Thread by @ulrichspeck

A few quick thoughts on the New York Times' revelation that Trump repeatedly said he wants to withdraw the US from Nato — thread.
nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/…

What's alarming is not that a certain Donald Trump thinks that Nato is dispensable. What's alarming is that someone with his mindset can become US president and enjoy stable support from a dedicated base. This points to larger, structural changes in US foreign policy thinking. 1/

Such an evolution shouldn't be too surprising. Nato at its core is a Cold War institution looking for a new mission ever since the Cold War ended. The missions it found were valuable but not as convincing as during the Cold War. /2

For the US, Nato is "nice to have": useful but not absolutely vital for its defense. That's why the end of Nato, once the Cold War was over, was always a distinct possibility. Especially since Europe became largely "whole and free". /3

For Germany and the countries further east in Europe by contrast, Nato is vital. With Nato weakened or gone, Russia would feel emboldened and would try to undermine sovereignty in Europe's east and center — take Donbas as a writing on the wall. /4

What should Germany do? It must do more to keep the US in Europe, which is by far the best option — only the US can credibly deter Russia. To do more means to invest in its defense and to become a more valuable partner for the US by raising Germany's foreign policy profile. /5

To invest more in defense and to raise its own foreign policy profile — not just on "soft", but also on "hard", geopolitical issues — is a win-win for Germany. First, it increases the likelihood of keeping the US involved in European security. /6

Secondly, a stronger Germany is in a much better position to protect itself and to build a European defense organisation with France and Britain, and Poland, if the US decides to disengage from Europe (which would be much weaker than Nato but much better than nothing). /7

The huge psychological step Germany needs to take is to accept that hard security matters for its own well-being, and that Germany itself needs to become a more geo-strategic actor. The times when Germany could fully rely on others are over. /8

That includes France. Shocked by Trump, there is a tendency in Germany now to look for comfort and reassurance in Paris. But France cannot replace the US, not as a security provider for Germany and the east and not as a geopolitical leader. /9

In other words, Germany needs to stand much more on its own feet. There is a long way to go however, because for decades the country has become used to be protected and largely guided by the US. That's almost engrained in Germany's statehood. /10