Thread by @Headsnipe011

Findings of Misconduct by Three FBI Employees and One FBI Task Force Officer for Violating DOJ and FBI Computer Rules of Behavior and FBI Policy by Forwarding a United Kingdom Intelligence Report Regarding the Manchester Arena Bombing and Other Sensitive or Restricted Emails

IG Report:

Leakers will be held accountable.

Manchester bombing Intel leakers

@drawandstrike @HNIJohnMiller @catesduane @rising_serpent @_ImperatorRex_ @Debradelai @GodlessNZ @almostjingo @tracybeanz @TheChiIIum

oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/f…

The Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this investigation upon the receipt of information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that an article published in The New York Times (NYT) on May 24, 2017 contained...

unclassified information that was sensitive, non-public, and derived from a United Kingdom (UK) intelligence report (UK Intelligence Report) regarding the Manchester Arena bombing on May 22, 2017.

The FBI referral, and the UK Intelligence Report itself, indicated that a UK government agency had disseminated the report by e-mail to numerous other U.S. federal agencies, as well as to many foreign law enforcement agencies.

The OIG determined that the FBI initially further disseminated the UK Intelligence Report to over 1,000 unique recipients, including to offices at FBI headquarters, Joint Terrorism Task Force members, and other federal agency partners.

This further dissemination included caveats about the sensitivity of the report and the need to limit further dissemination. We found that some of those recipients appropriately disseminated the report further to other FBI employees and to FBI law enforcement partners.

Under these circumstances, the OIG’s ability to identify who may have leaked the information in the report was severely limited. As an initial matter, the OIG’s jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the actions of DOJ and FBI employees,

as well as non-FBI employees assigned to FBI task forces. The OIG had no ability to review the actions of the many non-FBI organizations, both inside and outside the U.S., that received the UK Intelligence Report.

Additionally, given the wide distribution of the report within the FBI, it was impossible for the OIG to follow up on each of the well over 1,000 FBI employees who received the report.

The OIG did seek to identify whether FBI records reflected (a) contact by FBI personnel with the author of the NYT article on or around May 24, 2017, or (b) that an FBI recipient had forwarded the UK Intelligence Report to a non-government e-mail account,

as a practical means of identifying those who posed an enhanced risk of having forwarded the report for an inappropriate purpose.

Upon referring the matter to the OIG, the FBI informed the OIG that it had analyzed FBI e-mail records, internal text messages, and FBI telephone logs, but found no contacts with the telephone numbers or e-mail addresses...

known to be associated with the attributed author of the NYT article.

The OIG investigation found that some FBI personnel forwarded the UK Intelligence Report to non-government e-mail accounts...

but the investigation did not identify evidence that any of these individuals provided the report to the NYT.

However, the OIG substantiated the following violations of DOJ and FBI computer rules of behavior and FBI policy by the following four individuals in connection with their handling of the UK Intelligence Report:

• Two FBI personnel intentionally forwarded the e-mail containing the UK Intelligence Report to their personal, non-government e-mail accounts;

***holy crap @drawandstrike @tracybeanz***

-One of these two FBI employees, during the one year period before the Manchester report was leaked, had improperly forwarded to the employee’s personal e-mail account approximately 550 other FBI e-mails

with header information indicating the content was sensitive, or restricted for official use;

o The second of these two FBI employees, during the one year period before the Manchester report was leaked, had forwarded one other FBI e-mail containing operationally sensitive information to the employee’s personal e-mail account;

o The OIG conducted a consensual review of the personal e-mail accounts maintained on the personal mobile devices of these two individuals. The OIG did not find evidence that either forwarded the UK Intelligence Report to the NYT, or anyone else.

• A task force officer assigned to the FBI forwarded the UK Intel. Report to a foreign law enforcement partner without obtaining FBI permission to do so, & transmitted the report without including all of the relevant instructions restricting further distribution of the report;

o The task force officer, during the one year period before the Manchester report was leaked, forwarded 3 other FBI e-mails containing operationally sensitive information to unauthorized recipients;

• A fourth FBI employee had set an unauthorized auto-forward of the employee’s FBI e- mail to the employee’s personal e-mail account in violation of FBI policy;

however, internal FBI e-mail filters prevented the delivery of the UK Intelligence Report and most other FBI e-mails from being forwarded automatically.

• All four individuals denied providing the UK Intelligence Report, or information contained in it, to the NYT.

The OIG provided its report to the FBI for appropriate action.