Thread by @ZenonasTziarras

A piece by @MadaMasr on the #EastMed tensions with my two cents.

#Thread with some of my comments.

[Do read the whole thing, it's extensive and very balanced]

#Turkey #Egypt #Cyprus #Greece #Israel #UAE #Libya @prioMidEast @PRIOUpdates @PRIOCyprus

madamasr.com/en/2020/08/25/…

1. "The Egyptian-Greek Exclusive Economic Zone (#EEZ) deal is important because it settles, at least partly, an issue that has been open for decades in the area and completes another small [piece of the] puzzle in the maritime zone disputes of the #EasternMediterranean"

2. #Turkey's actions aim to“to deconstruct the existing regional status quo & security architecture & bring about a new one that will be more beneficial to itself, in terms of the geopolitical space, the natural resources and the maritime routes that it will be able to control.”

3a. "It is impossible for a country that wants to become a great power — like Turkey does — to do so without trying to maximize its national power components (e.g. its economy, military might and access to natural resources) and its influence abroad...” >

3b. "In that sense, there is, indeed, a strong pragmatic aspect in Turkish foreign policy that is, however, part of greater geopolitical strategy. The Turkish business sector (including business associations, be they conservative or secular) always tend to be more pragmatic... >

3c. in their approach, pushing for good relations with both the West and the East. This manifested in Turkey’s relations with #Israel and #Egypt, as well, where despite political problems economic relations were not interrupted... >

3d. From this perspective, it seems that #Turkey managed to compartmentalize its political and economic relations with these (and other) countries."

4. "While it is not unlikely for #Turkey to restore relations with Israel and #Egypt in the future, it is possible that #Erdogan will need to reproduce the crises with these countries for domestic consumption, as part of [his] efforts to remain in power at least until 2023"

5. "Turkey is now looking to acquire a permanent military presence (as well as political and economic influence) in Libya that it will use to further expand its sphere of influence into Africa. An important aspect of this strategy is natural resources.”

6a."The ideological vision of TFP was assisted by structural changes in the international system, most notably the regional power vacuums created frm mid-2000s onward when the Iraq War & the gradual retreat of US from the area created new security concerns & opportunities for TR>

6b. ...Over the past 10 years #Turkey has transformed into a full-blown revisionist power. And partly because of the limited US involvement in the region, Turkey has also been able to redefine its relationship with the US and Russia & turn it into a largely transactional one...

6c. ...As such, over the past five years or so, #Turkey emerged as a ‘third pole’ in the broader #MiddleEast, i.e. between the #US and #NATO on one hand and #Russia on the other, trying to benefit from the best of both worlds, not always successfully...

6d. ...In this context, the #US and #NATO found themselves in a historic dilemma: to ‘discipline’ #Turkey and risk pushing it further to the arms of Russia and Eurasia, or incentivize it (sometimes using a carrot-and-stick approach) in order to keep it close to the West?...

6e. ...It seems that Washington has so far opted, for the most part, for the latter and, as a result, it often ended up turning a blind eye to Turkish revisionism, either in the Middle East or the Eastern Mediterranean...

6f. ...Not least because #Turkey appears willing to occasionally accommodate or serve certain #NATO interests, e.g. in #Syria, #Libya or the #BlackSea."

#fin @UnrollThread