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Declarations like this from @AmbJohnBolton might enthuse some--especially Venezuelans--who see US intervention as a good way to depose @NicolasMaduro.
Declarations like this from @AmbJohnBolton might enthuse some--especially Venezuelans--who see US intervention as a good way to depose @NicolasMaduro.
Setting aside normative concerns about military intervention and state sovereignty, political science and history suggest that this action would end badly.
@DenisonBe explains many of the general risks here: washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-ca…
@DenisonBe explains many of the general risks here: washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-ca…
To summarize the argument, which is based on his dissertation (curate.nd.edu/show/j67312608…):
1. Trying to change a foreign regime generally fails, especially when--as loads of research show--the outside power is attempting to build new domestic institutions.
1. Trying to change a foreign regime generally fails, especially when--as loads of research show--the outside power is attempting to build new domestic institutions.
2. Policymakers think interventions are easy, which leads to poor planning.
(It's hilarious that Venezuela Twitter has complained for days about gringo commentators who don't understand their country--yet some want those same gringos to plan an invasion and rebuild the state?)
(It's hilarious that Venezuela Twitter has complained for days about gringo commentators who don't understand their country--yet some want those same gringos to plan an invasion and rebuild the state?)
Those who favor intervention point to successes like Panama (1989) and Grenada (1983). But focusing on successes and ignoring failures like Afghanistan or Iraq is an exercise in selection bias.
Moreover, Panama and Grenada are *nothing* like Venezuela in terms of their geography, social polarization, state security apparatuses, or importantly, institutions. Venezuela today is more like Iraq than Panama.
This leads to @DenisonBe's third, and overarching point:
This leads to @DenisonBe's third, and overarching point:
3. Local institutional strength is crucial in determining the success of foreign intervention and nation-building.
This augers especially poorly for Venezuela, which possesses the weakest bureaucratic and institutional strength of any country in the Americas.
This augers especially poorly for Venezuela, which possesses the weakest bureaucratic and institutional strength of any country in the Americas.
There are a lot of ways to measure the overlapping concepts of state capacity, bureaucratic capacity, and institutional strength, but all data paint Venezuela in a poor light.
Here's the country's bureaucratic effectiveness using data from the World Bank. On a scale from -2.5 to 2.5, Venezuela has been below 0 since the 4a República--and somehow gotten worse! 
A comparative regional perspective throws the country's debilities into sharper relief.
Here's state authority over territory.
Numbers reflect the state's lack of monopoly on the use of force, due to ceding control of prisons to pranes, selected urban areas to criminal groups, and rural areas, like the Arco Minero, to gangs. It also possesses weak border control.
Numbers reflect the state's lack of monopoly on the use of force, due to ceding control of prisons to pranes, selected urban areas to criminal groups, and rural areas, like the Arco Minero, to gangs. It also possesses weak border control.
In short, Venezuela's weak institutions and complex security situation suggest that an invasion would be utter folly.
The country's weak bureaucracy would require a sustained institution-building project to achieve stability, meaning that any military intervention--US or otherwise--would be more likely to end with a lengthy occupation than not.
