Public understanding of (recent) politics--the Biden turnaround & the failure of Warren campaign-- would be increased if there were more familiarity with soc sci research on how *coordination* can generate collective choices that differ from those ppl make on their own. THREAD
Start with an example from a very different social domain: financial-market bubbles.
A common misconception is that when prices get very high (relative to reasonable estimates of intrinsic value), this is because investors are caught up in erroneous beliefs.
A common misconception is that when prices get very high (relative to reasonable estimates of intrinsic value), this is because investors are caught up in erroneous beliefs.
In fact, & as Abreu & Brunnermeier show, bubbles are often fueled by (professional) investors who know prices are too high; they invest anyway, with the aim of getting out before most other investors do. But why don't they act on their beliefs? In a word: coordination. Any one+ 
investor doesn't have enough capital to influence prices. And none of them know when the others will sell. And so it often requires a *public "news event"* to make it common knowledge that everyone is poised to sell. Once that event happens, the race to the exits is on.
Similar kinds of dynamics are visible in many other social settings. Consider Adut's insightful theory of scandal. The misconception that scandalrs are triggered by new information. In fact, & as well represented by the case of Oscar Wilde, the deviance is often+
+ widely known already. In fact, deviance can be an open secret for many years without leading to any effort to address it; what's key is "disruptive publicity" of deviance: it helps opponents channel their attacks & spotlights those who've seemingly been complicit. This idea+
has obvious resonance with recent movements like #MeToo.
I shd pause & stress that when soc scientists as different as Adut (sociology) & Abreu & Brunnermeier (finance) make very similar arguments (see also related lines of research from other fields) we should pay attention!
I shd pause & stress that when soc scientists as different as Adut (sociology) & Abreu & Brunnermeier (finance) make very similar arguments (see also related lines of research from other fields) we should pay attention!
Now to (recent) politics & gender. The key link to the social situations above is that any one person has a minuscule effect on the collective outcome-- i.e., who wins an election. As such, if we assume that voters care whether their choice wins or not, they should be+
extremely sensitive to what they think other voters are going to do. In short, if I'm willing to live with both candidates X & Y but I prefer X to Y, there are times when I will choose Y over X.
Not only that, but even if *everyone* prefers Y over X but they don't know that
Not only that, but even if *everyone* prefers Y over X but they don't know that
but they do know everyone is willing to live with X, it can be rational for everyone to go for X rather than Y.
Q: How do voters learn what other voters are willing to live with?
A: Well-timed endorsements & elections can be key!
To say the "party decides" is too simplistic
Q: How do voters learn what other voters are willing to live with?
A: Well-timed endorsements & elections can be key!
To say the "party decides" is too simplistic
What Clyburn's endorsement did was to focus public attention-- it became *common knowledge*-- what everyone knows that everyone knows-- that it's OK to vote for Joe. By contrast, there was nothing comparable for any other candidate. The SC election then reinforced this public+
as did the subsequent endorsements. In the absence of any other public signal, it was an extremely clear message that any Democrat could hear:
Joe will do!!
(washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/…)
Joe will do!!
(washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/…)
Now what about Warren and gender?
Here I think not enough people have read Cecilia Ridgeway's (the dean of the sociology of gender) book Framed by Gender.
Key to Ridgeway's model is that
Here I think not enough people have read Cecilia Ridgeway's (the dean of the sociology of gender) book Framed by Gender.
Key to Ridgeway's model is that
gender (as well as race & any widely publicized category system) is a *coordination device* (or what Schelling famously called a "focal point") to which people default when they are trying to manage their relations with one another. If the name of the game is anticipating what+
other people will do & if you know they're aware of the same gender stereotypes bc they're part of the same (public) cultural system, you'll anticipate them to use gender to coordinate their action.
(Ridgeway, coauthors & I show that this logic is key to soc status advantages)
(Ridgeway, coauthors & I show that this logic is key to soc status advantages)
Key Implication:
Even if most people would prefer a woman candidate to a man candidate, they may vote for the man. And this is especially likely if-- as seems esp true in this primary-- they mostly care about coordinating around someone who's acceptable.
Even if most people would prefer a woman candidate to a man candidate, they may vote for the man. And this is especially likely if-- as seems esp true in this primary-- they mostly care about coordinating around someone who's acceptable.
Final note: Even if much recent politics are driven by coordination problems, this doesn't mean other factors are unimportant. Also, that gender stereotypes are so deeply lodged in common knowledge may make them *harder* to undo than if they are privately held. This leads us+
to a really bitter irony (see this great point from @jenmercieca ), which is that all the post-2016 takes about how Americans won't vote for a woman (even though HRC won the popular vote!) may have made it harder to coordinate around a woman candidate.
@threadreaderapp unroll
