Benjamin Tallis 🇺🇦 Profile picture
Jun 14 18 tweets 7 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
#Germany’s first National Security Strategy was published today.

A short 🧵 of reflections on what is, overall, a disappointing document (even taking account of lower expectations) - but also has some interesting & positive points to work with.

nationalesicherheitsstrategie.de/en.html
1/
Many have summarised the content - but thats not my purpose here. For a summary - & also a quite different take, see @RikeFranke's thread here

But, I want to draw attention to some other issues
2/
Even though there will be no national security council, this is clearly a strategy by committee - there are LOTS of very different items included [a fault of many other strategies too] but in this case there are competing worldviews trying to be squeezed into one document
3/
This is clearest in the unresolved tension on China - still referred to first as a partner but also as, increasingly a systemic rival and strategic competitor, which has also delayed the German govt's China strategy.

4/
It is also apparent in the presence of rhetoric of both bipolarity (& systemic rivalry, bloc formation) & multipolarity - & not quite finding a clear position for #Germany, certainly not one that would guide what to do if push comes to shove in Taiwan & sides must be taken
5/
This is indicative of a more general problem with the #NationaleSicherheitsstrategie
-as I told @washingtonpost earlier today
while it sees Germany doing more, it is more of the same approach that has seen the country fail to embrace its strategic position & remain reactive
6/ Image
It also contains a lot of aspirations ... not least on 'properly equipping the Bundeswehr', but the 100bn special fund is nowhere near enough to do that, and the confusion over when & how the NATO 2% of GDP target will actually be reached doesn't help either.
7/ Image
Yet the strategy repeatedly emphasises #Germany's "special responsibility" for European security -stemming from its history as well as size, economic weight & the commitment to liberal & democratic values it prioritises [of which more, later]
- But how will it live up to that?
8/
Beyond some nice language, there is not much that suggests how Germany will plug its very real capability and credibility gaps in security - and not much that would reassure allies in CEE that it will live up to its "special responsibility" for the European pillar of NATO
9/
Nor is there really much on how Germany will live up to its again stated "special responsibility" for security on NATO's Eastern Flank. CEE allies don't get mentioned and will not be reassured by being overlooked, especially when they have lead on Ukraine & securing NATO.
/10
There's also nothing on Ukrainian NATO membership.
BUT, and now we move onto the more positive aspects,
there is clear support for EU enlargement to Ukraine (& Moldova & Western Balkans) -even if it is hedged by the usual demands for treaty reform, which is going nowhere fast
/11
There is some very positive language, which has been pushed by the Greens & the Foreign Ministry, on values based policy & in a moment of #NeoIdealism the Strat notes that “It is in our fundamental interest to defend our values.” @ABaerbock doubled down on this in press con
/12
The best thing in the #NationaleSicherheitsstrategie IMO is the concept of "Integrated Security" - but this remains more potential than practice at this point and is undermined by the lack of clarity, competing objectives, unfunded aspirations & incredible promises in there
/13
Nonetheless, if it were substantiated & made consistent, this approach would be good. It makes useful links between economic security – in terms of livelihoods and peoples everyday needs, echoing the Biden administration’s ‘foreign policy for the middle class’ and ...
/14
It also makes meaningful connections in principle between the geopolitical, technological and ecological transitions. Were that to be combined with a more clear eyed view of systemic competition, why we need to win it, & the means to do so then it could be very effective.
/15
For now, however, while it contains a lot of admirable intentions the strategy is too much of a continuation of problematic tendencies in Germany's foreign and security policy - as well as giving space to endless quite obvious points that are repeated as mantra - on e.g. UN
/16
Overall, the strategy doesn’t a show a change of thinking commensurate with the challenge of the #Zeitenwende –but it does show that the fight to define what that change should be is ongoing between the parties of #Germany's coalition government.
nationalesicherheitsstrategie.de/en.html
/17
PS - This language was also refreshing & interesting to see - but needs backup
"We tackl[e] the challenges of our age with confidence and optimism ...
We want to shape our future together – in awareness of the risks, but with confidence and with every faith in our strengths."

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More from @bctallis

May 23
How to deal with #Russia
- Short thread based on my talk at #LennartMeriConference 2023. #NeoIdealism

1. Ukraine's war is our war - & must be won.
That means restoring UA's 1991 borders & ensuring UA's ability to defend them - & the people within them. Image
2. After victory we have to get #Ukraine into #NATO & the #EU as fast as possible.
- As @SwedishPM has said:
This should be merit based but cannot again be an excuse for going soft or going slow on UA's accession.
- we have to institutionally tie our future to UA's.
3. We have to overcome any residual fears of #Ukraine's victory and #Russia's defeat.
As @EliotACohen said in Warsaw - RU must lose & know it has lost:
on the battlefield, its offensive military capability for 10 years & has lost Ukraine for good.
Read 13 tweets
Apr 3
Is #Germany's #Zeitenwende
a) "a Fundamental Change?"
b) 🇩🇪's emergence as a "Leading Power"?
c) "a mere buzzword"
d) "bullshit"
* its been described as all those things
- but how to judge & why does it matter? A 🧵 1/10
ip-quarterly.com/en/zeitenwende…
📷Michael Lucan CC 3.0
Olaf #Scholz' 'turning point' speech in Feb '22 declared #Russia’s full-scale invasion of #Ukraine a 'watershed moment' (#Zeitenwende") -something happening to #Germany & others- but also set out the Zeitenwende as a task for🇩🇪 to develop new capabilities & a new approach.
2/10
There were 5 key elements in this initial framing (broadly speaking):
1) Support for #Ukraine
2) Bolstering #Germany's Defence
3) Diversification of Energy Supply (esp away from🇷🇺!)
4) A New Approach to Authoritarian States
5) Getting 🇩🇪's role in the #EU, #NATO &🌍right
3/10
Read 10 tweets
Mar 13
There's been criticism of the detail (esp re #Poland, which has already delivered Leos) - but @JeremyCliffe's main point is right.
▶️I'd actually take it further (it's not about #Germany but about #Ukraine), which is why we need to talk about #Finland🧵

newstatesman.com/quickfire/2023…
I've repeatedly praised #Finland's approach to standing up #Russia & have written on its own #Zeitenwende in joining #NATO.
I've also repeatedly praised @MarinSanna as a figurehead of #NeoIdealism - who's been wonderfully clear on how & why #Ukraine must win & RU must lose
/2
So, to be clear, this is not a general critique of🇫🇮or '🇫🇮 bashing'!
- BUT on the tank issue, I think #Finland has got it wrong.
- According to public info they have agreed to send
3 Patria Leopard2R heavy mine breaching tanks
-But NO #Leopard2 MBTs
ip-quarterly.com/en/zeitenwende…
/3
Read 23 tweets
Mar 12
What a silly, one-eyed yet quite indicative article.
The author (who I know a little & respect) is right about PiS’ vile tactics & #Poland’s well documented rule of law issues
- BUT totally blind to #Germany’s own faults re Poland, #Russia & #Ukraine
1/4
politico.eu/article/poland…
Most glaringly
- how #Germany trampled over #Poland’s concerns on Nordstream

- & how it free-rode on security, enriched & entrenched RU & undermined #Ukraine, helping RU enact the very sphere of influence logic he bemoans from far right allies of Morawiecki (eg Le Pen)
2/4
The article also fails entirely to address a widespread concern that while #Germany sees itself as having built an EU for all, others see the EU as primarily set up to benefit 🇩🇪 (esp DE business).

- with criticism of the #EU dismissed as nationalism (unacceptable to DE)
3/4
Read 4 tweets
Mar 8
Ever tried to Global #Britain but ended up accidentally pulling a little #England?
- Turns out you’re not alone.
A🧵on British identity, foreign policy & why we need to properly understand #Brexit to move beyond it.
- based on a new article I have out in @ISQ_Jrnl
1/25 Image
The article, which I'm really happy to have in top IR journal @ISQ_Jrnl, challenges a received wisdom about #Brexit – that it both reflected & reinforced a general, almost tribal polarisation of British society.
2/
academic.oup.com/isq/article-ab…
This might seem counter-intuitive (& against the evidence) but stay with me - its not that simple & that’s important. Not only for understanding Brexit but for getting the UK’s international affairs right in future [spoiler: it matters for other countries too]
3/
Read 30 tweets
Mar 1
If the #EU & it’s member states really wanted to do something about #Orban’s #Hungary, they would.

- The mess over ratifying #Sweden & #Finland’s NATO membership is only the latest incident & 🇭🇺‘a continuing presence is a stain on 🇪🇺reputation & effectiveness.
🇭🇺should go. 🧵/1 Image
In case anyone doubts the game playing over 🇫🇮& 🇸🇪’s #NATO membership the country’s foreign minister Peter Szijjarto made it clear earlier this week
- Fidesz now says it will support accession but it has been a farce & again cast doubt on 🇪🇺competence /2

euobserver.com/nordics/156770
Thankfully, Commission VP @VeraJourova (already among the tougher voices on Orban in Brussels) seems to have had enough
A lesson we should have learned from recent years is that we can’t treat illiberal actors in a liberal way.
#NeoIdealism
/3


euractiv.com/section/politi…
Read 6 tweets

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