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Fascinating (but I think muddled) decision on encryption workarounds -- here, visiting person in jail to get her phone passcode. The court suppressed all the evidence on the phone on 4A, Miranda, *and* 6A grounds. Here's a thread on US v. Maffei. orinkerrblog2.files.wordpress.com/2019/04/u.s.a.… #N 
In the case, the feds have a warrant to search suspect's phones but don't know the passcode. They visit her in jail after her initial hearing, say they are there to get the passcode, and she tells it to them. They use it and find evidence on the phone, Q is suppression of it.
Court first rules that it violated the 4A to get her passcode because the warrant didn't say they could get the passcode from her: The warrant said they could use biometrics, but said nothing about getting her to disclose passcodes. Thus all suppressed as beyond the warrant.
But that's not persuasive, I think. Putting aside whether the warrant could legally compel assistance w/ biometrics (I think it can't), later asking suspect for the PW wasn't done under the warrant: It was just a convo, outside the warrant. It's not a search or seizure.
Next, court rules that asking the person for her password has to be suppressed under Miranda, as she had asserted her right to counsel.
I don't think this works as to the contents on the phone, however, as the phone itself is a physical fruit per U.S. v. Patane that not subject to suppression. See here: washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-co…
Finally, court rules that the evidence has to be suppressed under the 6th Amendment b/c she was represented by counsel and they questioned her anyway.
Not sure what to make of that holding. Under Texas v. Cobb, 6A Massiah rights are offense-specific: How do you classify the offense for a question about a passcode? And how broad remedies are for Massiah violations seems uncertain after Fellers (CA8 2005). Maybe, but not sure.
Anyway, fascinating case!
