Further clashes are bound to unfold soon in #Tripolitania.
Because:
• some #local rivalries have become too tense.
• #macro fault lines have shifted too far away from #Libya’s Jun 2020 equilibrium, which so many policymakers & watchers take for granted;
[ see 🧵 thread👇🏻]
Because:
• some #local rivalries have become too tense.
• #macro fault lines have shifted too far away from #Libya’s Jun 2020 equilibrium, which so many policymakers & watchers take for granted;
[ see 🧵 thread👇🏻]
One must, right off the bat, acknowledge the outsized importance of #Zawiyah actors in today’s NW Libya configuration.
The most zealous pro-Dabaiba fighters on 5/17 in #Tripoli were led by #Bahrun.
& the #Buzeriba forces (who didn’t fight on 5/17) are ferociously anti-Dabaiba.
The most zealous pro-Dabaiba fighters on 5/17 in #Tripoli were led by #Bahrun.
& the #Buzeriba forces (who didn’t fight on 5/17) are ferociously anti-Dabaiba.
Other #local antagonisms that became evident on 5/17 in Tripoli include Mustafa Qaddur’s animosity vs. his #Mukhabarat superior & Dabaiba ally Hussein al-#Ayeb.
Nawassi — which holds a major grudge against Bahrun, too — coordinates w/ Buzeriba & Wershefana’s Muammar al-Dhawi.
Nawassi — which holds a major grudge against Bahrun, too — coordinates w/ Buzeriba & Wershefana’s Muammar al-Dhawi.
There are *plenty* other enmities floating around in NW Libya nowadays.
But the Qaddur/Buzeriba vs. Bahrun/Ayeb tensions are almost impossible to de-escalate without the use of force.
The anti-Dabaiba camp, in all likelihood, will soon deploy violence to weaken those 2 groups.
But the Qaddur/Buzeriba vs. Bahrun/Ayeb tensions are almost impossible to de-escalate without the use of force.
The anti-Dabaiba camp, in all likelihood, will soon deploy violence to weaken those 2 groups.
There is also #Ghnewa’s armed group, which may or may not get assaulted by the anti-Dabaiba coalition.
Ghnewa went pro-Dabaiba on Mar 1st.
And in Apr, got into a serious dispute w/ Nawassi.
Yet a frontal attack will not necessarily be attempted against Ghnewa’s big armed group
Ghnewa went pro-Dabaiba on Mar 1st.
And in Apr, got into a serious dispute w/ Nawassi.
Yet a frontal attack will not necessarily be attempted against Ghnewa’s big armed group
https://twitter.com/JMJalel_H/status/1498759865652727817
Geographically, the anti-Dabaiba camp has a significant presence in & around Tripoli—in addition to all the usual pro-LNA territories.
I.e., current dynamics have little to do with Apr 2019, when no meaningful foes of the then Tripoli govt existed w/in the greater Tripoli area…
I.e., current dynamics have little to do with Apr 2019, when no meaningful foes of the then Tripoli govt existed w/in the greater Tripoli area…
Dabaiba knows all this. But he can’t have Nawassi disappear as a militia by merely issuing a circular.
Not only does Nawassi continue to exist, but it may also go after Bahrun & Ayeb in Tripoli sooner rather than later.
In all cases, the existing status quo can’t be sustained.
Not only does Nawassi continue to exist, but it may also go after Bahrun & Ayeb in Tripoli sooner rather than later.
In all cases, the existing status quo can’t be sustained.
The anti-Dabaiba camp as a whole will work on making it harder for Bahrun’s armed group to move back & forth btwn Zawiyah & Tripoli.
To do so, Buzeriba/Dhawi will try & assert themselves much more firmly west of Janzur & southwest of Tripoli.
The idea is to squeeze the capital.
To do so, Buzeriba/Dhawi will try & assert themselves much more firmly west of Janzur & southwest of Tripoli.
The idea is to squeeze the capital.
This is where the #local & the #macro intersect.
Buzeriba already controls bits of territory near Nesmah, southeast of #Gharyan.
Buzeriba & Saddam #Haftar are tightly allied w/ each other, and coordinate together militarily.
Buzeriba already controls bits of territory near Nesmah, southeast of #Gharyan.
Buzeriba & Saddam #Haftar are tightly allied w/ each other, and coordinate together militarily.
https://twitter.com/jmjalel_h/status/1500152554168143883
2 relevant facts must be underscored:
• the number of #LNA vehicles in Jufrah & Sirte has increased over the last several weeks;
• #Gharyan has been neglected by Turkey & Dabaiba.
Therefore, Buzeriba & Haftar will be tempted to take #Gharyan by force w/in foreseeable future
• the number of #LNA vehicles in Jufrah & Sirte has increased over the last several weeks;
• #Gharyan has been neglected by Turkey & Dabaiba.
Therefore, Buzeriba & Haftar will be tempted to take #Gharyan by force w/in foreseeable future
Contrary to some urban myths,
#Russia is still very much present in 4 major bases in Libya.
We cannot rule out a scenario whereby Russia uses its #aircraft in support of a ground incursion launched by the LNA from Jufra & Sirte into Tripolitania’s southern & eastern flanks.
#Russia is still very much present in 4 major bases in Libya.
We cannot rule out a scenario whereby Russia uses its #aircraft in support of a ground incursion launched by the LNA from Jufra & Sirte into Tripolitania’s southern & eastern flanks.
Morality:
Tripolitania is so fractured, attacking it from within & from outside simultaneously is an appealing prospect for the anti-Dabaiba camp despite Turkey’s presence.
Notice however that I’m not alluding to an attack on Tripoli per se, similar to Haftar’s 2019 aggression.
Tripolitania is so fractured, attacking it from within & from outside simultaneously is an appealing prospect for the anti-Dabaiba camp despite Turkey’s presence.
Notice however that I’m not alluding to an attack on Tripoli per se, similar to Haftar’s 2019 aggression.
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