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Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
@ArveloaMert
Jan 6, 2023 • 109 tweets • 79 min read • Read on X
This is the new and second thread 🧵 for the Strategic Assessment of #Ukraine's Winter Counter-Offensive that started after the liberation of Kherson from #Russia's invasion. This is the third thread on overall strategic assessment of war. Image
1) Please take a look for understanding how a counter-offensive should be conducted, what are the goals and requirements and for the events that occured between September to November.
2) You can take a look to this thread for the first part of the Ukrainian Winter Counter Offensive which includes the situation and events between November to January.
3) For other threads on the Russo-Ukrainian War, you can navigate through this thread;
4) Fighting continues around the forests of #Kreminna. Forests provide cover to infantry so both sides have problems with artillery fire correction. Increased risks of ambushes and snipers are important to underline. As temperatures will fell soon the equipments will be decisive
5) As the battle for #Kreminna goes as a warfare in a wood (not a jungle be sure), we have to take a close look to it. Forest warfare generally favours the defensive side. But in forests both sides were blind. It needs special equipments like oversighting drones and night visions Image
6) Reconing and being familiar with the forest could mean everything. For example, Clausewitz underlined that if someone masters the wood area it could found better short-cuts to strike enemy positions. #Ukraine choose the wood because it knows that Russian reconing is weak. Image
7) Weather and environment conditions could be more unexpected in the woods with frequent fogs caused by moisture and day-night temperatures. This is why the one with better winter and vision equipment will win this battle. #Ukraine slightly has better equipment. Image
8) Another issue is logistics. Forests are hard to enter and cross via armoured vehicles as roads are outnumbered or have lesser availability. This creates risks for mining and ambushes as Russia suffered around Chernihiv. But an ability to cross wood could create a shock. Image
9) Possible freeze of ground could ease the Ukrainian movement. But remember that there is rumors that #Russia is also preparing for an offensive in Luhansk. Ukraine want to use the wood as both offense and defense booster to avoid Russian fire power. Image
10) Lastly, forests need a command autonomy as high density of woods could cripple the comms and GPS. This means that a forest warfare commander should have enough creativity to find its way by his own through it and a resilience to save his men from possible ambushes and mines. Image
11) #Ukraine (and to some extent #Russia) tries to mitigate this familiarity problem in woods as it did across Dnipro and around Oskil River. Ukraine use SOFs and reconing teams to locate alternative paths in the woods that rest of the military can follow.
12) #Ukraine's Air Force started take more risks to relieve the defenders of #Bakhmut and #Soledar via air strikes. Arrival of the American Zuni air-to-surface missiles could provide UAF with more close air support and air to ground capacity.
13) The west has several problems with the number of ground vehicles that can launch missiles. #Ukraine's adaptivity plays such an important role as they adapted BUK to launch American-made Sea Sparrows and Migs+Mis to launch HARM and Zuni rockets.
14) #Soledar and its Salt Mine increasingly became disputed by #Russia from west and central axis but it is still under the control of #Ukraine. 🇺🇦 defence at there resembles Japanese General Kuribayashi’s defence in Iwo Jima. But it is slightly better as 🇺🇦 still have logistics. ImageImage
15) Increased non-violent partisan activity reported in #Donetsk and #Melitopol under psychological warfare of Yellow Ribbon Movement by #Ukraine. As Ukrainian Army is still away from both locations, moves have a motivation to disrupt #Russia by psyops.
16) Attempts to strengthen #Ukraine's civilian war resilience is continuing. Czechia, Japan and Germany donated high numbers of generators and heaters. While inflammable raid shelters positioned around #Kherson to protect local people.
17) Serious concerns about the situation around #Bakhmut and #Soledar as positions changed slightly #Ukraine needs a recalibration of positional defence. Indeed, 🇺🇦 soldiers are bravely defending both towns but there are serious doubt about reinforcements, hope it is not too late Image
18) Some discussions on social media goes on over #Ukraine’s withdrawal from #Soledar. Towns logistical connection is under dire threat. But Wagner has a will to turn the mines in both towns as underground fortresses while using their economic value.
euractiv.com/section/global…
19) From the very start, this was a battle of Wagner. It shows further grab of power by the group as it created a seperate strategy and operation, armed brigade and even after a possible took over, a seperate occupation administration. Withdrawal is a hard decision to take. Image
20) Curse of positional defence as #Soledar fell or become contested 🇷🇺 tried to achieve minimal gains around Krasna Hora and Pidhorodne. You can see how communication btw Bakhmut-Soledar came under stress. #Ukraine needs to double the efforts for Bakhmut.
21) It looks like #Soledar is contested rather than being fell. Wagner withdrew its forces from #Bakhmut to here and give the place for regular army’s mobilized. The prize, now, is not Bakhmut but the road between Siversk to Bakhmut. This is why #Ukraine tries to hold the town. Image
22) By controlling the exterior line of communication from #Soledar to Krasna Hora to Pidhorodne, #Wagner wants to threaten and achieve a fire control vs #Ukraine’s interior line of comm, the road of Slovyansk to Bakhmut. With this, they search a way to took the town bia a siege. Image
23) #Russia appointed CoS Gerasimov to an active duty as the head of SMO. His arrival will keep previous General Surovkin at bay. The move is closely related with #Wagner's success in #Soledar as Kremlin is concerned with Prigozhin's influence and autonomy
24) #Gerasimov's arrival to frontline could provide both pros and cons to #Ukraine. His arrival could made 🇷🇺 C2 aware of issues in the battlefield and deficiencies of mobilized. This could pave the way for a second mobilization while regular army could compete more with #Wagner. Image
25) His appointment drag this 'SMO' to more a 'all-out-war'. We could expect new fronts as this would be the last option for 🇷🇺 high command before the far-right and #Wagner seize the initiative. More clashes and overlapped authority in C2 is ahead, this is the pro for #Ukraine. Image
26) By appointing #Gerasimov, #Russia by-passed the operational command (intermediate between high and mission commands). Kremlin could possibly expect that integrating two commands could reduce miss+arbitrary command. But it would increase the frictions and priority differences. Image
27) #Russia reinforced #Kreminna and #Zaporizhia with VDV. Most of these regions were protected by vulnerable mobilized soldiers. Even their numbers were decreased since February, arrival of VDV is a boost. #Ukraine needs new announced weapons to be employed fast and right.
28) Crucial questions from @WarintheFuture. #Gerasimov couldn’t take strategic, operational and tactical burdens at once. Who and how they will command the daily issues in force and strategic forces? Also Mission Command never loves High Command within them as they want autonomy.
29) This map by War Mapper is what I had in my mind when we discussed #Soledar. #Ukraine could show additional resistance within the contested zone+mines. Holding Bakhmotvka River+TO513 with train station will give precious time and hit-and-run capacity.
30) Forced labour by prisoners in #Russia became a common practice for Uralvagonzavod who built tanks and armoured vehicles. Forced labour is indespensible part of a war. It show increased population stress on 🇷🇺 and stress of sanctions over the company after the war in #Ukraine.
31) #UK train Ukrainian soldiers with a conprehensive and lengthened style in huge numbers. Specialized winter training and CASEVAC trainings are invalueble for #Ukraine. UK has a highly good military training nature and soldiers combined with new weapons could make difference.
32) #Ukraine uses long-range deeper strike artillery and MLRS to prevent #Wagner's positioning within #Soledar. More firepower is the best answer to relieve this region and support the troops to hold the positions and to a some degree of counter-attack.
33) #Russia's #Wagner's tactics drew some interesting parallels with the Korean War. (Be aware having parallels did not mean it is same). Since the start of the attacks to #Bakhmut and #Soledar, use of human wave tactics voiced louder. But these tactics did not referred much. Image
34) Mao's human wave tactics were affiliated with the concept of protracted war. While Wagner has no means and legitimacy for such kind of protracted war. Lin Biao had four principles; high number of low quality infantry, a control over these command, a need for frontal assaults, Image
35) and use deep columns for small and coordinated attacks. These are not as it defined but instead with small numbers of soldiers who assault frontlines in repeating frequency. By this, attacking side wants to achieve small gains with creating exhaustion and logistical problems. Image
36) Different from the current conditions in #Ukraine, UN troops in the Korea had deficiencies in night vision and reconing. This push Chinese soldiers to exploit the night with superiority of local geography, while 🇺🇦 soldiers have these advantages, #Wagner again have problems. Image
37) In both day and night, Wagner tried to attack Ukrainian positions around Bakhmut, Krasna Hora, Bakhmutske and Soledar to find weaker points in the positional defence. While they found it in Bakhmutske and Soledar where they shifted their coordinated attacks over these towns. Image
38) While these tactics should be turned to a protracted war where #Wagner (I have some doubts as Wagner has economic gains from #Soledar and could left rest to regular army) have to move to threaten the logistics of Bakhmut while threaten the counter-offensives in #Kreminna. Image
39) #Wagner used a changed version of Lin Biao's 'One Point, Two Fronts' approach as 'One Point (Bakhmut), Many Fronts'. While Chinese gains in the Korean War was stalled by logistical and men power concerns similiar issues were also there for Wagner. What #Ukraine can do then? Image
40) UN Soldiers in Korea, retreated at night after the intense clashes while during the day they counter-attacked via use of air power. From here, #Ukraine should improve its reconing capacity to find possible Wagner intrusion points via commercial drones.
41) Shark UAVs could improve this. 🇺🇦 Command have to make a crucial self-assesment to locate possible weak points and supply them before Wagner locate them. All efforts should be focused upon protecting Bakhmut's GLOCs and it did not hamper 🇺🇦 other counter-offense efforts. Image
42) As a last point, MLRS and artillery strikes are important to counter those human wave tactics. But current level of drone tech is limited. Ukraine still needs augmented air power via fighter jets and CAS or at least immediate support of air-to-surface and high drop munitions. Image
43) Quantity remains as the opposite side of qualified approach (eyes operational success via less human loss) For #Wagner who have deficiencies in tech and men, continuing this approach is not easy. But current discussions in #Russia for a new mobilization is important to follow Image
44) These attacks and their devastation is horrible. But sadly supplying more ADs is not a solution. #Ukraine has a plenty number of ADs and 🇷🇺 'overwhelming missile' strategy is almost impossible to FULLY stop these as it was designed to overwhelm ADs.
45) #Ukraine's AD performance improved highly and more systems are on their way. Rather than focusing on more AD, Ukraine and its allies should create a response in the battlefield. These attacks should show #Germany that how much their concerns on battlefield balance is futile. Image
46) Rather than discussing ADs, we should emphasize that states who is reluctant to give weapons to #Ukraine, what holds you from donating fire trucks, ambulances and other emergency vehicles? Emergency services are heroes and they need and deserve more.
47) There are numerous states(which includes neutrals) but donating first aid kits is not enough. #Ukraine is an agrarian economy with dispersely populated rural towns and war is on-going in rural. Emergency services needs mobility. It is a human rights issue #RussianUkrainianWar Image
48) #UK gave 5 week long training to soldiers from #Ukraine. This includes a 'focus' on fighting in rural and woods. Fighting in woods require special training that we talked earlier, these groups could be decisive in the push for #Kreminna and #Svatove.
49) #Russia has huge post-Soviet stocks of ammunution which is hard to spent. The risk for 🇷🇺 is logistically deploy these stocks. #Ukraine’s focus on positional defence eased the pressure over 🇷🇺 GLoCs. So 🇺🇦 could not make any plan on assesing possible lack of ammunution in 🇷🇺.
50) This is why mobile and active 🇺🇦 force build-up and counter-attacks are so much important. 🇺🇦 should be armed to ensure its mobility via dispersed groups to bite Russian logistics. Current frontal defence gave relative luxory of logistics to #Russia from the land corridor. Image
51) Frontlines in #Ukraine is far from being like WWI. But I still believe main 'gravitational' front in #Bakhmut and #Soledar resembles WWI. But this is not a statelemate, now, Ukraine is in a renewed effort for force generation.
smh.com.au/world/europe/n…
52) In strategic terms there is still a window of opportunity for a victory of Ukraine or at least a pyhrric one for Russia. WWI's statelemate was caused by a huge parity in weapons, militaries and strategies. This war has much more flexible trench warfare
53) Hitler dictated similiar orders in Op. Barbossa. These orders are far from understanding the military situation at the battlefield as political will is different from practical outcome. Time-settled goals for a military which you did not directly command could cause troubles.
54) Sit. in #Bakhmut is stable but for #Soledar things became more problematic. 🇺🇦 needs to use high terrain to effectively deny #Wagner’s movements in town to limit its comfort. While Krasna Hora and Pidhorodne line is still stable, ensuring this needs trouble for 🇷🇺 in Soledar.
55) The importance of 'cautious optimism' is important in this context. Yes, #Russia has problems but it is clear that they silently improved their logistics around #Kherson and #Zaporizhya while #Ukraine focused on stabilizing Dombass.
56) Apart from concerns in new weapons production and menpower shortage, #Russia silently works on increasing the resilience of railroad logistics. Fortifications helped in this manner which increased #Ukraine's needs for disruptive longer range artillery to continue its strategy Image
57) With two valuable and isolated stations from 🇺🇦 strikes in Myrne and Sokolohirne, #Russia benefits with dispersed logistics which is vertical to the river. This vertical logistics reduce the 🇺🇦 SOF and artillery's ambush chances horizontal to the river
58) This footage shows how much reconing and artillery targeting is important even #Soledar has fallen to #Russia.
59) RIP for him&other victims of crash and big condolences to #Ukraine. MIA is an important institution for war efforts. Since the French Revolution, external securite and internal surete seemed as complementary for sustaining war efforts.
60) Mr. Monastyrsky and his colleagues did important job in organizing #Ukraine's emergency service responds, interior security&intel and developing early warning systems. Even it is a blow to #MIA, I believe in the institution's organizational culture to endure their activities. Image
61) On the reports of Pantsirs that positioned across #Moscow, it is hardly for any real military purpose. #Ukraine has no will to use long range weapons to the city. But a clear part of info war as 🇷🇺 state demonstrate a show of insecurity among 🇷🇺 people
62) Significant military contribution from #NATO to #Ukraine. These are good for breaking the balance in frontlines and for winning an operation. I hope the problem with Germany over Leopards will resolve real quick. But Kyiv still needs long-range strike.
63) #Bakhmut’s second exterior ground line of communication is, now, also under a risk. Ivanhrad and Krasna Hora constitutes key positions for the town. 🇷🇺 still recons for #Ukraine’s weak points and attack them via vicious human waves without support. Still a problem though.
64) While there are some claims over a possible Russian offensive towards #Zaporizhzia. Could be a sham info warfare tactic to prevent #Ukraine’s troop diversions to #Bakhmut. But it is not clear. It could be a 🇷🇺 risk before the arrival of new equipment to Kyiv.
65) Short but such an important intelligence report from 🇬🇧 MoD. This is what I called as cautious optimism. There is a problem and lean towards deadlock on the battlefield (and it is not related with weather). It is not unbreakable but we have to act now.
66) A good thread that show Russian fortifications. I witness increasing discussions on #Russia's fortification attempts in #Ukraine with the failure of WWII's Maginot Line. Indeed, in modern war relying on them to stop the enemy is foolish and would fail.
67) But in here, one should recognize that Russian goal in fortifications is not to stop #Ukraine but to slow down the pace of maneuver warfare with least units possible. Fortifications consist different types some have a goal of reducing infiltrations...
68) ... and hit-and-run campaigns against garrisoned forces and logistics. #Russia have a significant men power shortage to men these forts but remember the goal is not stopping #Ukraine but stripping out it from its pace, valuable men power and resources.
69) Maginot Line was broken due to a surprasing attack from Ardennes Gap, excessive use of tanks as a novel strategy of Blitzkrieg and weaknesses of French mil. structure. With the arrival of anti-tank weapons and reconing in modern war, it is not good historical example to take. Image
70) If you want a historical example for Russian fortifications you can look to the Atlantic Wall instead. You can consider Dnipro River as the natural barrier. Hitler tried to stop or at least slow down the Allied efforts of landing via fortifications around the coast. Image
71) Fortifications in the modern warfare are not inbreakable. But Hitler delayed Allied offense in a wide front with less men as he was also under stress in the East and South. With excessive fire and air power, Allies achieved to break it. These two conditions are still crucial. Image
72) Unpopular opinion on #Russia's #Zaporizhzhia Offensive claims: it could be a PR effort by 🇷🇺 military after the arrival of Gerasimov to the front. He need a PR campaign to shadow down #Wagner's #Soledar PR. Sham or not we will see a limited activity.
73) GLSDB could be a game changer in this war. It could threaten stationary air targets within occupied 🇺🇦 air bases, train stations and armed vehicle convoys and concentration points. Not clear when these weapons will arrive as US did not provide info.
74) Dismissing commanders to cover up strategic mistakes is a common thing. Mostly #Putin and his High Command circle searches operational victims to dismiss. It proved as a way of failure even after Athens’ dismiss of Admirals after Syracuse+Hitler’s dismissals in Op. Barbossa.
75) Breathtaking video of how #Ukraine's SOF makes night hit-and-run operation against #Russian forces across the Dnipro River. I am not sure what is the goal and where is the location. But you can see how intense and hard to make such kind of landings.
76) On Riverine Warfare, it is hard to find any stable operational theory as it is too much neglected. This USNI article is really good. It define riverine systems as an interior artery of a country. Which requires a special Riverine Command.
usni.org/magazines/proc…
77) Abel underlined in this article that the US formed a coalition of Marines and Army Rangers to deliver successful attacks on Vietnamese and to bring goods across the river. He underlined that riverine warfare requires covered outposts which made tiny islands on Dnipro valuable Image
78) Clausewitz underlined three important conditions for riverine warfare:
-the widht of the river (siginificant in #Dnipro)
-quality&quantity of river crossing equipment
-force of defending side.
As 🇺🇦 has already have a force across the river, risking Dnipro is less attractive. Image
79) #Ukraine continues to recon Kinburn Spit, Potemkin Island, islets in Oleshky and Nova Kakhovka to contest #Dnipro. But the ground is not solid so not suitable for armoured support. Islands are cursed as they are small and have limited roads. Image
80) They vulnerable to artillery and denial of movement after landings. #Russia packed the region with artillery, fortifications and have no stressful shortage of logistics+ammunution for now. This is why artillery and counter-battery duels intensified across #Kherson for now. Image
81) That Russian bulge in Pidhorodne is highly concerning. It still means contested ground but put the defence of #Bakhmut under huge stress. Ukrainian soldiers in the town is like Old Guards in experience and they are so valuable. It is better to have a Plan B for a near term.
82) #Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence says that Ukrainian SOF raid across #Dnipro in #NovaKakhovka is determined by the intel that came from partizans. It is an important example that show the value of partizan warfare. Unpopularity of invasion would strengthen the Ukrainian hand.
83) There is an intensified discussions on donating fighters to #Ukraine. After the Dutch offered F-16s, Slovakia also renewed its bid to donate Mig-29s. It is a heated discussion that needs serious consideration. Airpower is still game changer in this war
84) #Russia tries to capture #Vuhledar. But it now contest an outskirt in the town. Moscow attempt to change the operational status quo a little by sacrificing a lot. All these efforts are subordinate to #Bakhmut and will not change the strategic pic much.
85) Earlier tweets stressed about #Soledar and possible loss of #Bakhmut and other positional front as alarming. But it is alarming for increased need of men and resources for #Ukraine. But 🇺🇦 still could change the balance with new weapons via attacking
🇷🇺 from its logistics. Image
86) This is why Russia also simultaneously use counter-attacks around #Kreminna, #Svatove and #Zaporizhia. Even if #Ukraine withdrew from its positions in #Donetsk, it has to win in Luhansk+Zaporizhia fronts. With this, Ukraine could exploit 🇷🇺's excessive men and resource loss. Image
87) #Russia completed the training of mobilized of 2nd Motorized Rifle Division in #Belarus and preparing them to deploy in #Ukraine. This division is a crippled armoured division that operate tanks. There are overlapping claims on possible 🇷🇺 offensive in #Kreminna and #Svatove.
88) I had some reservations for the efficiency of loitering munitions. But #Lancet’s footages are highly impressive in counter-battery purposes. But we need accuracy/kill ratios to reach a general conclusion. Netting and dedicating a soldier as sky watcher could be life-saving.
89) Alarm bells are ringing for #Russia in #Svatove. If #Ukraine could achieve to gain a momentum at there, possible Russian offensive could fell in a risk. Russia could postpone its decisive offensive in Luhansk to support Svatove's defences.
90) Soviet heritage in the East #Germany continues to create divergences. But it is wrong to frame it in that way. Russian intelligence is still actively work in the region to manipulate far right and far left tendencies in the region.
91) This could be the right thing to do to help #Ukraine in much more efficiency. But the feasibility of this option needs longer time to make. But at least for artillery and spare parts, Polish know-how could be combined with Ukrainian needs.
telegraph.co.uk/world-news/202…
92) #Russia will start military training lessons in Secondary Schools and Universities. Similiar educations were offered in #Ukraine and #China. It will have limited military value but signals growing militarization of 🇷🇺 society and further intervention of war to 🇷🇺 daily life.
93) #Russia increased its risk taking approach by making fresh offensives around #Vuhledar and a unprecendented one in the Eastern #Kharkiv rather than a one in #Svatove and #Kreminna line. All those efforts looks like subordinate to Bakhmut and has a goal of attrition of Ukraine
94) More and more reports claims (by British MoD and ISW) that #Russia is preparing for a full scale offensive in Luhansk Oblast. It will possibly start from #Kreminna and would end in #Lyman where liberated by Ukraine in October.
95) It could start in the first weeks of February if #Russia can stabilize #Svatove front. Russia could try to use Makiivka-Torske route and Topolivka-Siversk-Lyman route to reach the town. By this they are planning to ease the pressure on #Kreminna and by-pass 🇺🇦 efforts. Image
96) #Russia face grave limitations of medics, medical equipments and field hospitals in #Kherson region. Dire consequences of human wave tactics in the East. It is unexpectable to start a new offensive in Luhansk but these claims are from the reports of Western intel, NOT FROM ME
97) #Poland opened a repairment centre for Krab self-propelled guns of #Ukraine. It is the second one after the one opened in 🇱🇹 for certain weapons. Another was opened for the US-made M777 Howitzers in 🇵🇱 while US offers a hotline for instant repairs.
mil.in.ua/en/news/poland…
98) A spectacular summary by ISW that shows the phases of this war. It shows how since November #Ukraine and #Russia entered into positional warfare. ISW tied it with delayed Western support and it is so true. Positional War allowed 🇷🇺 to delay 🇺🇦 advance to bolster its defences. Image
99) Last week #US has already sent 60+ Bradley's to Europe. Training of Ukrainian crews started weeks before. While #UK started special training to Ukrainian soldiers to operate Challenger 2 tanks.
dvidshub.net/news/437455/us…
100) A perfect map that show #Ukraine’s and #Russia’s troop distributions. You can clearly see how much troops were allocated for #Bakhmut and #Kreminna. Given the numbers in Kherson and Zaporizhya, it is highly hard and unlikely to start a new offensive by both sides.
101) There is a slight disparity of troops around #Svatove and #Vuhledar by #Russia. But most of these units are mobilized so disparity is less important in quality. But numbers in these regions show 🇷🇺 have enough men to attrit 🇺🇦in these secondary efforts via human wave tactics Image
102) Given the troop numbers in #Zaporizhia, any Russian success is hard to achieve but qualified soldiers (VDV&Naval Infantry) were deployed here. This give #Russia a relative courage to take micro-offensive in the expense of loses to delay any further Ukrainian counter-attack.
103) #Ukraine undertakes an anti-corruption crackdown against many former public figures. It is a significant move. Many Western-aimed trolls claimed excessive levels of corruption within Kyiv. But corruption is also two-wayed in the Government.
104) #Ukraine’s young Gvt tried to reform via anti-corruption laws. #Russia benefited the existence of pro-Kremlin bureaucrats to proliferate resources and richness and fuelled 🇷🇺 war aims. Since Yanukovich’s bureaucrats Kremlin ties lingered this process. Image
105) While EU membership efforts directly attacked Kremlin’s economic profitibility. Anti-corruption is undispensible part of 🇺🇦 independence. But it should not turn to a witchhunt. Such kind of home front efforts could easily back fire and cause divisions
theguardian.com/commentisfree/…
106) #US underlined that its next package could be announced on Friday and include GLSDB long range smart bombs. Boeing and SAAB announced that they already have ammunition in stocks. It could help Ukraine much in #Kherson, #Bakhmut, #Svatove and #Kreminna
wsj.com/articles/u-s-e…
107) #Ukraine achieved to repel #Russia’s micro-offensives around #Vuhledar via use of artillery power. There is already a prescription that shows human wave tactics could be limited by use of firepower. 🇺🇦 needs fast incorporation of new weapons and this depends upon the West. Image
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More from @ArveloaMert

Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Oct 21, 2023
Lets start the twelfth and the newest thread on the strategy of the Russo-Ukrainian War that will cover fall offensives. #Avdiivka #Bakhmut #Ukraine #Robotyne #UkraineWar #Kherson #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Berdyansk #Verbove #Novoprokopivka #Tokmak Image
1) Here is the previous thread on the strategy of the Russo-Ukrainian War that includes issues like information warfare, Allied trainings for Ukraine, situation in #Avdiivka offensive and #Kherson counter offensive, Zaporizhzhia and modern day fortified wars and other issues.
2) Lets talk about #Russia’s losses of officers in #Ukraine. Russian Military lost unbelieavable number of 3000 officers in Ukraine from different ranks. However, the lion share the losses were concentrated on junior officers like Lieutenants and Majors. This group is important.
Read 109 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Aug 23, 2023
Lets start our tenth and the newest thread on the strategy of Russo-Ukrainian War which will cover operations during the late August and early fall. #Bakhmut #Ukraine #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson Image
12) Few words on #Tokmak. We have to carefully asses the claims that state #Russia’s defences in the town is in the brink of imminent collapse. The town is one of the #Ukraine’s critical operational goals with Melitopol. Its South has key railroad link that makes the land bridge. Image
12) #Tokmak is heavily fortified town which increasingly become a target of #Ukraine’s long range strikes. But still the town is main position for #Russia to hold-on. Leaving Tokmak without a fight is highly irrational for 🇷🇺 as it would not only risk the theatre but entire war. Image
Read 92 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Jul 15, 2023
Here is the ninth and the newest thread about Russo-Ukrainian War that includes #Ukraine’s counter offensive efforts in #Bakhmut. #Ukraine #Zapoizhzhia #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #Oleshky #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson #Wagner Image
1) You can find all earlier Twitter threads on war in #Ukraine and #Russia's unlawful invasion and more in this interactive map. Please remember that this map is not for showing the exact lines of contacts but to understand strategies.
2) Mistrust increasingly become visible after the #Wagner's mutiny within the Russian Command. After General Surovikin (who is the most senior officer that disappeared), Major Generals Popov and Vladimir Selivestrov were dismissed from their duties.
Read 45 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Jun 19, 2023
Here is the eight and the newest thread about Russo-Ukrainian War that includes #Ukraine’s counter offensive efforts in #Zaporizhzhia #Ukraine #Bakhmut #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #Oleshky #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson #Wagner Image
13) The Attacker could use firepower to prevent this laying process. But just like the first aspect, defenders could increase their fire power which would decrease the operational pace. Russian decision to relocate troops from Kherson and further risking of air power shows this. Image
14) But different from what Malthus claimed, just like population all this laying and firepower increase process has a limit of production, resupply and logistics. In long run with long-range strikes #Ukraine could balance this rate if they can achieve to protect their equipment. Image
Read 97 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
May 28, 2023
Here is the seventh thread 🧵 about the strategy of the #RussoUkrainianWar for the early summer. Russia took the control of #Bakhmut while Ukraine is still planning its offensive efforts. #Ukraine #Russia #Soledar #Kreminna #Svatove #Wagner #UkraineWar #Leopard2 #Vuhledar Image
1) You can find all earlier Twitter threads on war in #Ukraine and #Russia's unlawful invasion and more in this interactive map. Please remember that this map is not for showing the exact lines of contacts but to understand strategies.
2) British MoD underlined that, as planned, #Wagner is now withdrawing from the center of #Bakhmut. The defence of the town will be transferred to so-called DNR forces combined with VDV units. This shows that Wagner will not be in defensive efforts.
Read 62 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Apr 26, 2023
Here is the sixth thread 🧵 about the strategy of the #RussoUkrainianWar for the late spring.Russia continues to focus on Dombass while Ukraine is still planning its offensive efforts. #Bakhmut. #Ukraine #Russia #Soledar #Kreminna #Svatove #Wagner #UkraineWar #Leopard2 #Vuhledar Image
1) As always please take a look for understanding how a counter-offensive should be conducted, what are the goals and requirements and for the events that occured between September to November.
2) You can take a look to this thread for the first part of the Ukrainian Winter Counter Offensive which includes the situation and events between November to January.
Read 31 tweets

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