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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Apr 2

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In a television interview with the advisor to the Iranian Supreme Leader and his special envoy, Ali Larijani, he warned that any American or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear program would force Tehran to develop nuclear weapons. An analytical reading of the of the rising tensions between Iran, Israel, and Washington recently, exploring possible scenarios and the regional stance.
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This is not the first time that a senior Iranian official has spoken about the possibility of Tehran changing its nuclear doctrine in the event of an external attack on its nuclear program. About two months ago, the Supreme Leader’s advisor, Kamal Kharrazi, who is currently personally responsible for the nuclear negotiations with the West, issued the same warnings. It is important to emphasize, based on current data, that Iran has the military and technical capability to manufacture a nuclear bomb at any time it desires. The only obstacle is the fatwa of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which prohibits the military development of the Iranian nuclear program. However, both Larijani and Kharrazi are figures close to Khamenei, and therefore it can be said that these warnings come from the Supreme Leader himself and must be taken seriously. So, what are Iran’s alternative options if Trump chooses to pursue the military option to deal with the Iranian nuclear program?
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Some may wonder, if Tehran does not want nuclear weapons, and there is a fatwa from the Iranian Supreme Leader prohibiting them, then why does its nuclear project exceed all permissible limits for a nuclear program for civilian purposes by producing uranium at high levels (recently, uranium enrichment in Iran was increased to 60%) and continuously increasing the number of centrifuges?
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Mar 25

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After more than 530 days of war in the Gaza Strip and a pause of over a month before it reignited, the political and military landscape today appears extremely complex. An analytical reading of the political scene and diplomatic offers to end or temporarily halt the war between Israel and Hamas.
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On the ground
At the dawn of March 18, the IDF announced the launch of a large-scale attack on Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip, based on directives from the political echelon. This attack marks a new beginning for a war in which the field situation has become less impactful, given the return of significant American military support for the IDF through new batches of bunker-bustier missiles and multi-purpose munitions, and the reorganization of ground forces. On the Hamas side, despite launching several rockets in coordination with the Islamic Jihad militia, all of which were intercepted by the IDF's Iron Dome, it is clear that the Palestinian militia's rocket arsenal has been depleted, and its stockpile is nearing exhaustion. In terms of manpower, Hamas has been able to reorganize some of its forces and recruit new fighters. However, these forces face three major challenges that limit their ability to withstand and inflict casualties on IDF forces: first, a shortage of ammunition for small arms and anti-tank launchers; second, a lack of experience among the remaining forces and the new recruits, which hampers their ability to carry out ground maneuvers given the technological development and air cover for the attacking forces, making any movement by Hamas fighters and other Palestinian militias outside the tunnels extremely dangerous. Third, there is significant damage to the tunnel networks, which have become like isolated islands, some of which have been severely damaged to the point of becoming dangerous to be within them. In parallel, the ground communications network that was located within these tunnels has been damaged, making communication between battalions and units extremely complicated. Therefore, the field and military reality confirms that any new Israeli military operation will not be as costly as it was over the past year and six months, while Hamas will avoid the option of direct confrontation and rely on ambushes and sniper tactics.
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Politically
It can be said that the decision of the Israeli government, led by Netanyahu, to return to war and not move forward with the second phase of the deal is linked to the perception this government reached, that the results of the war over the past year and five months were insufficient and did not achieve the war goals set by the government at the outset, which was to eliminate Hamas. While some viewed the killing of the senior leaders of the militia, headed by the mastermind of the October 7 attacks, Yahya Sinwar, and the militia’s chief of staff and military commander, Mohammed Deif, as an important achievement that could be translated as the end of the militia, the way Hamas appeared during the truce period and the military parades that accompanied the release of the Israeli hostages painted a different picture. This has influenced the convictions of the Israeli government, which considered that going to the second phase under these circumstances would mean accepting the reality of Hamas’s continued control over the Gaza Strip. Consequently, and after lengthy discussions between the Netanyahu government and the Trump administration, the decision was made to return to war in the hope of achieving the most important goal, which is to end Hamas in Gaza, in addition to the possibility that this military operation would lead to the imposition of a new reality in the Strip that would open the way for the implementation of Trump's plan to rebuild Gaza. While the sounds of artillery and airstrikes escalate, the negotiating tables in Egypt and Qatar remain open, and several offers are currently being discussed and studied.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Mar 8

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On the evening of Thursday, March 6th, groups of former officers and members of the Assad regime army carried out an organized attack targeting military sites, police stations, and security patrols belonging to the new Syrian administration in the Alawite-majority Syrian coastal region. The Syrian Ministry of Defense moved urgently to reassert control over the area, which led to a large number of deaths on both sides, as well as the deaths of dozens of civilians. An analytical reading of the circumstances of this attack, the parties behind it, and its repercussions on the Syrian and regional scene.
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Before delving into the political analysis, I will clarify some details about the attack that began with an organized assault carried out by hundreds of fighters armed with individual and medium weapons, as well as some heavy weapons, targeting the cities of Jableh, Tartous, Latakia, Banias, Draykish and Qardaha, and cutting off the two international highways, Aleppo-Latakia and Homs-Tartous. In the early hours of the attack, they were able to take control of several neighborhoods in the aforementioned cities and kill at least 150 Syrian security personnel and dozens of civilians, particularly in the cities of Jableh and Latakia. They were also able to besiege the naval college in Latakia and control the Istamo helicopter airport in the Latakia countryside. This attack was led by the former brigadier general in the Assad army, Ghaith Dallah, one of the leaders of the 4th Division that was headed by Maher al-Assad and supported by Iran and the IRGC, known to be a war criminal and responsible for committing war crimes during the Syrian revolution. Given the size and the spread of this attack, it is evident that we are dealing with a well-thought-out plan whose goal was to impose these groups’ complete control over the Syrian coast, taking advantage of the fragile security situation in Syria under the new Syrian administration. So, who is behind this attack and behind Brigadier General Ghaith Dallah?
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One day before this attack began, the Iranian Fars News Agency, which is closely associated with the Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, published a statement attributed to a group calling itself the “Syrian Islamic Resistance Front - Uli al-Bas” affirming its presence in Syrian territory and its efforts to confront the new Syrian administration positioning themselves as part of the "Resistance Axis" led by Iran. They called on the Syrian people to support them and emphasized that the coming days will confirm their presence. This militia, which first appeared after the fall of the Assad regime, had previously published statements claiming to carry out attacks against the IDF in southern Syria. While all eyes were on the Syrian coast, at the same time there was a mobilization of Israeli forces in the demilitarized zone on the Syrian-Israeli border. According to a statement issued by the same group, it confirmed that it had fired on an Israeli force in southern Syria, which underscores a direct connection between this militia affiliated with the Iranian Quds Force and the groups led by Brigadier General Ghaith Dallah.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Feb 24

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Yesterday, during a graduation ceremony for IDF officers, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a number of important remarks addressing three key issues: Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon. An analytical reading of these statements and their impact on the map of the region.
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I will break down this analysis by examining each file separately and I will explain the possibilities of what Netanyahu promised in this speech, as well as the obstacles the Israeli government may face within a strategy that I will call the “Security circle”. In my opinion, this strategy is a direct result of the attacks of October 7 and the shift it caused in the perspective of Israeli politicians and military officials, both within Israel and in the region.
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Gaza file
Netanyahu confirmed that he will bring back all Israeli hostages from Gaza without exception, that Hamas will not control the Strip, and that his government will work to disarm them. This statement is very important for several reasons. Regarding the remaining Israeli hostages held by Hamas, it can be said that Netanyahu, despite the doubts, is still committed to the exchange deal that began mid-last month. However, there are still questions about Netanyahu and his government’s vision for the form of the second phase. With voices within the government coalition urging Netanyahu not to move forward with the second phase, alongside American pressure pushing for its initiation, Netanyahu finds himself in a dilemma. He believes that returning to war again at the end of the first phase would result in more hostages being killed, and discontent from Trump and his administration, whose support he urgently needs on both the Gaza evacuation and the Iranian nuclear issue. On the other hand, advancing to the second phase would mean a sustainable cessation of the war and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, something that several of his government ministers reject, which threatens to fragment the coalition and lead to early elections, something Netanyahu does not want at this stage. This dilemma has led Netanyahu to seek a way out by requesting an extension of the first phase of the agreement. This will allow for the release of more hostages without allowing the Gaza reconstruction process to begin or implementing a permanent ceasefire, thus satisfying the Israeli domestic front and its government ministers, while also keeping Trump’s plan to relocate the residents of the Gaza Strip possible. Beginning Gaza's reconstruction would disrupt Trump's plan, which, as of now, remains theoretical, despite being adopted by Netanyahu’s government and many opposition parties in Israel.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Feb 18

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On the 12th of this month, the Syrian SANA news agency reported a phone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, during which Putin congratulated al-Sharaa on the presidency during the transitional phase. The two leaders also discussed the strategic relationship between Syria and Russia. A geopolitical reading of the relationship between Moscow and the new Syrian administration between interests and the differences of the previous phase.
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Since the launch of the Syrian armed opposition’s military operation from Idlib on November 27 of last year, all eyes have been on Moscow and its stance regarding the rapid collapse of Assad’s army. Despite the limited participation of Russian warplanes in this operation, compared to Russia’s overall air power, it can be said that Moscow was not eager to continue supporting Assad’s survival in power after nearly nine years of direct military intervention in Syria. Of course, the Russian invasion of Ukraine drained Moscow’s military capabilities in supporting the Assad regime militarily, but this is not the full picture. Practically speaking, Moscow could have sent some air squadrons within hours to its air base in Khmeimim from the first day of the Syrian armed opposition’s advance. The Russian military could have also used its warships in the Mediterranean or even those in the Black Sea to bolster Assad’s forces in the face of the opposition’s advance. However, it is clear that Moscow was unwilling to do so. In the same context, and according to what security sources confirm, Tehran had at least demanded that Russia secure guarantees from the Israeli side not to target their forces that might enter Syria from Iraq or those might arriving by air. However, Moscow did not respond to the Iranian request. Thus it can be said that the Russian leadership, which was a fundamental factor in keeping Assad in power since the fall of 2015, no longer sees the benefit of this role, a shift proven by Putin’s abandonment of supporting Assad’s continued rule.
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n return, Moscow agreed to receive Assad, his family, and a number of military and security officers on its territory. This step was adopted for three reasons: First, Moscow does not want to lose its reputation as a protector of dictatorships, as several leaders in Africa are watching the situation in Syria and rely on Russian protection. Second, Assad, his family, and a number of Syrian generals in his army have investments, deposits and trade in the Russian market, and Moscow is currently in dire need of any money to support the Russian economy. Third, Moscow wants to keep Assad as a valuable negotiating card, whether with the new Syrian administration or even with international parties that have ties with Assad and do not want the details of these relationships to be exposed. Therefore, it can be said that Russia, days before Assad's fall, had made its decision and had already begun building communication channels with the Syrian opposition, initially through the Turkish gateway.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Feb 14

Thread 🧵
While eyes in Lebanon and for those interested in Lebanese affairs are directed towards the borders with Israel, with February 18 being the scheduled date for the IDF to withdraw to their positions prior to last September, developments at Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut and the Syrian-Lebanese border have reaffirmed that the Lebanese scene remains complex. An analytical reading of the political and military developments in the Lebanese arena.
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On November 26, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced his government’s approval of a ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, brokered by the United States and France, which began at dawn on the 27th of the same month. While all 13 terms of the agreement have been revealed, the agreement remains controversial, especially within Lebanese parties. Following the agreement, General Joseph Aoun was elected president, and Nawaf Salam was chosen as prime minister of the new Lebanese government, which was announced a few days ago. Despite the positive atmosphere in Beirut, this cautious optimism has already begun to face challenges on multiple fronts, most notably the domestic front. While Lebanese political parties, with regional and international support, are trying to push Lebanon into a new phase entitled “Lebanon after the defeat of the Hezbollah-Assad-Tehran axis,” Hezbollah rejects the narrative of its defeat in the last war with Israel, emphasizing its political and popular influence, and asserting that there is no new Lebanon without Hezbollah and its weapons. This polarization between the two competing narratives may pose a dilemma for the new era headed by Joseph Aoun and the government of Nawaf Salam, as it may be difficult to satisfy all parties at the same time.
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To better understand the Lebanese scene, it is essential to clarify the popular reality there, away from what is presented by Western or Arab media. Yes, Hezbollah has suffered huge human estimated at around five thousand dead, with double that number wounded, and the deaths of the first and second ranks of the leadership, along with the deaths of Nasrallah, a key symbol of the "Resistance Axis" in the region. A security source confirmed to me that during the war, thousands of militia fighters refused to go to southern Lebanon to fight. And yes, the last war caused massive destruction in most of the towns and cities where the Shiites of Lebanon live, who constitute the human reservoir of the militia. However, despite this difficult reality, Hezbollah still enjoys considerable popular support among the Shiite community in Lebanon and beyond, and they are prepared to bear these losses despite their impact to their economic reality. The relationship between Hezbollah and the Shiites in Lebanon is an ideological religious relationship, not an institutional partisan one. Therefore, talking about the end of Hezbollah in Lebanon, at least as a political party, is an incorrect assessment. This is what Hezbollah in alliance with the Amal Movement tried to confirm by blocking Joseph Aoun’s election from the first round, and then by securing four ministers in Nawaf Salam’s government and finally by staging protests in front of Rafic Hariri International Airport (Beirut Airport) in response to the refusal to allow an Iranian plane to land. Hezbollah makes it clear that any confrontation with it would mean a confrontation with a significant part of the Shiite sect in Lebanon.
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