An excellent point to highlight. It ties in with something I've been thinking on North Korea. [thread]
1. Nuclear arsenals have costs: in money and in potentially making one's country a target. There are other resource costs as well, like putting smart minds to this problem rather than those that would make a humanitarian difference.
2. Leaders recognize those costs.
"We [Pakistan] will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get [a nuclear weapon] of our own -- Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
"We [Pakistan] will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get [a nuclear weapon] of our own -- Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
3. If Iraq taught North Korea and Iran that having a nuclear arsenal might deter the US from invading, they might want to minimize those costs. The way to do that is to have a minimal arsenal.
4. But what is minimal? Bluffing can increase the utility of what they have. The point is to convince the US that the price it will pay for an attack is too high.
5. The US obliges with a very public reaction. Trump's is even more public than usual, although he believes in bluffing too.
6. Kim Jong Un seems to feel he has achieved a goal. That goal may well be that the US is deterred sufficiently to recognize North Korea as a fellow nuclear power. Trump has obliged by agreeing to meet with him.
7. That goal says nothing about numbers or operability of nuclear weapons. The six underground nuclear tests and numerous missile tests, covered with extreme secrecy, were enough.
8. Iran figured this out too and thus planned on an extremely limited nuclear arsenal, probably what they figured would deter the US.
9. Looked at that way, one might argue that North Korea and Iran have developed their nuclear weapons programs reluctantly.
10. That would mean that a nonthreatening posture on the part of the US would be the most effective way to approch North Korea and Iran.
/fin
/fin
