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Spygate: Origins
The Final Thread
Part I
Let me tell you a story about the time regime change in Iran was planned on the back of a napkin.
Spygate: Origins
The Final Thread
Part I
Let me tell you a story about the time regime change in Iran was planned on the back of a napkin.
2\
On December 21, 2001, intelligence operatives from 3 countries attended a clandestine meeting in an indistinct office building in Piazza di Spagna.
On December 21, 2001, intelligence operatives from 3 countries attended a clandestine meeting in an indistinct office building in Piazza di Spagna.
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The participants included representatives from Italy’s military intelligence agency, Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare (SISMI).
The participants included representatives from Italy’s military intelligence agency, Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare (SISMI).
4\
Also present was Manucher Ghorbanifar: International Man of Mystery.
Also present was Manucher Ghorbanifar: International Man of Mystery.
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Ghorbanifar has made several appearances in previous threads in this series.
Ghorbanifar has made several appearances in previous threads in this series.
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Ghorbanifar is the Iranian arms dealer who was allegedly involved in both the “October Surprise” and the Iran-Contra affair in the 1980’s.
He had managed to keep a low profile during the 1990’s, but in 2001 he was back in the middle of high-stakes political intrigue.
Ghorbanifar is the Iranian arms dealer who was allegedly involved in both the “October Surprise” and the Iran-Contra affair in the 1980’s.
He had managed to keep a low profile during the 1990’s, but in 2001 he was back in the middle of high-stakes political intrigue.
7\
Ghorbanifar brought to the meeting with him several Iranians, including “a very high-level ex-Revolutionary Guard.”
Ghorbanifar brought to the meeting with him several Iranians, including “a very high-level ex-Revolutionary Guard.”
8\
The final country represented at the meeting was the United States.
The American attendees included Harold Rhode, a civilian analyst in the Office of Net Assessment (ONA).
The final country represented at the meeting was the United States.
The American attendees included Harold Rhode, a civilian analyst in the Office of Net Assessment (ONA).
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Larry Franklin, a policy analyst and Iran desk officer in the Department of Defense (DoD).
Both Rhodes and Franklin speak Farsi.
Larry Franklin, a policy analyst and Iran desk officer in the Department of Defense (DoD).
Both Rhodes and Franklin speak Farsi.
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And the final representative was the omnipresent Michael Ledeen, the stealth operator who’s made numerous appearances in this series.
And the final representative was the omnipresent Michael Ledeen, the stealth operator who’s made numerous appearances in this series.
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At the time, Ledeen was a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a think tank founded by Bill Kristol.
He held no official position in the US government.
At the time, Ledeen was a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a think tank founded by Bill Kristol.
He held no official position in the US government.
12\
A note on sourcing: most of what follows can be found in the Senate Selection Committee on Intelligence 110-345 report published on June 5, 2008.
intelligence.senate.gov/publications/r…
A note on sourcing: most of what follows can be found in the Senate Selection Committee on Intelligence 110-345 report published on June 5, 2008.
intelligence.senate.gov/publications/r…
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The meeting was initiated by Ledeen after Ghorbanifer contacted him in the days following the 9/11 attacks.
The meeting was initiated by Ledeen after Ghorbanifer contacted him in the days following the 9/11 attacks.
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Ledeen initially sought approval for the meeting from a mid-level Defense Dept official.
The meeting was declined.
Ledeen initially sought approval for the meeting from a mid-level Defense Dept official.
The meeting was declined.
15\
Ledeen then went to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley for approval. Ledeen claimed the Iranians wanted to defect.
There was one stipulation: the CIA was not to be involved.
Ledeen then went to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley for approval. Ledeen claimed the Iranians wanted to defect.
There was one stipulation: the CIA was not to be involved.
16\
The meeting was approved by the DoD.
The CIA and the State Dept were only minimally briefed on the meeting; many details were left out, most importantly that Ledeen and Ghorbanifer would be in attendance.
The meeting was approved by the DoD.
The CIA and the State Dept were only minimally briefed on the meeting; many details were left out, most importantly that Ledeen and Ghorbanifer would be in attendance.
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The CIA had previously issued a “burn notice” on Ghorbanifar because the agency considered him a serial fabricator, con man, and possible Iranian intelligence asset.
motherjones.com/politics/2006/…
The CIA had previously issued a “burn notice” on Ghorbanifar because the agency considered him a serial fabricator, con man, and possible Iranian intelligence asset.
motherjones.com/politics/2006/…
18\
Ledeen concealed Ghorbanifar’s involvement in the meeting from everyone, including his American counterparts.
Ledeen concealed Ghorbanifar’s involvement in the meeting from everyone, including his American counterparts.
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The DoD justified the secrecy because Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had authorized the meeting on a “close-hold” basis.
The DoD justified the secrecy because Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had authorized the meeting on a “close-hold” basis.
20\
However, even the DOD claimed to be in the dark about the extent of Italian intel involvement and their motivation for organizing and sponsoring the meeting.
However, even the DOD claimed to be in the dark about the extent of Italian intel involvement and their motivation for organizing and sponsoring the meeting.
21\
The Italians did not host the meeting out of an intense desire for world peace. They were more concerned that regime change in Iran didn’t halt oil and gas sales.
The Italians did not host the meeting out of an intense desire for world peace. They were more concerned that regime change in Iran didn’t halt oil and gas sales.
22\
And did I mention that the Iranians really, REALLY didn’t want the CIA involved, according to Ledeen?
And did I mention that the Iranians really, REALLY didn’t want the CIA involved, according to Ledeen?
23\
Coincidently (or not), DoD officials knew the CIA would never had dealt with Ghorbanifar.
Coincidently (or not), DoD officials knew the CIA would never had dealt with Ghorbanifar.
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So late one night, in a bar in Rome, Ghorbanifar wrote down his plan for regime change in Iran on the back of a napkin.
So late one night, in a bar in Rome, Ghorbanifar wrote down his plan for regime change in Iran on the back of a napkin.
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As it turned out, the Iranians did not want to defect. However, they did have intel to offer.
According to the notes of Rhode and Franklin, the following issues were discussed:
As it turned out, the Iranians did not want to defect. However, they did have intel to offer.
According to the notes of Rhode and Franklin, the following issues were discussed:
26\
Rhode sent a cable back to the Pentagon that the group had “made contact with Iranian intelligence officers who anticipate possible regime change in Iran and want to establish contact with the United States.”
For a price.
Ghorbanifar needed $5 million as “seed money.”
Rhode sent a cable back to the Pentagon that the group had “made contact with Iranian intelligence officers who anticipate possible regime change in Iran and want to establish contact with the United States.”
For a price.
Ghorbanifar needed $5 million as “seed money.”
27\
On December 12, Ledeen met with the United States ambassador to Italy, Marvin Sembler.
The ambassador said the DoD participants “were talking about 25 million [US dollars] for some kind of Iran program.”
On December 12, Ledeen met with the United States ambassador to Italy, Marvin Sembler.
The ambassador said the DoD participants “were talking about 25 million [US dollars] for some kind of Iran program.”
28\
Sembler had several concerns:
-- he was not notified in advance of the meeting
-- the DoD participants failed to get “country clearance”
-- Ledeen was not an employee of the US government.
Sembler had several concerns:
-- he was not notified in advance of the meeting
-- the DoD participants failed to get “country clearance”
-- Ledeen was not an employee of the US government.
29\
The Deputy Director of Operations (CIA) sent a cable expressing his dismay that the agency was not properly notified of the details of the meeting.
The Deputy Director of Operations (CIA) sent a cable expressing his dismay that the agency was not properly notified of the details of the meeting.
30\
On January 29, 2002, during his State of the Union address, President George W Bush stated that Iran along with Iraq and North Korea formed an “Axis of Evil.”
(The speech was penned by NeverTrumper David Frum)
On January 29, 2002, during his State of the Union address, President George W Bush stated that Iran along with Iraq and North Korea formed an “Axis of Evil.”
(The speech was penned by NeverTrumper David Frum)
31\
On February 5, 2002, a memo on how to proceed with the Iranians was prepared from Wolfowitz to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
The option of bypassing the CIA was considered.
On February 5, 2002, a memo on how to proceed with the Iranians was prepared from Wolfowitz to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
The option of bypassing the CIA was considered.
32\
In early February, both the CIA and State Dept opposed any further meetings with the Iranians.
In April 2002, the DoD authorized an “executive referral” for Ledeen to meet with the Defense HUMINT Service.
In early February, both the CIA and State Dept opposed any further meetings with the Iranians.
In April 2002, the DoD authorized an “executive referral” for Ledeen to meet with the Defense HUMINT Service.
33\
Ledeen, however, refused to produce the information necessary for DoD intelligence to check the validity of his sources.
Ledeen, however, refused to produce the information necessary for DoD intelligence to check the validity of his sources.
34\
When the Defense HUMINT Service contacted the CIA, the Agency told them of Ledeen’s checkered history of dealings with Iran (The Iran-Contra affair, anyone?).
The Service advised no further contact with Ledeen.
When the Defense HUMINT Service contacted the CIA, the Agency told them of Ledeen’s checkered history of dealings with Iran (The Iran-Contra affair, anyone?).
The Service advised no further contact with Ledeen.
35\
Ledeen, never one to take “no” for an answer, continued to push Ghorbanifar’s plan via other channels.
Ledeen, never one to take “no” for an answer, continued to push Ghorbanifar’s plan via other channels.
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Former Speak of the House Newt Gingrich got involved.
Former Speak of the House Newt Gingrich got involved.
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On July 4, 2002, Ledeen informed Ambassador Sembler that he would be returning to Rome to “resume the program.” Sembler sent a cable back to the US expressing his concern about the legality of the meeting.
On July 4, 2002, Ledeen informed Ambassador Sembler that he would be returning to Rome to “resume the program.” Sembler sent a cable back to the US expressing his concern about the legality of the meeting.
38\
Secretary of State Colin Powell was opposed to any further contacts between Ledeen and the Iranians. The DoD told Ledeen to “cease activity on this issue.”
Secretary of State Colin Powell was opposed to any further contacts between Ledeen and the Iranians. The DoD told Ledeen to “cease activity on this issue.”
39\
In May 2003, Ledeen sent a new version of Ghorbanifar’s plan for regime change to Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith.
In May 2003, Ledeen sent a new version of Ghorbanifar’s plan for regime change to Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith.
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Feith was in charge of the notorious Office of Special Plans (OSP).
theguardian.com/world/2003/jul…
Feith was in charge of the notorious Office of Special Plans (OSP).
theguardian.com/world/2003/jul…
41\
According to Ledeen, the reason there was no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was because they had been moved to Iran.
mcclatchydc.com/news/special-r…
According to Ledeen, the reason there was no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was because they had been moved to Iran.
mcclatchydc.com/news/special-r…
42\
Ledeen didn’t stop there. He sent a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Pat Roberts, with the endorsement of several senators.
Ledeen didn’t stop there. He sent a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Pat Roberts, with the endorsement of several senators.
43\
When Roberts contacted the CIA, he was told that “none of these leads has resulted in information of significant intelligence value.”
On June 30 and July 1, 2003, Rhode meets with Ghorbanifar again, the time in Paris, arranged by Ledeen
When Roberts contacted the CIA, he was told that “none of these leads has resulted in information of significant intelligence value.”
On June 30 and July 1, 2003, Rhode meets with Ghorbanifar again, the time in Paris, arranged by Ledeen
44\
Employees of ONA were apparently free to perform other tasks for the DoD.
Sound familiar?
Employees of ONA were apparently free to perform other tasks for the DoD.
Sound familiar?
45\
Back then, however, “the Vulcans” were in control of the DoD.
foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsul…
Back then, however, “the Vulcans” were in control of the DoD.
foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsul…
46\
Ledeen disputed Rhode’s account that Ledeen set up the meeting. Ledeen claimed he “read about it in the papers.”
Ledeen disputed Rhode’s account that Ledeen set up the meeting. Ledeen claimed he “read about it in the papers.”
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Meanwhile, Larry Franklin, who shared Ledeen’s passion for regime change in Iran, was growing impatient with the Bush administration.
newyorker.com/magazine/2005/…
Meanwhile, Larry Franklin, who shared Ledeen’s passion for regime change in Iran, was growing impatient with the Bush administration.
newyorker.com/magazine/2005/…
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In February 2003, Franklin met with two representatives from the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in hopes the organization would lobby the administration on Iran policy.
In February 2003, Franklin met with two representatives from the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in hopes the organization would lobby the administration on Iran policy.
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What Franklin didn’t know was that the FBI had been watching one of the men, Steven Rosen, for two years.
In a meeting on June 26, 2003, Franklin discussed “highly classified” information with Rosen and another AIPAC employee while FBI agents were listening.
What Franklin didn’t know was that the FBI had been watching one of the men, Steven Rosen, for two years.
In a meeting on June 26, 2003, Franklin discussed “highly classified” information with Rosen and another AIPAC employee while FBI agents were listening.
50\
In September 2003, DoD personnel was told to cease communications with Ghorbanifar.
In September 2003, DoD personnel was told to cease communications with Ghorbanifar.
51\
In June 2004, FBI agents raided Franklin’s home in West Virginia and found 83 classified documents.
The FBI flipped Franklin and set up a sting in which Franklin passed supposedly classified information to AIPAC employee Rosen.
In June 2004, FBI agents raided Franklin’s home in West Virginia and found 83 classified documents.
The FBI flipped Franklin and set up a sting in which Franklin passed supposedly classified information to AIPAC employee Rosen.
52\
Rosen in turn notified Naor Gilon, Israeli embassy employee and an expert on the Iranian nuclear program. Additionally, Rosen allegedly contacted a Washington Post reporter and leaked the information given to him by Franklin (“I’m not supposed to know this”).
Rosen in turn notified Naor Gilon, Israeli embassy employee and an expert on the Iranian nuclear program. Additionally, Rosen allegedly contacted a Washington Post reporter and leaked the information given to him by Franklin (“I’m not supposed to know this”).
53\
On August 24, 2004, FBI agents sought an interview with Steven Rosen.
Soon after the FBI approached Rosen, Ledeen contacted Franklin. Ledeen arranged for ‘Super Lawyer’ Plato Cacheris to represent Franklin, pro-bono.
nytimes.com/2019/09/26/us/…
On August 24, 2004, FBI agents sought an interview with Steven Rosen.
Soon after the FBI approached Rosen, Ledeen contacted Franklin. Ledeen arranged for ‘Super Lawyer’ Plato Cacheris to represent Franklin, pro-bono.
nytimes.com/2019/09/26/us/…
54\
As the Franklin espionage scandal was unfolding in the summer of 2004, the New York Times published a series of stories about Ahmad Chalabi, the founder of the Iraq National Congress.
nytimes.com/2004/05/24/wor…
As the Franklin espionage scandal was unfolding in the summer of 2004, the New York Times published a series of stories about Ahmad Chalabi, the founder of the Iraq National Congress.
nytimes.com/2004/05/24/wor…
55\
Chalabi allegedly told Iranian officials that US intelligence had broken Iran’s secret communications code. How did Chalabi know that information?
Chalabi allegedly told Iranian officials that US intelligence had broken Iran’s secret communications code. How did Chalabi know that information?
56\
Chalabi, though an Arab, was always considered a suspect ally of the United States because he was a Shiite Muslim and thus potentially sympathetic to the Iranian government.
Chalabi, though an Arab, was always considered a suspect ally of the United States because he was a Shiite Muslim and thus potentially sympathetic to the Iranian government.
57\
However, thanks to the efforts of former CIA director James Woolsey, Chalabi became a source for intelligence on Iraq anyway.
However, thanks to the efforts of former CIA director James Woolsey, Chalabi became a source for intelligence on Iraq anyway.
58\
In August 2004, Feith was interviewed to determine whether he authorized Franklin’s leaks to AIPAC.
On Sept 6, 2004, Newsweek published an article about a possible “mole” passing classified information to Israel. Ledeen defends Franklin.
web.archive.org/web/2005040603…
In August 2004, Feith was interviewed to determine whether he authorized Franklin’s leaks to AIPAC.
On Sept 6, 2004, Newsweek published an article about a possible “mole” passing classified information to Israel. Ledeen defends Franklin.
web.archive.org/web/2005040603…
59\
According to a Newsweek source, Franklin was not motivated by money.
According to a Newsweek source, Franklin was not motivated by money.
60\
On May 3, 2005 Franklin was charged with espionage in a sealed complaint.
fas.org/irp/ops/ci/fra…
On May 3, 2005 Franklin was charged with espionage in a sealed complaint.
fas.org/irp/ops/ci/fra…
61\
Before he entered his plea, Franklin was approached by two men who suggested he fake his suicide and avoid testifying.
forward.com/news/108778/on…
Before he entered his plea, Franklin was approached by two men who suggested he fake his suicide and avoid testifying.
forward.com/news/108778/on…
62\
On Jan 20, 2006, Franklin was sentenced to 12 years and 7 months in prison.
nytimes.com/2006/01/20/pol…
On Jan 20, 2006, Franklin was sentenced to 12 years and 7 months in prison.
nytimes.com/2006/01/20/pol…
63\
The DOJ eventually dropped the charges against the AIPAC employees. After those charges were dropped, the judge reduced Franklin’s sentence to 10 months.
The DOJ eventually dropped the charges against the AIPAC employees. After those charges were dropped, the judge reduced Franklin’s sentence to 10 months.
64\
Nevertheless, Franklin’s professional career was ruined. He worked a series of odd jobs in the years after his release.
forward.com/news/108778/on…
Nevertheless, Franklin’s professional career was ruined. He worked a series of odd jobs in the years after his release.
forward.com/news/108778/on…
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Rosen was fired by AIPAC, whom he later sued for defamation. He lost the case.
Rosen was fired by AIPAC, whom he later sued for defamation. He lost the case.
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One of the Israelis that the FBI alleged Rosen passed information to was Naor Gilon, an Israeli political counselor and Iranian nuclear expert.
Franklin’s was Gilon’s immediate point of contact at the DoD.
One of the Israelis that the FBI alleged Rosen passed information to was Naor Gilon, an Israeli political counselor and Iranian nuclear expert.
Franklin’s was Gilon’s immediate point of contact at the DoD.
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Gilon was not charged with any crime. He went on to a successful career in the Israeli diplomatic service.
He was Israel’s ambassador to Italy from 2012 to August 2016.
Gilon was not charged with any crime. He went on to a successful career in the Israeli diplomatic service.
He was Israel’s ambassador to Italy from 2012 to August 2016.
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Ledeen has continued his relentless crusade for regime change in Iran, authoring several books on the dangers of the regime.
Ledeen has continued his relentless crusade for regime change in Iran, authoring several books on the dangers of the regime.
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It took me quite a bit of time to create this thread because it required a lot of sourcing to be believable.
It took me quite a bit of time to create this thread because it required a lot of sourcing to be believable.
70\
In my research, I came across some credible sources that call the previous narrative into question. As it turns out, all may not be what it seems. There may be more to the story.
To be continued...
In my research, I came across some credible sources that call the previous narrative into question. As it turns out, all may not be what it seems. There may be more to the story.
To be continued...
....Part II 👇
