread by @TheStudyofWar

1/21 #Ukraine must regain certain specific areas currently under #Russian occupation to ensure its long-term security and economic viability.🧵
isw.pub/RusCampaignOct…

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1581815661302403072

2/21 #Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against a future #Russian attack requires liberating most of #Kherson and #Zaporizhia Oblasts. Ukraine’s economic health requires liberating the rest of Zaporizhia Oblast and much of #Donetsk and #Luhansk Oblasts.

3/21 #Ukraine has every right to fight to liberate all the territory #Russia has illegally seized, particularly in light of the continued atrocities and ethnic cleansing Russia is perpetrating in the areas it occupies.

4/21 However, #Ukraine also requires the liberation of the areas mentioned above for purely strategic military and economic reasons. ISW continues to assess that #Putin’s intentions are unlikely to change whether or not a ceasefire or some other settlement occurs.

5/21 The #Kremlin would use any suspension of hostilities to consolidate its gains and freeze the frontline in the best configuration #Putin can get to prepare for future coercion and aggression against #Ukraine.

6/21 Those seeking enduring peace in Ukraine must resist the temptation to freeze the lines of combat short of #Ukraine’s international borders in ways that set conditions for renewed conflict on #Russia’s terms.

7/21 If a ceasefire or any sort of agreement suspends fighting with the #Russians still in possession of their lodgment on the west bank of the #Dnipro River in #Kherson Oblast, the prospects for a renewed Russian offensive in southern #Ukraine would be vastly improved.

8/21 If #Ukraine regains control of the entire west bank of the river, on the other hand, the #Russians would likely find ground attacks against southwestern Ukraine extraordinarily difficult.

9/21 #Ukraine’s hold on its entire western Black Sea coast will remain tenuous as long as #Russia holds territory in southwestern #Kherson much further north than the 2014 lines.

10/21 Tracing defensible lines requires constantly referring to the roughly 25-km maximum effective range of the 152mm artillery system. Planners must assume that #Ukrainian positions within 25 km of #Russian lines may be subject to massive artillery barrages.

11/21 Sound military doctrine also teaches that one does not attempt to defend a position by standing on it—reliable defenses must be established well forward of the points or lines that must be held.

12/21 The #Dnipro River should not be #Ukraine’s first line of defense, but rather its last. Ukraine must therefore be able to establish and hold positions on the eastern bank of the river.

13/21 Consideration of key terrain in eastern #Kherson and western #Zaporizhia Oblasts must integrate security and economic concerns because of the location of the #Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) at #Enerhodar.

14/21 If the #Russians retain control of #Melitopol and the roads running south and east of it, they can and likely will turn it into a major militarized base from which to launch mechanized attacks across the largely flat steppe land to its north and west.

15/21 If #Ukraine regains control of #Melitopol, on the other hand, the #Russians would be confined to #Crimea and the narrow and vulnerable road and rail connections across the Perekop Isthmus that separates Crimea from the mainland.

16/21 The reconstruction of a viable #Ukrainian economy that does not require large amounts of long-term international financial assistance requires restoring the #Donbas economic region to #Kyiv’s control.

17/21 The military requirement for that restoration includes the #Ukrainian liberation of #Mariupol and the road and rail networks north via Volnovakha toward #Donetsk City and to the west toward #Melitopol and #Zaporizhia City.

18/21 Similar economic arguments hold for the historically industrial cities of #Donetsk, #Severodonetsk, and #Luhansk.

19/21 Allowing #Russia to retain control of these key junctions at Svatove, Starobilsk, and Bilovodsk and the road and rail networks on which they sit would give #Moscow a significant advantage in building up for a renewed invasion from the northeast.

20/21 The #Crimean Peninsula, finally, is strategically important for #NATO as well as #Ukraine.

21/21 If #Ukraine is to emerge from this war able to defend itself against a future #Russian attack and with a viable economy that does not rely on long-term international financial support, it must liberate almost all its territory.
isw.pub/RusCampaignOct…