#Turkey is currently following a two-fold strategy in the broader #EasternMediterranean. On the one hand it embarked, at least ostensibly, on an effort to normalize its relations with a number of regional countries including #Egypt, #Israel, #Greece, #France and the #UAE. >
Ankara expects that this will convince the #US and #EU that it adopted a more pro-western and constructive foreign policy orientation. Both the talks with #Greece and the developments in the #Cyprus process aim to appease the EU, advance Turkish-EU relations, and >>
increase the chances of economic rewards for #Turkey. On the other hand, Ankara is trying to use the normalization of these relations in a subversive way, namely to undo the network of cooperation that has emerged between #Cyprus, #Greece, #Israel, #Egypt, and >>
other Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries. This network has among other things functioned as an antagonistic pole to #Turkey thus challenging its revisionist geopolitical aspirations. >
By restoring individual relationships with some of these states, #Turkey is hoping to weaken its cohesion and more participate in the regional security architecture as an agenda-setter more effectively.
In #Libya, #Turkey has already managed to reap the fruits of its intervention on multiple levels, including maritime zones, security cooperation, and construction contracts. However #Greece's recent effort to write the wrongs of its previous Libya policy >>
by approaching the new interim government points to a new round of Greek-Turkish antagonism in the #EasternMediterranean and #NorthAfrica. >>
W substantial issues remaining unresolved between the 2 counties, #Erdogan's efforts to court #Greece & create the prospect for a meeting w Mitsotakis is about fabricating a virtual momentum that'll allow him to bypass meaningful moves at the negotiating table and signal the EU >
#Dendias' stance at the press conference with #Erdogan aimed to push #Cavusoglu to "come out" and show his true colors and, at the same time, give the Greek position more publicity - in the hopes of getting more support. >>
#Dendias basically wanted to expose the Turkish stance, given that no substantial developments have taken place at the official talks. That is, there was nothing to jeopardize apart from the image of the country that plays along that #Turkey is trying to project abroad.
Fin.
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With #Turkey visiting #Egypt to normalize relations and an upcoming FM Summit between #Cyprus, #Greece, #Israel and #UAE on security and economy it seems that we have two parallel geopolitical dynamics shaping.
A. Turkey is trying to disrupt the emergent block of cooperation in the #Eastmed (that includes extra-regional actors) and deny international power multipliers from #Greece and #Cyprus in particular. Plus it promotes a different regional status quo, including on maritime zones. >
B. In parallel, #Greece, #Cyprus, #Israel and #UAE are trying to set up a different mechanism that will not be restricted by the dynamics & monothematic character of #EMGF. [UAE are unable to enter EMGF due to Palestinian veto]. This will allow them to enhance cooperation in >>
1. "The Egyptian-Greek Exclusive Economic Zone (#EEZ) deal is important because it settles, at least partly, an issue that has been open for decades in the area and completes another small [piece of the] puzzle in the maritime zone disputes of the #EasternMediterranean"
2. #Turkey's actions aim to“to deconstruct the existing regional status quo & security architecture & bring about a new one that will be more beneficial to itself, in terms of the geopolitical space, the natural resources and the maritime routes that it will be able to control.”
Another article (not surprisingly on Al Jazeera) trying to convince us that #Ankara is the victim and Turkish foreign policy is on the defence. The approach is superficial at best and ignores a number of facts >>
That Turkey unofficially abandoned regime change in #Syria is not the point: same author, in 2013 Hinnebusch & Tur book wrote "Turkey saw an opportunity to bring abt regime change in Damascus at Iran's expense...it was a matter of geopolitical competition between Ankara & Tehran"
Regime change was an unprecedented policy for Ankara to adopt & a revisionist one; by the author's admission, for the purpose of regional power. 4 interventions later it's inaccurate to say that "Turkey's ability to influence the course of the conflict was reduced to a minimum"