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I may share some takeaways and reflections as I'm reading through the report this evening. To start, this report frames U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific in terms of "preparedness, partnerships, and the promotion of a networked region."
I'd say it's a positive that the notion of a "free and open Indo-Pacific" is framed in terms of "common principles" (rather than, say, American principles) shared among nations in the region, including highlighting the importance of economics and governance. 
I see this as an important statement: "It is a vision which recognizes that no one nation can or should dominate the Indo-Pacific." Neither American nor Chinese hegemony is the way forward for the region; rather networks and partnerships can promote a more balanced architecture.
As a side note, the emphasis that "economic security is national security" reflects a new theme in U.S. strategy that is warranted, but interestingly does converge in some respects with how China has defined it national security and interests, in which development is integral.
It is encouraging that the importance of investments and infrastructure, including the BUILD Act, is highlighted, but the scale of investments that the U.S. has committed to providing to date is still much less sizable than what Beijing has been promising and often delivering.
So the critical question on U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific will continue to be that of resourcing and implementation, which still does seem uncertain in some respects.
On the PRC as a "revisionist power" — The PRC "under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), undermines the international system from within by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously eroding the values and principles of the rules-based order."
Importantly, the report does call out "the PRC’s systematic mistreatment of Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslims in Xinjiang – including pervasive discrimination, mass detention, and disappearances" as of concern to the region.
In discussing PRC coercive activities and military modernization, the report calls out the violation of Xi's 2015 pledge that “China does not intend to pursue militarization,” while also pointing to 'gray zone' activities that have involved a range of tools and tactics.
I'm encouraged to see this section on risk reduction and engagement, which I'd argue become more important than ever at a time of intensifying competition. The report calls for setting the U.S.-China military relationship on "a long-term path of transparency and non-aggression."
Turning to the lines of effort, there is an emphasis on innovation and experimentation that should be welcomed, but will likely remain challenging to execute, particularly the issue of maintaining interoperability with allies and partners. How will that be sustained in practice?
In discussing preparedness, there is concern about how to prevent a competitor (e.g., China) from achieving a fait accompli to achieve limited objectives (e.g., Taiwan), and the report describes measures underway to advance Joint Force preparedness.
On modernizing the force in anticipation of high-end competition, there are a number of investments included as illustrative of the direction of development, including in USVs, resources for cyber operations, and accelerating space doctrine and capabilities.
I'd add I'm not seeing in the discussion of posture much attention to the question of mobilization for potential scenarios of large-scale conflict, which I worry could present an under-appreciated challenge, as I argued in testimony to @Inspire2ServeUS: inspire2serve.gov/_api/files/200
There is robust discussion of partnerships as a key line of effort, highlighting efforts to expand interoperability and undertake security cooperation and information-sharing. The efforts described are all to be welcomed, including new and emerging engagements and partnerships.
However, beyond the scope of this DoD report, but perhaps a more enduring concern, is the role of diplomacy in the implementation of U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. Will we see equally forceful engagements from the State Department in the region?
The nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs still hasn't been confirmed to date? And the U.S. is still missing a number of ambassadors in Asia, including Cambodia (nominated), Singapore (vacant), and Thailand (vacant). afsa.org/list-ambassado…
So while there are elements of this Indo-Pacific Strategy Report that are praiseworthy, the uncertainty, of course, remains whether or not we will see real progress across government in implementing this agenda, which will require more than DoD alone can do.
