Thread by @OlivierR_Bel

[THREAD] Should the US withdraw its forces from Africa to better focus on China and Russia?

A thread in light of the recent Pau Summit and as the US is considering a significant drawdown. 1/13

https://twitter.com/WarOnTheRocks/status/1220695117335580673

1/ The situation in the Sahel is not good. Terrorist attacks have been deadly in the past months and are moving south, towards the tri-border region of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. But it’s not hopeless.

➡️ A good explainer
africacenter.org/publication/re… by @Pauline_Le_Roux 2/13

What happened in Pau?

Two key issues 1) reconfirming that Sahel countries still wished for French (and international) presence, in the face of growing anti-French sentiment 2) Devising a new strategy.

More here ➡️ thedefensepost.com/2020/01/14/sah… 3/13

[I focus on the security side, though of course the solution is political ➡️csis.org/analysis/polit…
On that front, the Mali peace agr implementation grp met again after a 5 months interruption, discussed a return of the army to Kidal. Good sign?
➡️ voaafrique.com/a/le-retour-de…] 4/13

In Pau, leaders set up a Sahel Coalition w joint command between FR op #Barkhane & #G5Sahel force. This + announcement of Takuba (Euro SOF TF mentoring Malian forces) + 🇪🇺 likely decentralizing its training mission hints at new method, i.e. closer embedding with local allies 5/12

This is welcome: it would help bolstering Sahel forces' fighting ability throughout deployment cycle (not just training) and put them in the spotlight (rather than FR), thereby increasing their aura and facilitating the return of gvt authority. 6/13

2/ In this context, the Pentagon is considering a drawdown of its forces to focus on great power competition. Fully logical given National defense Strategy. But is it not counterproductive in the end? 7/13

US provides mostly surveillance (‘ISR’), air refueling and lift (also training). Why are these critical?

Because the theater is huge: around 2500 miles wide, i.e. roughly the US coast to coast (we tend to underestimate how big Africa is, maybe due to Mercator projection?). 8/13

This is a pretty good deal. With a limited investment, the US increases manifold the ability of its European and African allies fighting on the ground.

It's also a great example of burden sharing. Ending it risks signalling that burden sharing is really burden shifting. 8/13

But it’s also counterproductive from a greater power competition pt of view.

Democracies on both side of the Atlantic are better off together. Eg 🇪🇺, a $18 trillion eco and 500M consumer market, shares concerns with 🇺🇸 on China trade 👉@EUintheUS

https://twitter.com/EUintheUS/status/1217198929273593859

9/13

Yet Europeans destabilized by terrorism or mass migration and a populist backlash make poor allies.

A limited but critical American investment — eg airlift and surveillance assets — would ensure that Europe remains both a willing and able ally in the great-power game. 10/13

That investment is not endless. Europeans are stepping up (eg 🇩🇰 now providing key lift @DenmarkinUSA

https://twitter.com/forsvaretdk/status/1206870206255157253

). But they need a little bit more time. Pulling the rug under those efforts before they have reached fruition would be penny wise but pound foolish 11/13

I’ve seen that some, from @MichaelShurkin at @RANDCorporation (rand.org/blog/2020/01/a…) to Congress (defensenews.com/congress/2020/…) have joined the debate, and I'm sure others have different opinions.

Happy to discuss further! 12/13 [END]