Thread by @Charles_Lister

As #Syria fatigue sets in & concerns over refugee flows increase, some states within the #EU have begun pushing hard for a softer stance towards #Assad's regime -- some are even engaging.

The #EU itself may not change its policy, but actions by member states could pull it apart.

https://twitter.com/ForeignPolicy/status/1587082110455746566

Concern within & between core #EU member states has risen markedly in recent months -- it's why I wrote this @ForeignPolicy piece.

Arguing that #Ukraine will deter internal #EU division on #Syria is not just wrong -- it's being proven inaccurate almost daily in #Brussels.

@ForeignPolicy Again, the #EU is unlikely to change its long-established policy on #Syria anytime soon -- but actions taken by an increasingly long list of individual states is already beginning to undermine the credibility & practical value of the #EU's official position.

That's v. worrying.

@ForeignPolicy The #EU's internal 'red line' against engaging #Assad's regime has already been broken -- and attempts to bridge the prohibition against early recovery+ are underway. Once the #EU sanctions regime begins to weaken, so too does the credibility of the #CaesarAct.

Stakes are big.

@ForeignPolicy If established #Syria policy principles were ever going to weaken or change, that change was never going to a sudden, rapid reversal -- it would be the result of a slow, incremental erosion of the status quo from within the system that developed it.

That may be where we're at.

@ForeignPolicy The impetus for this @ForeignPolicy article was a series of high-level conversations with senior European officials working on #Syria & #MiddleEast policy.

They all raised it, individually & unprompted -- and their concern was clear and urgent.

foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/27/eu-…