Let's compare 'longer transition' with 'Norway for now', shall we?
Both are being floated as solutions to backstop issues and getting to a deal on the WA.
I've written today about transition (blogs.surrey.ac.uk/politics/2018/…) but it's helpful to do a quick read-across, to see how they stack up in relative terms
Transition's +ves:
- model exists and is already provisionally agreed
- obviates multiple transitions of EU-UK relations
- least disruption to Irish border
- model exists and is already provisionally agreed
- obviates multiple transitions of EU-UK relations
- least disruption to Irish border
Transition's -ves:
- effectively membership, but w/o legitimacy of taking part in voting
- dodgy legal basis
- runs into budget issues past 2020
- effectively membership, but w/o legitimacy of taking part in voting
- dodgy legal basis
- runs into budget issues past 2020
Norway for now +ves:
- clearer move away from membership
- maintains SM links, so avoiding need for that part of backstop
- more opportunity to be firm about time-ltd-ness
- clearer move away from membership
- maintains SM links, so avoiding need for that part of backstop
- more opportunity to be firm about time-ltd-ness
Norway for now -ves:
- No text to do this exists, and requires agt of non-EU states
- EEA & EFTA members cool on idea of disruption of their set-up
- won't cover all aspects currently in backstop, so doesn't fully avoid it
- No text to do this exists, and requires agt of non-EU states
- EEA & EFTA members cool on idea of disruption of their set-up
- won't cover all aspects currently in backstop, so doesn't fully avoid it
So neither model works that well, across the board. Which suggests that exigences of getting to an agreed text will weigh heavy, which favours lengthening transition
Hardly a battle of excellent choices though
