THREAD: Personal highlights from an 'on the record' Council On Foreign Relations teleconference yesterday on the 'Kashoggi affair,' chaired by @robbinscarla and featuring @stevenacook and @Martin_Indyk. All responsibility mine for any note taking lapses.
@stevenacook: 'Brazen, reckless murder' arose from "insularity and arrogance" of MBS & inner circle, 'relatively young & not entirely worldly people.' MBS sees RU killing opponents, TK jailing journalists, CH interning Uighurs, etc. and thinks: "why shd I act differently ?"
@Indyk: MBS is "extremely thin-skinned and doesn't accept criticism of any kind." He's "eliminated any opposition within the Royal family," and has the military and security forces entirely under his control. "So, he thinks he can do whatever he likes."
@stevenacook and @Martin_Indyk agree it's unlikely King Salman will force MBS out. Cook: if King were to try to do so, wd probably cause even further turbulence w/in family. Expects, rather, "some trimming of MBS' sails" and, maybe, Salman stepping up to a "more executive role."
@Martin_Indyk Salman *could* force MBS out, but wd only do so if Trump told him"this is really bad and there'll be consequences for our relationship unless you remove him." Indyk "doesn't see Trump doing that" and doesn't think there are family members ready to pressure King.
Bottom line on MBS' surviving the crisis: both Cook and Indyk think MBS is increasingly confident of his ability to "tough it out."
Re. internal KSA consequences: @stevenacook says MBS' 'reformist' "Vision 2030" was inherently destabilizing, a frontal assault on 'vested interests' in place since founding of Kingdom. Those vested interests will now be able to push back against MBS' 'reforms' more effectively.
Re. regional geostrategic impact: KSA is now the only 'major' Arab power still able to exert power regionally. Egypt, Syria and Iraq are all out of the game. And KSA traditionally an econ power, not a military one. MBS has tried to change that, and created problems in doing so.
@Martin_Indyk: MBS' actions in leading KSA into Yemen, blockading Qatar, leading the Arab world into peace w/ Israel (telling Palestinians 'your time has passed') are 'highly problematic.' Yet "this is the role Trump and Kushner have decided they want KSA to play."
@Martin_Indyk DJT "wants to sub-contract America's Middle East strategy to Israel and KSA." Israel's capacity to function in Arab world is ltd, so primary reliance on KSA in Arab world. We're "bouncing from one crisis to another" under MBS, and will continue to do so, unless . .
DJT uses current crisis as leverage to tell MBS "We can't go on like this. If you're going to be our partner, you have to be a reliable partner, and for starters, you have to get out of Yemen." Indyk doubts DJT "has any concept of the need to do that, let alone how to do it."
Re. KSA-UAE relationship: @Martin_Indyk MBZ 'confounded by what's happened' [w/ MBS]. UAE 'wants out' of Yemen, and is trying to convince Saudis, w/out success. UAE now 'v. worried abt how this is developing.' Sense that Emiratis "don't know how to engage w/ MBS at this point."
Re. oil markets: @Martin_Indyk US sanctions on Iran oil will come into effect Nov. 4. Will remove ~1mm barrels/day from already tight mkt (Venezuelan production problems). Resulting price rise wd. ill Iran headroom to price cut and circumvent sanctions.
So, we need KSA to play traditional role as 'swing producer.' Trump seems to focus on Saudi importance as arms buyer, not on 'swing producer' role, but oil may be one reason why US seems to have 'soft pedalled' response to Kashoggi murder, at least initially.
Re. KSA-Iran balance of power: Cook says 'Saudis have proved inept at countering Iranian influence around the region.' Crisis redounds to Iran's benefit. Maybe gives US a chance to get KSA to let up on Qatar and get them out of Yemen. Regional balance of power now favors Iran.
Same subject, Indyk: "Make no mistake, [this crisis] is a windfall for Iran. One of the pillars of U.S. strategy in the region (i.e., KSA) has gone wobbly on us."
Q re. what Erdogan wants: Cook -- "Turks genuinely outraged." Kashoggi was quite close to a senior Erdogan advisor [Yasir Aktay]. Turkey sees multiple opportunities in crisis: (i) rehab Erdogan's image in West, after long period in which his repressive record had negative impact,
Erdogan can now project himself as responsible, statesmanlike and cooperative with West; (ii) re. Turkey's alignment w/ Qatar, the Kashoggi affair "reinforces the Qatari narrative that MBS is reckless and heedless;" and
(iii) US figures prominently in the negotiations (not just KSA-TK). TK can ask for change in US rel w/ YPG. Also, in context of TK economic crisis, Erdogan may try to get Saudi cash -- consistent with how Saudis 'checkbook diplomacy' in past.
As to latter (checkbook diplomacy), there are reports Erdogan has already rejected Saudi offers of cash, but unconfirmed. Finally, there is the issue of "Erdogan's view of Turkey as the leader of the Muslim world" (contra KSA).
Last, from Indyk, on Haspel's mission to Ankara: on her return, "she will have to brief the administration and congressional leaders, esp. Senate Intel, not only on what she learned from the Turks, but on what we have from our own sources."
This will happen vs backdrop of Senate talk re. sanctions vs Saudis. If sanctions were imposed, it would mean "real problems in the [US-KSA] relationship," and would be a "significant problem for the Administration" (given centrality of KSA in Trump-Kushner regional strategy).
