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This is pretty much the small beer, no-movement-on-nukes-&-missiles deal most analysts expected. It's basically a wash - which in itself is a N Korean win, one might argue - bc Yongbyon is aging, and NK gets the (probably nonbinding) declaration, office, and (maybe) econ help. /1
Still, it could have been a lot worse, given Trump's rank ignorance, admiration for Kim as dictator, & disdain for US allies. And we still have to wait for Trump's post-summit presser where he'll say who-knows-what. Last year at Singapore, he was unhinged. The important things /2
though are: 1) There was zero movement on any of the political and strategic issues we really care about - nukes, missiles, missile launchers, inspectors, human rights, and so on. Trump could not even get a stockpile inventory out of Kim, which is the bright red flag that they /3
won't denuclearize. Of course, everyone knew that NK wouldn't denuke/de-missilize, but I've long thought that the inventory was the absolute basic minimum we need from NK if they are interested in the slightest in denuclearization: nationalinterest.org/feature/acid-t…. And I've also long /4
thought that maybe Kim would give up some warheads (1/3?) if we offered him something really juicy (sanctions relief?). Trump got nothing on that, raising the question why he, as POTUS, is even meeting w/ this tin-pot gangster? Which takes me to: 2) This is way too little for /5
POTUS' personal involvement. The State department could have negotiated this minor deal, and this is the second such meeting with Kim where Trump has gotten nothing worthy of POTUS' stature. POTUS meets confer prestige on the counter-party, which is particularly important for /6
isolated, loathed NK, and Trump is giving that away for nothing. He should stop. He shouldn't meet w/ Kim anymore if this is all he can get. POTUS interventions should be like the Camp David Accords, not this. 3) If Trump keeps meeting with Kim despite 2 nothingburger summits, /7
then that is proof positive that Trump is doing this for TV coverage & his craving for Nobel Prize. We all know that too, of course, but a 3rd meeting wd make it indisputable that this is a vanity project for domestic political purposes back home. 4) We can all now agree that /8
Trump is not in fact a great negotiator. Again, we knew this before, but supposedly Trump's 'art of the deal' would would turn weak hands into strong ones and pull concessions out of counter-parties blown away by Trump's wheeling-and-dealing skills. Yet on the most important /9
deal in Trump's life, after 10 months, he's still not achieved anything the State Dept could not have done. The promise of summit diplomacy with NK was that leader-level meetings would break through the morass of bureaucratic process and detail which overwhelmed previous /10
efforts like the 6-party talks. After 14 months of NK engagement by the US and SK presidents, there is very little to show for all the summit-level theatrics. This should get kicked down to the professional diplomats and only involve the presidents if the NK is ready to make /11
real concessions. 5) Much depends on how binding the end-of-war declaration is. In the past I have heard from SK MPs that, because it is not a peace treaty, it is not legally binding. If that is so, and if it has no impact on force postures on either side of the MDL, which is /12
as yet unknown, then what exactly is this? There is much confusion here about the differences between a declaration, a peace regime, and a peace treaty. My own guess is that it will have minimal empirical impact. Neither USFK nor KPA deployments will change in response. Trump /13
himself said US forces in Korea were not up for discussion at Hanoi, but wouldn't that be implied by a meaningful end-of-war statement? It feels like a fudge - politically valuable for Trump and Moon, but not changing much on the ground. END.
