Thread by @RocketSchiller

The following Thread is not to be seen as a full analysis, but more like some thoughts on things that should have been pointed out a while ago. Since they were not, I will do that now. So, here are some thoughts on the new #NorthKorea “ATACMS-lookalike” #missile. 1/19

According to open source knowledge, this missile type was first launched August 10, 2019 (2 launches 16 minutes apart), and again August 16 (2 launches 15 minutes apart). 2/19

The reported range and peak altitude at flight was 400 km with 48 km (Aug 10) and 230 km with 30 km (Aug 16). That raises the question why NK developed this system. They already have 7(!) different operational systems for that range: 3/19

Hwasong-5/Scud B: 50-300 km
Hwasong-6/Scud C: up to 500 km
KN-18 Precision Scud: up to 450 km
KN-21 Precision Scud: up to 250 km
KN-23: <240-600+ km
Guided MRLS: 250 km
Recent Heavy MRLS: 380 km
4/19

Reminder: A missile is just the thing that flies. A missile system includes all the support infrastructure, fire control, fueling, guidance testing, communications, and all procedures (storage, handling, launch preparations, firing table, …). This costs money. Much money. 5/19

Launcher and missile show similarities to the U.S. ATACMS system. This is certainly not a coincidence. Probably intended to send the message “we have the same capabilities as the USA have”. Afaik, ATACMs had a total program price tag of more than $ 3 bn. 6/19

So, could NK have developed just another expensive high-precision mobile missile system, or are there indications that this narrative might be wrong? Let’s have a quick look. 7/19

The missile seems to have similarities to the KN-23, which I still think is closely related to the Russian SS-26 Iskander family. Assuming the same 0.91 m diameter, missile length falls far short of the family, though. 8/19

But it still has the cable raceway leading into the conical section, like the KN-23. And what looks like a separation plane right on top of that, so the striped tip seems to be the warhead. 9/19

The cable raceway is one major difference between the KN-23 and the Iskander family. Cables/pipes are routed around the fuel tanks (liquid-fueled rockets) or the combustion chamber (solid-fueled rockets), indicating the rocket’s propellant load, and thus, potential range. 10/19

With the KN-23 cable raceway, NK apparently wanted to send the message that this is NOT related to the Iskander, because raceway – and motor – are much longer than at the Iskander. But no one would build a conical solid rocket combustion chamber. 11/19

But we see that again at the ATACMS-lookalike. And here is where I think the NK propaganda squad made a huge mistake. (This is not the first NK mistake, by far. Look, for example, here: 12/19 fas.org/wp-content/upl…

Thing is: As you can see, there is no room for the guidance system! It is usually situated “under” the warhead. Yes, ATACMs has it in front, but that would leave almost no space for any noteworthy payload for the NK missile. 13/19

But have you noticed the numbers on the side of the NK missile? Don’t they look a little squeezed? Other NK missile numbers look different. More spacious. Not squeezed. Stretching the numbers makes them look normal. 14/19

What does that mean for our missile? Well, funny enough, stretching the missile by this amount yields exactly the same length as our KN-23 or Iskander family. 15/19

And there even is a shadowy line visible where the guidance compartment should sit in an Iskander missile. 16/19

Bottom line: There is a good chance that the whole event was staged again. NK just launched the KN-23 from a self-made canister and edited the photos, maybe also exchanging the KN-23 warhead with something looking like a separable warhead. 17/19

Why? Because it’s cheaper than developing a complete ATACMS-equivalent missile system. And it seems that analysts tend to fall for their confirmation bias (myself included!), and it feeds the public narrative of miraculous NK missile development capabilities. 18/19

Reminder and disclaimer: This is just a hypothesis, intended to kick off a debate, not more. 19/19

For more on a different view of NK’s missile capabilities, see “The Scope of Foreign Assistance to North Korea s Missile Program”, free link to be found here along with other interesting essays.
think.taylorandfrancis.com/the-denucleari…