Thread by @alexebarker

Warning: some Brexit heresy coming up.

It is possible to:

1) substantially renegotiate the exit treaty

2) ditch the backstop customs union

3) secure a workable "Norway for Now" option

4) get the EU to agree

*ALL AT THE SAME TIME*

The answer: reverting to the draft deal Theresa May and Dominic Raab rejected in mid-October.

Remember this? ft.com/content/e5ecd6…

There is one important hitch. You could probably call this model "DUP Minus" -- and therein lies the problem.

First on why it's possible.

The EU is hugely reluctant to reopen the exit treaty.

But it might accept the Oct version because it's pre-cooked.

The draft is ready. The compromises are balanced. There would be no stampede of big EU27 demands (there'd be minor things of course)

The advantage for Brexiters is ditching the UK-wide customs union backstop.

The October deal mentioned a UK-EU customs union, but only as an option.

It had to be negotiated after Brexit in a separate treaty.

The trap feared by Brexiters would disappear.

How does that square with Norway for Now?

Part of the deal was also a "rolling" extension clause - allowing limitless one-year extensions, as long as both sides agree.

That's as close as the UK will ever realistically get to a Norway for Now model

Norway advocates like @NickBoles would prefer to renegotiate political declaration.

But that's Norway on the never-never, a deal to be negotiated in full after Brexit.

A transition extension lacks some Norway model frills. But it's doable, practical and keeps options open

Indeed the main upside of the October deal is it's flexibility.

It allows Brexiters and Remainers to both imagine they can prevail. The cards aren't stacked against any vision of future UK-EU relations

The glaring weakness for Westminster is Northern Ireland.

The Oct deal includes an NI-only backstop in the withdrawal agreement, which requires deep integration with the EU, and creates trade barriers between parts of the UK.

The DUP and Tory Unionists hated the idea -- which is why Theresa May pushed for a new version including a complete UK-EU customs union.

Given the DUP aren't happy with that either, you have to wonder whether the October version now has a chance of being resurrected

It may well fail to solve the Westminster conundrum.

But it shows the fundamental choice.

A big withdrawal treaty renegotiation will leave at least one big casualty:

1) the DUP

2) the Irish (if EU unity breaks and backstop removed)

3) the UK/Ireland in a no-deal scenario.

Take your pick