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There has been a lowering of expectations before the Hanoi US-DPRK summit by POTUS. If—like Singapore—Pyongyang largely influences pre-summit agenda and outcome document, we might see outcomes exclusively focused on points #1 and #2 of Singapore summit declaration this time.
What does that mean in practice? Well, on one hand, you have normalization of US-DPRK relations, per the Singapore “spirit” as Pyongyang likes to say. A liaison office does that. On the other, you have peace regime progress, which an end-of-war declaration gets to.
Those aren’t the “corresponding measures” North Korea has been seeking; that phrase, from the Pyongyang declaration, is effectively a euphemism for sanctions relief. We’re not there yet.
So, we’re being set up for a Hanoi summit that may have very little—if anything at all—to do with point #3 of the Singapore declaration: DPRK working toward complete denuclearization. POTUS is in “no rush,” as we heard. We may have a third summit to discuss that again later.
If the above sequence—or something close to it—is what comes out of Singapore, we’d be seeing a pretty important sequencing shift in the US approach to North Korea, FWIW. For once, it won’t be a “denuclearization first” bout of diplomacy.
The reason we’re here is probably POTUS: he’s nihilistic on the question of DPRK disarmament and focused on the PR wins of a) the testing moratorium, and now likely b) getting to be the American president who takes historic steps with DPRK (liaison office & EoW declaration).
For those who fret about the “acceptance” of a nuclear-armed DPRK, my view has been that’s a moot point after Singapore. It’ll be especially moot after a Hanoi outcome like this. We’ll have echoes of the US-PRC normalization process in the ’70s.
As I said, there’ll probably be a third summit at some point. Hanoi will be little to do with “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” No “corresponding measures”; no “denuclearization steps.”
