1/17 Own conclusions on @RUSI_org report: #Russia set out to conquer and annex all of #Ukraine and to commit #genocide by murdering #Ukraine government and all those who would resist #russification.
https://twitter.com/MikkoLaaksonen1/status/1598009741216976896
2/17 The plan was based on mistaken assumptions of opinions of #Ukraine population and military, in particular a faulty perception that the majority would not resist a #Russia invasion
3/17 #Ukraine intelligence estimated that instead of the overambitious actual plan the #Russia main effort would be a general attack in #Donbas. While dispersal was mostly done in time, redeployment started too late.
4/17 The result was that the decisive battles became meeting engagements with a disoriented, tactically incompetent attacking #Russia force and smaller, but determined, tactically competent #Ukraine force.
5/17 The main reason why #Russia invasion plan failed was president #Putin and the untenable targets set by him for a force too small and incompetent for the task. Due to deception, the main forces did not get their orders in time.
6/17 The #BTG organization was main reason why the #Russia ground forces were slow to adapt and why they suffered immense materiel losses. The uneven units had not trained together and were hard to lead.
7/17 #Ukraine had during the 2014-2022 phase of the war managed to modernize its army and air force mostly by refurbishing and modernizing legacy #Soviet tanks, artillery, airplanes. It had a large reserve with combat experience against #Russia from #ATO
8/17 #Russian actions could and did not significantly prevent mobilization in the cities they were not able to seize. In #Kyiv, #Chernihiv, #Sumy, #Kharkiv, #Mykolaiv and #Odesa this would in the end be decisive.
9/17 #Russia plan mostly succeeded in south, where #Melitopol, #Kherson and #Berdyansk were taken relatively easily. Ukrainian units were insufficient. The southern offensive dissipated when it continued too far north of #Mykolaiv and #Ukraine mobilized sufficient forces
10/17 The battle for #Kyiv was decided by time bought for mobilization by special forces delaying the northwest attack and the #Ukraine mobilization in the bypassed cities of #Chernihiv and #Sumy. These allowed to cut the supply routes, and once threatened, #Russia had to retreat
11/17 In the #Kyiv, #Chernihiv and #Sumy area, forested terrain and rivers provided the defender with advantages to set up ambushes and obstacles, which were lacking in the south.
12/17 In #Kharkiv the main attack and encirclement on the city was prevented by battles in the city surroundings. This is addressed in the report less clearly.
13/17 Media and social media reporting overrepresented the role of #Western anti-tank weapons and #drones. The decisive weapons in defense were artillery and tanks, which #Ukraine used competently.
14/17 #Ukraine used tanks unconventionally in large part for indirect fires. This was not only due to lack of artillery. #Russia adopted this tactic in #Donbas. This should be studied in more detail.
15/17 #Russian air defense and air campaign was at the start disoriented and failed to suppress #Ukrainian air force and defense. This was corrected relatively fast. After the air defense of both sides solidified, both air forces could no longer penetrate the battlespace.
16/17 #Russia could strike in the depth of #Ukraine with ballistic and cruise missiles with success. It shifted to less precise and suboptimal systems when stockpiles of modern #Iskander, #Kalibr were reduced.
17/17 #Russia regrouping, attack in #Donbas were partly successful. Ukrainian defences were worn out by mass artillery fire followed by assault waves. The slow grinding attack was blunted as #Ukraine received precision #MLRS and artillery to attack the Russian artillery logistics
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