Thread by @tanvi_madan

@arzandc Factors I've outlined before can explain why India might reconsider Aus -> MALABAR:
- found #Quad useful
- GOI usually moves step-by-step (eg JAI trilat) & this is natural
- greater comfort level w/ Aus
- signal to China, esp given its contd. reax re Kashmir
- political will 1/

@arzandc Let me unwrap these elements. India often takes a step-by-step approach to gauge commitment, utility & regional responses. e.g. India-Japan-US trilat:
2011: starts to meet at working level
2015: Japan -> US-India naval ex MALABAR
2015: 1st ministerial
2018: 1st leader level 2/

@arzandc Ppl whose only litmus test for Quad success is a maritime Quad may hv missed, but over last 2+ yrs:
- met 5 times at working level
- upgraded to ministerial
- India hosts table-top CT exercise
- cyber officials meet on multilat sidelines
- bilat/trilat engagement btwn all ↑ 3/

@arzandc Mind you, this is just the engagement between the Quad countries that they have acknowledged. For instance, there have also been reports of diplomats of the Quad countries based in some South & Southeast Asian countries meeting regularly 4/

@arzandc Re ↑ bilat/trilat🤝btwn Quad. Ind-Aus:
- defense activities: 11 in 2014 -> 38 in 2018
- AUSINDEX naval ex from '15; 2019: US, NZ observers
- India in Aus multilat ex PITCH BLACK, KAKADU
- 2+2
- Aus-Ind-Jap trilat
- Senior mil visits
- Aus reax on Ind-Pak
Bilat bonhomie helps 5/

@arzandc ↑ bilateral India-Australia interaction wld hv helped Delhi's comfort level w/ Canberra. So would the fact that more competitive Aus view of China has held up. Some in Delhi had questions about whether that wld be the case of Labor had won elex, but w/ Liberal victory... 6/

@arzandc Also, while each Quad country's been engaging China (in India's case see Wuhan-Chennai track), they've been doing more w/ each other, & w/ others
- Ind-JP-US-Philippines group sail thru SCS
- Aus-JP-US-France ex in BofBengal (La Perouse)
- Aus-JP-US-ROK ex (Pacific Vanguard) 7/

@arzandc That brings me to India & China. Last 2 yrs has made evident "reset" involved tone/temperature rather than substance. & over last yr, been setback in tone too. India's seen China:
- back Pakistan post-Pulwama
- give cover to Pak in FATF
- repeatedly move vs India on Kashmir 8/

@arzandc Re China & India's move to dilute Art370 re J&K:
- Ind wld hv expected MOFA stmt; natural...PRC party to dispute, but
- repeated PRC stmts incl Wang Yi UNGA speech
- moves to call UNSC mtgs, incl v recently, & UNHRC one
(this while India's stayed silent on Xinjiang, Hong Kong) 9/

@arzandc Why China continues to bring up J&K is a good question. Possibly PRC:
- feels need to back Pak (thx to CPEC it has more leverage w PRC than in past)
- believes India's a lost cause
- feels better w/ US deal, Abe summit, thinks Modi on backfoot
- thinks Ind won't/can't respond 10/

@arzandc So, India considering Australia -> in ex MALABAR could be:
- showing China that it does hv ways of responding to PRC upping the ante
- result of it thinking Beijing's a lost cause (RCEP might hv contributed too)
(or by leaking possibility of mQuad, cld be signaling PRC) 11/

@arzandc Then, there's these factors rel to political will in India re considering Australia in MALABAR
- EAM Jaishankar's approach
- Chinese behavior (wrt Kashmir, RCEP) wld hv strengthened hands of advocates of deepening Quad or of not letting PRC veto pace of India's balancing 12/

@arzandc So, will we see Australia -> MALABAR? We shall see, but it won't be surprising if we do for reasons above (unless India's just using a leak to signal China).
Regardless whenever Aus PM visits India, we shall see signs of ↑ engagement, incl likely a log. support agmt 13/

@arzandc I'll end this thread w/ a note that had we not seen Australian & Japanese PMs' visits to India get postponed, there'd hv been a lot of sub-Quad mtgs involving India:
Dec: IN-JP 2+2 (min)
Dec: IN-AUS 2+2 (sec)
Dec: IN-US 2+2 (min)
Dec: Modi-Abe
Jan: Modi-ScoMo
Feb: Modi-Trump
14/