Thread on what does and does not constitute human freedom from a Thomistic point of view:
Many hold that the source of human freedom is a negation or lack of divine causality or governance. In other words, we are free insofar as God is not involved with our actions.
Many hold that the source of human freedom is a negation or lack of divine causality or governance. In other words, we are free insofar as God is not involved with our actions.
C.S. Lewis argues this way. He says that sin is the price we must pay for not being automatons. The implicit argument is that if God holds any providential governance over our actions they cease to be free. Thus the human will is only free insofar as it is a no-fly zone for God.
Brian Davies recognizes this as a serious error in The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil. He states that proponents of this argument see human freedom "as if it existed independently of God's causal action." (121)
Now, it is beyond the scope of this little thread to argue why a) free creaturely actions ARE governed by God causally and b) how precisely this does not negate human freedom. However, it is clear that, for Aquinas, the source of freedom is not lack of divine interference but...
is indeed the nature of the relation of the will to the object willed. That is, is the thing willed willed necessarily or contingently? This depends upon what is being willed.
ST I-II, q. 10, a. 4: "Wherefore if the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the opposite...
...If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity."
In other words, the will is necessarily moved by things which are good in every sense. He explicitly cites happiness as such an object. And, of course, if, by the grace of supernatural vision, we were able to see God in His essence, we would recognize it as universally good...
...and providing perfect, supernatural happiness. But we don't encounter happiness simpliciter (natural happiness) or God Himself (supernatural happiness) very often, if at all. What we do encounter are particular goods. Coffee, friendship, sleep, etc.
These things are good in and of themselves but they are not perfectly good nor are they always good for us in the particular circumstances of life. Thus we are not determined to them with necessity. We make judgments and can choose or not choose them.This is the source of freedom
We are volitionally indifferent (with regard to necessity, not necessarily inclination) to all the particular goods in life. So even if God moves us to this or that particular good, we retain the natural ability to have done otherwise (even if it doesn't happen that way).
This is why St. Thomas states in ST I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 1: "The Divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a way which is fitting to the nature of that thing...
...And therefore it would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature."
So, yes, Thomas thinks that God moves you to whatever good actions you do. But that in no way negates human freedom, which is not obliterated by God's providential governance but actuated by it! He is more intimate to us than we are to ourselves, even in our actions! /fin
