Thread by @JohnOBrennan2

A short thread on the Polish foreign minister’s suggestion (revealed earlier) of a 5 year expiry date on the Irish backstop. It has been the subject of some debate today. 1/
reuters.com/article/us-bri…

This isn’t the first time Poland has made what has been perceived (In Ireland) as an unwelcome intervention on Brexit. In July 2018 the Polish Minister for European Affairs raised concerns about the backstop amongst other issues. 2/

That earlier intervention may have given the UK govt impression that support for Ireland within European Council was softer than it appeared. Throughout the summer UK made concerted effort to undermine EU unity on the backstop. 3/

That intense summer UK diplomatic drive was specially aimed at Member States in Central and Eastern Europe and ‘hiving off’ those states from the collectively united EU27 position. 4/

One of the reasons Poland and Hungary were viewed from London as potentially amenable was that UK adopted a passive approach within the EU to the rule of law concerns expressed about and actions taken against Poland & Hungary. Some leverage arising from that position expected. 5/

But that effort by the UK to divide the EU27 was a total failure. Hungary and Poland stood squarely behind Michel Barnier’s team and did not dissent where it mattered - in the European Council. 6/

Simon Coveney was at pains today to make clear that he thought his Polish colleague was only trying to be helpful. I have no reason to doubt that this was the case. But the European Council’s position on backstop unchanged. WA not up for re-negotiation” 7/ rte.ie/news/brexit/20…

It could be that today’s Polish intervention was merely a ‘pro-forma’ intervention, designed to provide UK with support, in a way that doesn’t actually cost Poland anything. If that can guarantee continuing UK passivity on Polish rule of law transgressions, all to the good. 9/

Even if Poland moves from mere rhetorical suggestions on changes to the backstop to actual objections in the European Council, it will not be able to prevent the deal being signed off. The formal mechanism for garnering agreement in the Council is QMV. 10/
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes…

Note however, the strong preference within the European Council is for agreement through unanimity rather than QMV. The ‘eternal search for consensus’ has long characterized decision-making within the Council. So even though QMV could be employed on A 50, EU wants unanimity. 11/

Thus there are different ways of looking at the Polish suggestion. It may be meaningless because (a) it will not be followed through with the adoption of a formal position in Council or (b) QMV negates need for unanimity 12/

However, Dublin will not look at this development with at least some unease. It is possible that, as we get closer to 29 March, with Westminster still deadlocked, more member states will follow the Polish lead and express reservations about the backstop. 13/

Brexiteers have long suggested that these negotiations resembled a poker game, and that the EU had too much skin in the game not to blink at the prospect of a No Deal outcome.
They will view the Polish intervention in that light
(“See. We are too important to be ignored”) 14/

The other Brexiteer talking point will also be invoked here: that everything within the EU negotiating landscape happens at “five minutes to midnight” and we will see more of this Polish-type intervention /suggestions aimed at helping UK in the weeks to come. 15/

I think the logic of these points (14/15) is entirely wrong-headed. This is a very different negotiation to normal EU negotiations and is more like an accession process in reverse where the EU holds asymmetric power over acceding/leaving states. 16/

The Polish intervention might give Brexiteers false hope about the level of political capital the UK commands within the European Council. In fact the continuing chaos in Westminster and failure of London to tell EU capitals what kind of Brexit it wants has further damaged UK. 17

There are no grounds for thinking we will see any fracturing of EU unity in the European Council, nor of EU support for Ireland on the backstop. There is ZERO appetite for re-opening any part of the negotiation. It is up to London to secure parliamentary consent for that deal. 18