Post

@StateDept

@ZelenskyyUa

More from @evacool_

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 26

Thread 🧵
In his speech today, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the Ansar Allah militia, known as the Houthis, , affirmed that they are monitoring developments in the West Bank and Gaza. He warned that the failure of the ceasefire agreement would lead to a resumption of attacks by the militia. This statement comes just days after the Trump administration's decision to re-designate the Houthis as a terrorist organization. A comprehensive analysis of the political landscape regarding the Yemeni file and its prospects.
1/

On November 19, 2023, the Houthi militia announced the hijacking of the ship "Galaxy Leader," declaring the beginning of what they called "supporting Gaza operations." These attacks focused on two main fronts: the first was targeting commercial and military ships, either crossing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, those in the Red Sea, or those they could reach in the Arabian Sea. According to the latest data, the militia has claimed 110 attacks against commercial ships and 116 attacks against warships from November 2023 to December 2024. The second front was through direct targeting of Israeli territory using drones and ballistic missiles. According to the militia, they launched around 400 missiles and drones towards Israeli territory over a year and three months. Although Israeli defenses managed to intercept most of these attacks, the Houthi threats to Israeli national security have become a concern for military and political officials, given the militia's developing capabilities and its geographical distance, which poses a challenge in dealing with and stopping them. However, it can be said that after the latest developments, the Houthis have become a top priority for Israel in the coming phase.
2/

In March 2015, Saudi Arabia launched a massive military operation in Yemen as part of an Arab coalition to support the Yemeni government in Aden and confront the alliance formed between the Iranian-backed Houthi militia and former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This operation was followed by another Saudi operation called 'Restoring Hope', which has not been officially declared over to this day. This did not prevent the Houthis from consolidating their control over large areas of Yemeni territory, most notably the capital, Sana'a. Nor did it prevent the continued missile and drone attacks targeting Saudi territory, posing a serious threat to Saudi national security and global energy supplies amid ongoing attacks by the militia on refineries and oil wells in the Kingdom. With the military solution reaching a dead end and with the emergence of differences within the Arab coalition itself, the United Nations sponsored a ceasefire agreement between the Houthis and the Yemeni government in Aden. Although this agreement was initially limited to two months, regional and international consensus contributed to its extension until today. The understanding brokered by China between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023 played a crucial role in maintaining this calm, especially by halting attacks on Saudi territory. Today, with the changing balance of power in the region, changing Israeli priorities, and with Trump in the White House, questions arise about the fate of the Houthis and the ceasefire agreement.
3/

Read 9 tweets

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 22

Thread 🧵
While Syrian cities are still celebrating the fall of the Assad regime and Damascus is crowded with Arab and Western officials announcing the beginning of a new phase for Syria, the file of eastern Syria remains a thorny dilemma that could explode at any moment. A geopolitical reading of the SDF file and its presence in the east of the Euphrates River between internal disputes and regional and international interventions.
1/

The visits of SDF delegations to Damascus today are not their first. Even during Assad's rule, there were tough negotiations in search of a consensus that would suit the Assad regime and the SDF. The two sides were linked by military relations in Afrin, a joint alliance in Manbij, and disputes and clashes in the eastern Deir ez-Zor countryside. However, it can be said that the military operation launched by Turkey in coordination with the Syrian armed opposition in eastern Syria under the name 'Operation Peace Spring' in 2019 marked a significant shift in relations between the Assad regime and the SDF, as forces belonging to the Assad regime entered eastern Syria to fight Turkey and the Syrian armed opposition, then stationed its forces in the Manbij area. Oil cooperation between the two sides also increased. But despite this rapprochement and despite Russian mediation, all visits by delegations of this militia failed due to the intransigence of both sides’ positions. The SDF insisted on the principle of self-administration for eastern Syria, while Assad affirmed the centrality of the Syrian state.
2/

With the fall of the Assad regime, the new Syrian administration faced a dilemma in dealing with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and eastern Syria. After the collapse of Assad's forces in the city of Aleppo and its countryside, the militia moved from the Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood to spread in Aleppo International Airport in coordination with the Assad regime. This prompted the Syrian armed opposition, backed by Turkey, to launch a military operation in the Tal Rifaat area and its surroundings. Meanwhile, forces from the SDF militia advanced from Manbij towards the thermal power station in eastern Aleppo countryside and Kweires Airport. All these military movements by the militia sent negative signals to the new Syrian administration, which now views the SDF as an integral part of the Assad regime and believes it should end, whether diplomatically or militarily.
3/

Read 11 tweets

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 18

Thread 🧵
While the eyes of the world were fixed on Gaza, the ceasefire agreement and the release of the Israeli hostages held by Hamas after about 460 days of war, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian was in Moscow signing a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between the two countries with his Russian counterpart three days before Trump arrives at the White House. A multi-faceted reading of the scene in the Middle East from the Iranian perspective.
1/

After years of negotiations between two countries bound by shared interests and common enemies, the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Moscow and Tehran has finally been signed. Despite this agreement, the smiles on the faces of both Raisi and Putin conceal a more complex reality. Yes, Tehran has increased its military cooperation with Moscow since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, the Syrian file and the two countries' partnership in protecting Assad and his regime from falling have been crucial in driving this rapprochement. However, despite these shared interests, it does not appear that this is a decisive strategic alliance. Beneath the surface, there are larger and more heated disagreements between today's allies and yesterday's enemies.
2/

The Iranian media do not hide the extent of the differences between conservatives and reformists over relations with Russia. A large portion of Pezeshkian's government officials reject rapprochement with Russia and prefer relations with the West, while the conservatives view the West as the enemy and believe that rapprochement with Moscow is the natural path within the geostrategic landscape most suitable for Tehran. Khamenei seems to have been the decisive figure in this matter. He has given the green light to signing the agreement with Moscow while simultaneously allowing for a return to negotiations with the West.
3/

Read 11 tweets

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 13

Thread 🧵
About three weeks ago I had confirmed that we were closer than ever to reaching a deal that would end the war in the Gaza Strip and release the Israeli hostages held by the Hamas militia. Today it seems that we are hours or days away from announcing this deal. A pragmatic analysis of this deal from the perspective of the Israeli government, Hamas, and what comes after it.
1/

Over the past few days, the Qatari capital, Doha, has witnessed intensive rounds of indirect negotiations between representatives of the Israeli government and Hamas, in coordination with representatives of the Biden administration, the Qatari and Egyptian governments, in addition to the very important role of President Trump's envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff. During these rounds, viewpoints were brought closer and gaps between the two sides were bridged, so that today we are facing a comprehensive deal divided into three stages that ends the war, releases the hostages, and paves the way for the beginning of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. As for the most important details of this deal, according to what has been leaked so far, they are as follows:
2/

*The first stage begins with the release of 33 Israeli hostages in exchange for a temporary ceasefire for 42 days, during which several Israeli brigades withdraw from populated areas of the Strip, the release of a specific number of Palestinian prisoners (some of whom are serving life sentences), and an increase in the amount of humanitarian aid entering the Strip, including fuel. During this period, negotiations between the Israeli government and Hamas representatives will intensify to finalize the details of the second stage and release all civilian hostages.
*In the second stage, which also lasts for 42 days, all Israeli soldier hostages will be released in exchange for a specific number of Palestinian prisoners, in parallel with a complete withdrawal by the IDF from within the Strip, including the Netzarim area and the Philadelphi Corridor.
*In the third stage, the bodies and remains of the dead from both sides will be exchanged after their identities have been determined, a sustainable ceasefire will be declared, and plans for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip will be implemented, which may extend for five years under the supervision of the United Nations and a number of countries and international organizations, the crossings will be opened and the movement of people and goods will be permitted.
3/

Read 8 tweets

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 10

Thread 🧵
General Joseph Aoun is the fourteenth president of the Lebanese state, after more than two years of vacuum and internal political struggle and international and regional movements. This important development comes amid a state of anticipation on the Lebanese-Israeli border, a political earthquake in Syria, and panic in Iran. A reading of the Lebanese scene after the election of Joseph Aoun and the difficulties he will face in the next stage.
1/

Even 24 hours before the start of the first round of voting in the Lebanese parliament, General Joseph Aoun did not have the 86 votes that would suffice for him to win the elections, and bypass article nr. 49 of the Lebanese constitution that prevents any first class employee in the Lebanese state from running for the presidency unless he has resigned or retired at least two years before the voting date. Thus, the 86 votes necessary to amend the constitution mean that the representatives of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement would vote in support of Joseph Aoun, which was not possible at that time. However, contacts led by the French presidential envoy, Jean Le Drian, personally, with the support of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United States of America, and Qatar, created a breakthrough in the position of Hezbollah and Nabih Berri, who chose not to vote for Joseph Aoun in the first round, then supported his vote in the second round, so that he won 99 votes out of 128, and Lebanon entered a new phase different from what it was in the past three decades.
2/

Indeed, during the past three decades, the election of the Lebanese president was either by a decision from the Assad regime in Damascus or through pressures and blackmail by the Hezbollah militia. Today, General Joseph Aoun, although he is supported by the US, France and the Arabs, also represents the aspirations of a large part of the Lebanese people, Christians, Druze and Sunnis. This internal and external support will be a dire need for him in the coming stage, in which he will be forced to adopt decisions that some may not like internally and regionally, and to begin implementing UN Resolution 1701 and the annex that was agreed upon by the US envoy Amos Hochstein and the Netanyahu government, to which Hezbollah claims that it does not agree.
3/

Read 10 tweets

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 9

Thread 🧵
Αt dawn on December 7th, 2024, less than 24 hours before Bashar al-Assad fled the Syrian capital Damascus, while the Syrian armed opposition forces were still stationed on the outskirts of Homs, the Free Syrian Forces stationed in the al-Tanf area began an attack on the city of Palmyra in the heart of the Syrian desert, with support from the American warplanes. The target was ISIS positions in the area. A reading of ISIS’s next move after the fall of the Assad regime.
1/

After the killing of the leaders of the Islamic State in Iraq, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, in 2010, the organization entered a state of collapse and dispersion, to the point that many observers specializing in jihadist groups thought that it was the end. Indeed, the number of their fighters decreased to hundreds, hiding in the Anbar desert and its hills, or being hunted in the border villages with Syria. (This scene looks similar to what the organization is experiencing today, whose presence in Iraq and Syria has become limited to the Anbar desert and the Syrian desert). However, with the outbreak of protests in the Sunni areas of Iraq denouncing the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the organization began to reorganize its forces, publishing a statement called “Anbar Spring,” in which they confirmed that they were present in Anbar and that their revival was a matter of time. Indeed, in the summer of 2013, the organization attacked the Taji and Abu Ghraib prisons, as part of an operation called “Destruction of the Walls,” and released about 500 of their fighters, who were the nucleus of what was later called the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant “ISIS.” Will history repeat itself?
2/

After ISIS lost its last strongholds in the east of the Euphrates at the end of the Battle of Hajin in 2018, the organization adopted a policy of avoiding direct confrontation and concentration in cities and towns, and a policy of ambushes and hiding in the deserts of Iraq and Syria. During the past six years, the organization has not deviated from this policy except once in 2022 when it carried out a massive attack against the Ghuwayran Central Prison in Hasakah, northeastern Syria, managing to release hundreds of its fighters in this attack. Here, some may ask why the prison is the target when it would have been easier to storm one of the military bases in the region with the least damage?
3/

Read 10 tweets

Share this page!

Enter URL or ID to Unroll

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

More from @evacool_

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Send Email!