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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Feb 24

Thread 🧵
Yesterday, during a graduation ceremony for IDF officers, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a number of important remarks addressing three key issues: Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon. An analytical reading of these statements and their impact on the map of the region.
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I will break down this analysis by examining each file separately and I will explain the possibilities of what Netanyahu promised in this speech, as well as the obstacles the Israeli government may face within a strategy that I will call the “Security circle”. In my opinion, this strategy is a direct result of the attacks of October 7 and the shift it caused in the perspective of Israeli politicians and military officials, both within Israel and in the region.
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Gaza file
Netanyahu confirmed that he will bring back all Israeli hostages from Gaza without exception, that Hamas will not control the Strip, and that his government will work to disarm them. This statement is very important for several reasons. Regarding the remaining Israeli hostages held by Hamas, it can be said that Netanyahu, despite the doubts, is still committed to the exchange deal that began mid-last month. However, there are still questions about Netanyahu and his government’s vision for the form of the second phase. With voices within the government coalition urging Netanyahu not to move forward with the second phase, alongside American pressure pushing for its initiation, Netanyahu finds himself in a dilemma. He believes that returning to war again at the end of the first phase would result in more hostages being killed, and discontent from Trump and his administration, whose support he urgently needs on both the Gaza evacuation and the Iranian nuclear issue. On the other hand, advancing to the second phase would mean a sustainable cessation of the war and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, something that several of his government ministers reject, which threatens to fragment the coalition and lead to early elections, something Netanyahu does not want at this stage. This dilemma has led Netanyahu to seek a way out by requesting an extension of the first phase of the agreement. This will allow for the release of more hostages without allowing the Gaza reconstruction process to begin or implementing a permanent ceasefire, thus satisfying the Israeli domestic front and its government ministers, while also keeping Trump’s plan to relocate the residents of the Gaza Strip possible. Beginning Gaza's reconstruction would disrupt Trump's plan, which, as of now, remains theoretical, despite being adopted by Netanyahu’s government and many opposition parties in Israel.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Feb 14

Thread 🧵
While eyes in Lebanon and for those interested in Lebanese affairs are directed towards the borders with Israel, with February 18 being the scheduled date for the IDF to withdraw to their positions prior to last September, developments at Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut and the Syrian-Lebanese border have reaffirmed that the Lebanese scene remains complex. An analytical reading of the political and military developments in the Lebanese arena.
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On November 26, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced his government’s approval of a ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, brokered by the United States and France, which began at dawn on the 27th of the same month. While all 13 terms of the agreement have been revealed, the agreement remains controversial, especially within Lebanese parties. Following the agreement, General Joseph Aoun was elected president, and Nawaf Salam was chosen as prime minister of the new Lebanese government, which was announced a few days ago. Despite the positive atmosphere in Beirut, this cautious optimism has already begun to face challenges on multiple fronts, most notably the domestic front. While Lebanese political parties, with regional and international support, are trying to push Lebanon into a new phase entitled “Lebanon after the defeat of the Hezbollah-Assad-Tehran axis,” Hezbollah rejects the narrative of its defeat in the last war with Israel, emphasizing its political and popular influence, and asserting that there is no new Lebanon without Hezbollah and its weapons. This polarization between the two competing narratives may pose a dilemma for the new era headed by Joseph Aoun and the government of Nawaf Salam, as it may be difficult to satisfy all parties at the same time.
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To better understand the Lebanese scene, it is essential to clarify the popular reality there, away from what is presented by Western or Arab media. Yes, Hezbollah has suffered huge human estimated at around five thousand dead, with double that number wounded, and the deaths of the first and second ranks of the leadership, along with the deaths of Nasrallah, a key symbol of the "Resistance Axis" in the region. A security source confirmed to me that during the war, thousands of militia fighters refused to go to southern Lebanon to fight. And yes, the last war caused massive destruction in most of the towns and cities where the Shiites of Lebanon live, who constitute the human reservoir of the militia. However, despite this difficult reality, Hezbollah still enjoys considerable popular support among the Shiite community in Lebanon and beyond, and they are prepared to bear these losses despite their impact to their economic reality. The relationship between Hezbollah and the Shiites in Lebanon is an ideological religious relationship, not an institutional partisan one. Therefore, talking about the end of Hezbollah in Lebanon, at least as a political party, is an incorrect assessment. This is what Hezbollah in alliance with the Amal Movement tried to confirm by blocking Joseph Aoun’s election from the first round, and then by securing four ministers in Nawaf Salam’s government and finally by staging protests in front of Rafic Hariri International Airport (Beirut Airport) in response to the refusal to allow an Iranian plane to land. Hezbollah makes it clear that any confrontation with it would mean a confrontation with a significant part of the Shiite sect in Lebanon.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Feb 4

Thread 🧵
A car bomb exploded yesterday in the city of Manbij, located in the eastern countryside of Aleppo, northern Syria. The blast killed approximately 15 civilians, most of whom were women, making it the deadliest attack in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime. While social media users pointed fingers at the SDF militia, the new Syrian administration refrained from identifying those responsible. In an official statement, they focused on pursuing the perpetrators of this terrorist attack. An analytical reading of the security and political circumstances of this explosion.
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On December 9th, the SDF withdrew from the city of Manbij towards the eastern bank of the Euphrates river. According to informed sources, this withdrawal came after an agreement between Ankara and Washington, under which the Euphrates river will serve as the dividing line between the SDF forces and the Syrian administration forces in preparation for direct negotiations between Damascus and the SDF to reach a diplomatic solution to de-escalate the conflict. Indeed, a delegation from the SDF traveled to Damascus and intensive rounds of negotiations have been ongoing to this day without any notable results. Returning to the city of Manbij, which has been the subject of a dispute between the SDF and the armed Syrian opposition factions supported by Türkiye since the Kurdish militias, backed by the international coalition against ISIS, crossed the Euphrates River and imposed their control over the city of Manbij after expelling ISIS fighters in 2016, has been plagued by a series of car bombings since the SDF’s withdrawal. In less than two months car bombs eight car bombings have taken place with yesterday's attack being the deadliest. So, who is behind these bombings?
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It can be said that there are three parties accused by the conflicting sides. First, the SDF claims that the Syrian groups supported by Türkiye are behind these car bombings, arguing that Ankara is looking for a pretext to launch a military action against them in the eastern Euphrates region. In practice, the car bombings and motorcycle bombings have not stopped in the areas of the northern Aleppo countryside over the past six years, despite the strenuous efforts of the Syrian opposition factions supported by Türkiye to prevent them. Dozens of fighters from these factions, along with hundreds of civilians, have been killed in these explosions. Moreover, Türkiye is well aware that there is no military solution to the eastern Syrian file unless the ongoing diplomatic process in Damascus fails or if Washington gives the green light to this move by withdrawing its forces from the east of the Euphrates. Therefore, Türkiye or the Syrian groups affiliated with it have no interest in instigating such bloody events.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Feb 1

Thread 🧵
In a first-of-its-kind event, at approximately 11 PM last night, an Israeli force that had penetrated the vicinity of the village of Tranjah, located in the disengagement zone in southern Syria, was exposed to gunfire from the Syrian side, followed by the IDF combing the area and firing illuminating bombs. An analytical reading of the scene on the Israeli-Syrian border after the fall of the Assad regime.
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Less than an hour after this attack, a group called the Islamic Resistance in Syria claimed responsibility. In their statement, they confirmed firing towards a vehicle belonging to the Israeli Defense Forces in the village of Tranjah in the northern Quneitra countryside, which resulted in casualties on the Israeli side, and then the group withdrew. This statement is the second for this group since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8. A few days ago, they issued a statement confirming that the resistance in Syria has not ended and that the coming days will bring surprises. So, who is the Islamic Resistance in Syria?
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During the first years of the Syrian revolution, with the intervention of the Iranian Quds Force and the Hezbollah militia, they started forming groups of Syrian fighters who mainly belonged to the Shiite sect. The circle of fighters later expanded to include Sunnis loyal to Assad. As Assad expanded his control over southern Syria in the governorates of Quneitra and Daraa, Hezbollah leader Ali Musa Daqduq, who was assassinated last November by Israeli warplanes, took over the so-called "Golan file". This involved working to form a network of agents affiliated with the Iranian Quds Force and Hezbollah in southern Syria. The Military Security Branch of the Assad regime coordinated the work of this network by issuing security id cards to its members. During that period, the work of this network was limited to collecting information on the locations of the IDF and on the movements of Israeli patrols on the opposite side of the disengagement zone in the Golan. However, with the fall of Assad, Tehran gave the green light to this network to work on carrying out attacks against Israeli forces in the disengagement zone, which these forces had penetrated during the past two months.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 26

Thread 🧵
In his speech today, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the Ansar Allah militia, known as the Houthis, , affirmed that they are monitoring developments in the West Bank and Gaza. He warned that the failure of the ceasefire agreement would lead to a resumption of attacks by the militia. This statement comes just days after the Trump administration's decision to re-designate the Houthis as a terrorist organization. A comprehensive analysis of the political landscape regarding the Yemeni file and its prospects.
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On November 19, 2023, the Houthi militia announced the hijacking of the ship "Galaxy Leader," declaring the beginning of what they called "supporting Gaza operations." These attacks focused on two main fronts: the first was targeting commercial and military ships, either crossing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, those in the Red Sea, or those they could reach in the Arabian Sea. According to the latest data, the militia has claimed 110 attacks against commercial ships and 116 attacks against warships from November 2023 to December 2024. The second front was through direct targeting of Israeli territory using drones and ballistic missiles. According to the militia, they launched around 400 missiles and drones towards Israeli territory over a year and three months. Although Israeli defenses managed to intercept most of these attacks, the Houthi threats to Israeli national security have become a concern for military and political officials, given the militia's developing capabilities and its geographical distance, which poses a challenge in dealing with and stopping them. However, it can be said that after the latest developments, the Houthis have become a top priority for Israel in the coming phase.
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In March 2015, Saudi Arabia launched a massive military operation in Yemen as part of an Arab coalition to support the Yemeni government in Aden and confront the alliance formed between the Iranian-backed Houthi militia and former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This operation was followed by another Saudi operation called 'Restoring Hope', which has not been officially declared over to this day. This did not prevent the Houthis from consolidating their control over large areas of Yemeni territory, most notably the capital, Sana'a. Nor did it prevent the continued missile and drone attacks targeting Saudi territory, posing a serious threat to Saudi national security and global energy supplies amid ongoing attacks by the militia on refineries and oil wells in the Kingdom. With the military solution reaching a dead end and with the emergence of differences within the Arab coalition itself, the United Nations sponsored a ceasefire agreement between the Houthis and the Yemeni government in Aden. Although this agreement was initially limited to two months, regional and international consensus contributed to its extension until today. The understanding brokered by China between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023 played a crucial role in maintaining this calm, especially by halting attacks on Saudi territory. Today, with the changing balance of power in the region, changing Israeli priorities, and with Trump in the White House, questions arise about the fate of the Houthis and the ceasefire agreement.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 22

Thread 🧵
While Syrian cities are still celebrating the fall of the Assad regime and Damascus is crowded with Arab and Western officials announcing the beginning of a new phase for Syria, the file of eastern Syria remains a thorny dilemma that could explode at any moment. A geopolitical reading of the SDF file and its presence in the east of the Euphrates River between internal disputes and regional and international interventions.
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The visits of SDF delegations to Damascus today are not their first. Even during Assad's rule, there were tough negotiations in search of a consensus that would suit the Assad regime and the SDF. The two sides were linked by military relations in Afrin, a joint alliance in Manbij, and disputes and clashes in the eastern Deir ez-Zor countryside. However, it can be said that the military operation launched by Turkey in coordination with the Syrian armed opposition in eastern Syria under the name 'Operation Peace Spring' in 2019 marked a significant shift in relations between the Assad regime and the SDF, as forces belonging to the Assad regime entered eastern Syria to fight Turkey and the Syrian armed opposition, then stationed its forces in the Manbij area. Oil cooperation between the two sides also increased. But despite this rapprochement and despite Russian mediation, all visits by delegations of this militia failed due to the intransigence of both sides’ positions. The SDF insisted on the principle of self-administration for eastern Syria, while Assad affirmed the centrality of the Syrian state.
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With the fall of the Assad regime, the new Syrian administration faced a dilemma in dealing with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and eastern Syria. After the collapse of Assad's forces in the city of Aleppo and its countryside, the militia moved from the Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood to spread in Aleppo International Airport in coordination with the Assad regime. This prompted the Syrian armed opposition, backed by Turkey, to launch a military operation in the Tal Rifaat area and its surroundings. Meanwhile, forces from the SDF militia advanced from Manbij towards the thermal power station in eastern Aleppo countryside and Kweires Airport. All these military movements by the militia sent negative signals to the new Syrian administration, which now views the SDF as an integral part of the Assad regime and believes it should end, whether diplomatically or militarily.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

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