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Hot off the press. The latest version of our Brexit Endgame report by @DrAlanWager @jasimsoncaird and @matt_bevington Tells us all you need to know about the possibly parliamentary processes to come. ukandeu.ac.uk/research-paper… (1)
First and foremost, whatever happens today will have no legal consequences for Brexit, though obviously it is politically significant if the motion doesn't pass and/or the Soubry/Umunna amendment passes. (2)
Either way, attention will soon turn to the last week of February, when the real action will take place. At which point, the main, credible options facing parliament now are to approve the deal, hold indicative votes on the future relationship or extend Article 50. (3)
On the meaningful vote itself - which doesn't look like being before the end of the month - the Government will make a new statement to say political agreement has been reached. This will be laid in the Commons alongside the Withdrawal Agreement and the Political Declaration. (4)
The Government could decide to table two separate approval motions in the Commons - one on the WA and one on the PD. Both must be approved by parliament, but there is no legal stipulation that they have to be approved together. (5)
The advantage of separating them is that it will allow the Commons to consider the outcome of one set of treaty negotiations (the WA) and a mandate for the next set of negotiations (PD) individually. Amendments could be tailored to each. (6)
The WA is a treaty, the PD is not. So the Government can afford to offer more concessions on the latter and, let's face it, many of the criticisms levelled at the deal by MPs concern the PD rather than the WA. (7)
Bear in mind that the PD does not need to be formally approved by either the European Council of the European Parliament. So should the Government decide to ratify them separately, this has no bearing on the EU process. (8)
As for indicative votes, the authors suggest that these should focus on the political declaration, not least as, for the Government to support such a process, their outcome must be deliverable via negotiations with the EU. (9)
Such votes would allow the Commons to express its view on a range of options. For instance, indicative votes would be on statements that add conditions to the ratification of the WA and the PD, such as EEA membership, a customs union or Canada-style trade agreement. (10)
The authors distinguish different kinds of extensions of the article 50 process, given the increasing likelihood that this will be necessary. They identify a technical extension, a forced extension (imposed by MPs) and a panicked extension (requested if time was running out).(11)
The EU will take account of both the purpose of a proposed extension (if it is just a stalling manoeuvre with no endpoint in sight, they will not be as willing to approve) and the length of time requested. (12)
In terms of the latter, the key date is 2 July. If an extension goes beyond that, the UK might well have to elect MEPs. That, I (not the authors) suggest, would be a farcical election. (13)
Legally, a request to extend could be made without prior approval of MPs. A Minister can use secondary legislation to change the exit date in EU Withdrawal Act, but the purpose of this is only to make sure it matches the date when the EU treaties cease to apply to the UK. (14)
In reality, the Govt might end up seeking Commons approval before putting in such a request to the EU, but legislation need not be passed before the request is made. (15)
This is just a summary of what is a rich report. I'd urge you to read it. It's only short...ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/upl… (16)
