Triangulated identification was based on registrant emails, Iranian phone nos for Twitter accounts, and content.
medium.com/dfrlab/trolltr…
A lot of its content came from genuine news sources, such as @Independent.
(Note the Israel / Palestine theme.)
Targeting a community which was also heavily targeted by Russian trolls in 2016.
The "Latin American" think tank largely reposted Iranian state content, without attribution. Latin America wasn't its focus.
LibertyFrontPress posted authored pro-Iran / anti-Saudi content, and reposted other outlets.
The social media feeds presented themselves as left / progressive groups.
They promoted Iranian state messaging.
This looked like attempts to pass messaging into opposition groups, not to generate real-life action.
America was not the only target.
That's five separate online influence ops:
- Russian troll farm 1 (2014-17)
- GRU 1 (Fancy Bear + trolls, 2016)
- Russian troll farm 2 (probable; 2017-18)
- GRU 2 (Microsoft takedown)
- Iran
There will be more. Welcome to our world.
/Thread ends.