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This needs a bit of analysis. Let’s look at what Baker days are non backstop issues.
Let’s start here.
That is true for the transition period. That is a time limited period, which the U.K. could leave by end 2020. And it was a key U.K. request to have transition identical to EU membership while a final arrangement is being negotiated. Which will take at least a year. Likely more.
Otherwise you end up with two adjustments and consequent double disruption: EU to transition and then transition to final.
It is also true for citizens rights and for “run off” issues. That was agreed in the December 2017 agreement - which Baker defended as a Minister (he didn’t resign until months later). He has changed his mind on this. 
Now this.
See above. Also, the U.K. could have sought to “dock” to the EFTA court and for a U.K. judge to sit on those cases. Not tried. But if Baker prefers that route, he hasn’t said so.
This.
But this is the backstop (and his thread is supposed to be about non backstop issues). It’s also wrong about international law (see the UN treaties).
Now this. We are back to his objection to transition. See above.
Now this. Back to the backstop. But note that if alternative arrangements exist that demonstrably solve the Irish border problem while allowing NI + GB to leave the SM and CU, the EU has to consider them in good faith and can’t unreasonably say no.
And those solutions aren’t workable anyway unless the EU buys into them: so this is just the real world.
Since Baker is sure that those solutions exist, what’s the problem?
And a GB only exit from the backstop is very much on the table. Indeed, that was the EU’s initial proposal - until the Govt insisted on extending the backstop to GB.
Given all this, you can see why renegotiating all this is going to be hard. Going back on what was agreed (and in some cases demanded), in large part by a Govt of which Baker was and remained a member, is not a great negotiating look. /ends
