Recently, #IranChina ties have faced faux pas, criticism, and stagnation. Tomorrow, President Raisi will visit #Beijing to try and jump-start #Sino-#Iranian cooperation. 🇨🇳🇮🇷
In March of 2020, #Iran and #China signed the fabled "Iran-China Deal", in which China reported pledged massive cooperation with and investment in Iran over the next two-and-a-half decades. The deal ostensibly called for $400 billion in investment...
But as you may be able to guess from the number of qualifiers, the deal was, much like China's espionage efforts, full of hot air. Many experts, myself included, pointed out that the $400 billion number was almost completely fabricated...
Other signs of Sino-Iranian diplomatic engagement came over the course of the next year, such as opening a Chinese embassy in Bandar Abbas. The most significant move, Iran joining the SCO, was largely symbolic and has yet to lead to anything substantial.
Although Iranian oil sales to China are currently strong, these, too, are more affected by market considerations than a strategic commitment to Tehran. Sales to China fell dramatically after Russia discounted oil after the invasion of Ukraine.
The policy was part of a larger shift of Iranian elites towards Russia and China, proudly proclaimed as the "Look East" policy. Raisi was keen to project strength and break Iran's international isolation, especially amidst the ongoing JCPOA negoations.
But the deal also triggered widespread criticism from those who felt Iran should maintain a balanced foreign policy, and those who were suspicious of China's intent - as well as those who spread rumors that China was preparing to buy Iranian territory.
But despite all fanfare, not much has happened. Little progress was made as sanctions and fear of poor return on investment held Chinese investors back. In Raisi's first term, China has only invested $162m, less than Afghanistan and Turkey.
Relations hit a new low last month, when Xi Jinping's visit to Saudi Arabia triggered a minor diplomatic crisis. Meant to signal a return of Chinese global influence post-Covid, the trip highlighted the growing gap between China's flagging ties to Iran... thediplomat.com/2022/12/xi-jin…
...and its rapidly expanding ties to the GCC. In addition, China infuriated the Iranian media when it endorsed a statement released by the GCC that mentioned the UAE's claim to several islands in the Gulf under Iranian control.
Although the Chinese statement was mild and non-committal, Iranian society had a strong reaction. Reformist papers especially published op-eds criticising China and government's ties with Beijing, with one even endorsing Taiwanese independence.
Eventually, the Iranian government summoned the Chinese ambassador and lodged an official complaint, but took no serious action. China dispatched Vice Premier Hu Chunhua to re-assure Iran that China does not get involved in the affairs of other countries. aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/1…
Since then, the two sides have been trying to reset relations, but in the media, in think tanks, and among officials, enthusiasm for China and Looking East has noticeably waned. Watch this space for my analysis on how this trip may - or more likely, may not - change that!
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Officials tried to avoid mentioning the issue specifically, but stressed that future development would be done with Iranian companies and investment. "It is quite clear that the National Oil Company has reached a dead end in negotiations with the Chinese."
"Over the years, they have been indifferent to all of the ultimatums of the National Oil Company...at the beginning [of the Raisi gov't], they were optimistic that the Chinese would invest...but strangely, Beijing has no intention of investing at this time."
So what can you expect from this article? It fill a gap in the literature by sketching a narrative of RoC-#Iran relations between 1920 and 1949, by analyzing the factors behind #Sino-Iranian cooperation and competition in the #tea and #silk trades and at the League of Nations.
What did I find? Unofficial commercial interests, including Iranian merchants in Shanghai, played a large role in driving Sino-Iranian relations. Iranian companies were well established in China and Hong Kong, mostly shipping tea. See for example this advert in an expat paper.
#China and #Iran have agreed to expand their military ties. Of course, Fox News and the usual suspects are sounding the alarm. What does that mean, and is there anything noteworthy here?
First, this is nothing new. Chinese military have visited Iran before. They ALREADY cooperate by holding joint military exercises and collaborating on international crime, like drug trafficking and terrorism. China also does this with Saudi Arabia and other ME countries.
They’re likely to continue to deepen these ties, but they’re not particularly strategic or significant. That’s exactly what Bagheri said they’re doing, “expand bilateral cooperation in joint military drills, exchange of strategies, training issues and other common fields”.
The #Iran-#China deal has entered the "implementation" phase. This has triggered a new, yet not unexpected round of #Sino-#Iranian "alliance" panic.
But recent events hint at the limits of the Sino-Iranian partnership. Let's review... (a #ForeignPolicy#IranChina#thread) 1/
First, it's worth repeating that many aspects of the promised deal are overblown and exaggerated, including the fabled "$400 billion" investment. The deal was, and remains, aspirational and with no specific details. 2/
Iran may be forced to “Look East” in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, but the Chinese government continues to look in many directions at once. China has substantial relations with Saudi Arabia, Israel, and a number of other Iranian neighbors and/or rivals. 3/
Shortly after the Communist Revolution of 1949, China condemned Israel in the strongest possible terms. Israel was deemed an “imperial tool for suppressing national-democratic revolution movement of the Arab countries,” and a “Zionist entity,” equating Zionism to racism. 2/
Israel was always denounced as aggressive; any negotiated settlement was a conspiracy and “a betrayal of the interests of the Arab people.” People’s Daily proudly proclaimed “...we have nothing to do with Israel, neither will we have anything to do with it in the future.” 3/
Yesterday, #Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi put forth a Four-Point Proposal for peace in the #Israel-#Palestine conflict.
Why this "plan" offers nothing new and on #China's use of rhetorical support for #Palestinians
(Or, why do I have such a sense of deja vu?)
a thread🧵1/
Wang’s comments resurrected the Four-Point Proposal made by Xi Jinping in 2017, which itself was a repackaging of the Four-Point Plan for Peace of 2013. While the language has varied, the content has remained the same. All 3 versions endorse the international consensus... 2/
...that calls for a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state, condemn human rights violations and aggression on both sides, calls for an end to the Gaza blockade, and call for mediated negotiations. 3/