Today is the 5th year anniversary of the 2016 EU referendum vote in which the UK had narrowly voted to #Leave the European Union. Unlike Trump, the impact is permanent and already caused notable damage. Here is a 🧵 of 🧵 with some past work and deliberations on #Brexit... 1/...
In one of the first papers we asked "Who voted for #Brexit?". The paper is a systematic correlational analysis of what is common to #Leave support across districts and within cities & we also show that a #Brexit model can predict LePen voting. Link: goo.gl/VzBo57 2/
Similarly, we augment the analysis using individual level data. This helps tackle whether correlational district level evidence is due to ecological fallacy. Open access at @ejprjournalgoo.gl/sPzzwf 3/
But what caused #Brexit? Solid work providing causal evidence is scarce. Work by @PStanig & Colantone suggests that import-competition induced rapid and unfettered structural transformation is to blame 👉 "Global Competition & #Brexit" in @apsrjournalcup.org/3vNgDlh 4/
My own work highlights the importance that post financial crisis #Austerity has played a major role. The work leverages exceptionally granular data and is quite careful on causal identification. Read the paper in @AEAjournalsaeaweb.org/articles?id=10… 5/
The paper was extremely widely circulated and obviously attracted criticism. In an @LSEpoliticsblog long read, I address many of these in a fair bit of detail blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/10… 6/
#Austerity mattered not just in 2016 but by creating the the environment in which a referendum would be called. A short story of the 2010 elections, austerity, its fall out in 2015 & the subsequent EU referendum vote is highlighting this: 🧵
In work summarized by @ChrisGiles_ we show that the regional economic cost of #Brexit are already exacerbating those same cleavages that the EU referendum vote brought to the fore.
There is an interactive visualization of the costs of #Brexit across districts and UK regions which we will update this year with 2019 district level data once that becomes available from the ONS.
Now that the hardest #Brexit is a political reality & its destructive ideology is alove and well in UK politics we will likely see more work of the costly & painful decoupeling that has started five years ago. Economics research has a lot to offer, so watch the space. End.
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So I am going to report on some lack of progress about a #FOIA request we launched to @PHE_uk last Nov to make data available on the #Excel error that resulted in 15k #COVID19 cases to not be contact traced in a timely fashion (whatdotheyknow.com/request/region…). The response so far is ...
quite underwhelming. In the paper we reverse engineer the geographic distribution of the missing cases which is far from perfect. We find that places with higher exposure to the contact tracing error saw a notable differential increase in infections and subsequent deaths.
Naturally we would much rather prefer to work with the actual data as the measurement will be more precise. And further, it would allow for a direct measurement of infections among contacts of individuals that were traced with a delay. But @PHE_uk do not consider this is of
So @UKHofficial did have a look at my paper on #EOHO and #COVID19 - they have gone to some lengths to try to cast doubt about my research, the methods & results (see ukhospitality.org.uk/page/SafeReope…). So here are their point-by-point lines of attack on my work and my response. Thread 🧵⬇️
Point 1: Misunderstanding the research design and aggregate data fallacy 1/
Point 2: Actually, EOHO did not increase restaurant visits that much. 2/
Timely #ContactTracing does matter fighting #COVID19. In a new paper (➡️ bit.ly/394Ebuo) we study a bizarre #Excel error in England that caused 16k cases to NOT be contact traced. We econometrically can link this blunder to ~ 120k new cases & 1.5k deaths...🧵⬇️1/N
Studying non-pharmaceutical interventions to fight #COVID19 is HARD because we hardly ever isolate specific individual policies as often many measures are taken together (lockdowns, school closures, masks,...). For #ContractTracing we also have mostly correlational evidence...2/N
Enter the English Test&Trace system hastily built on, what appears to be a set of XLS spreadsheets giving us a consequential natural experiment. On Oct 4, PHE announced that ~ 16k #COVID19 cases were not correctly reported resulting in a large jump in reported cases.. 3/N
Today I m sharing another paper on unintended consequences of a UK policy which makes me cringe at how my tax money is spent all the while debating #FreeSchoolMeals "Subsidizing the spread of COVID-19: Evidence from the UK’s #EOHO scheme". ➡️ bit.ly/3ed5Slo a thread🧵⬇️
The EOHO scheme was conceived to help the hard-hit restaurant businesses in the UK in the wake of 1st #COVID19 wave. The scheme cut the cost of meals & non-alcoholic drinks by up to 50% across tens of thousands of participating restaurants in the UK from 3 to 31 August 2020. 1...
The research leverages data from #HMRC’s own #EOHO restaurant finder app which was the go-to platform for people searching for EOHO restaurants in their neighbourhood, together with weekly data on new #COVID-19 infections measured at the granular MSOA level (5-10k residents) 2...
We use the synthetic control method previously used by @JohnSpringford@bornecon@MSchularick studying #Brexit-vote economic impact on the UK as a whole, just that we study regional economic output. The UK wide exercise is published in the @EJ_RESbit.ly/3j2zt2V 2...
We apply (a lot of variations) on regional quarterly GDP as well as annual district-level Gross-value added data for the UK. In total, for districts we construct a total of 100+ synthetic control estimates to assess concerns of overfitting - below plot is the case of Lewisham 3..
I want to share a new paper. Its relevant to #GE2019. The findings are quite exemplary of the misguidedness of much of economic & social policy under the #ConservativeParty. It should be a harbinger to wary voters: there is more of the same under the Tories & with #Brexit. 1/..
The short summary: the reform to housing benefit from 2011 onwards was intended to save the public purse hundreds of millions. But quite the reverse happened: not only did it create huge amounts of misery and agony, it also ended up not saving the public much money at all. 2/..
What happened? From April 2011 onwards, local housing allowance was massively cut from covering up to the median level of rents, to only cover up to the 30th percentile of market rents. Here is a map of how this affected households in terms of expected losses per week. 3/..