Thread by @mishmosh84

THREAD

On 2nd August 1990 Iraq invaded its tiny southern neighbour, the State of Kuwait. The invasion occurred just as the old order of global geopolitics was collapsing, spurring an international reaction & resulting in the last major conflict of the 20th century: the Gulf War

Kuwait suffered terribly under Iraqi occupation for nearly 7 months before being liberated by an international coalition comprising nearly one million military personnel in February 1991.

The operation was called Desert Storm & lasted 6 weeks /2

Iraq swept into Kuwait with what was then the world’s 5th largest army, but the invaders didn’t have it all their own way. For 2 days, Kuwait’s small, vigilant force held out.

This is the story of Kuwait’s brief but valiant defence against a vastly superior enemy /3

PLANNING

In mid June 1990, Iraq’s General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID) began detailed studies of Kuwait’s terrain & military capability using reconnaissance flights by Iraqi MiG-25s & satellite photos purchased from a French SPOT commercial surveillance satellite /4

The top secret operation to invade & occupy Kuwait was codensmed “Project 17.”

Large formations of Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) were quietly moved to southern Iraq from 15th July onwards under the guise of military exercises to provide a thin veneer of legitimacy /5

RGFC commanders were kept in the dark as to why they were moved to the Kuwaiti border until 22nd July, leaving little time for planning & preparation.

Officers only had 1:100,000 scale tourist maps of Kuwait to navigate with & had no logistics supply chain to maintain them /6

The Iraqis were forced to rely only on what they could carry with them, including water supplies, crucial in the deadly summer heat of Kuwait.

The operation called for 7 exclusively Republican Guard divisions with accompanying special forces inserted by helicopter /7

ORDER OF BATTLE

The invasion force totalled 95,000 men with 570 tanks, 96 helicopters & 120 fighter bombers of the Iraqi Air Force (IrAF). In addition, 2 Osa missile boats with 150 marines would launch an amphibious assault on the Kuwaiti coast & outlying islands from al Bakr /8

Facing them across the border were the Kuwaiti Land Forces (KLF), organised into 3 brigades & 2 battalions.
At the time of the invasion, many personnel were on leave as it was high summer, therefore only about 8,000 men were on duty or available to be called in an emergency /9

The 6th Mechanized Brigade was deployed on Mutlaa Ridge, Kuwait’s highest point in the north.

The 35th Armoured Bde was at Jahra & 15th Mech Bde protected Kuwait City.

2 Commando Battalions formed the Royal Guard that protected Emir Jabah al Ahmad al Saber & his family /10

The KLF fielded a mix of mostly British & Soviet equipment with 251 tanks, 512 APCs & 112 artillery pieces.

Maintaining these assets proved difficult in the searing desert heat, particularly as Soviet vehicles were built for harsh Russian winters & not 50°C+ temperatures /11

The Kuwaiti Air Force (KAF) possessed 20 Mirage fighter jets, 30 A-4 Skyhawks & 12 BAe Hawk Combat Trainers.

These were deployed across two airbases: Ali Al Salem near Jahra & al-Jaber in the south. 5 MIM-23B SAMs were sited at strategic points around Kuwait for air defence /12

The Kuwaiti Navy based at al Qulayah consisted of 8 German built Lurssen fast patrol boats armed with 76 & 40mm guns & Exocet anti-ship missiles

Only 1 ship, Sanbouk, was on patrol on 2nd August, whilst Kuwaiti flagship Istiqlal sat in port along with the remaining vessels /13

LAND

At 21:15 on 1st August, Iraqi forces requested that Kuwait cease all of its border patrols with immediate effect.

Realising events were about to escalate, at 22:00 Kuwaiti commanders ordered their forces to go on alert & begin loading ammunition onto their vehicles /14

Kuwait’s long range radar was the Low Altitude Static Surveillance, a Westinghouse AN/TPS63 ground surveillance radar onboard a TCOM aerostatic balloon tethered at Jahra.

It was primarily used for detecting aircraft but could pick up ground targets from as far away as Basra /15

At 00:30 on 2nd August, the radar detected a huge mass of targets moving south towards the border.

This sent Kuwaiti staff from General Headquarters (GHQ) - now located in an underground bunker near Kuwait International Airport - into a panic as they could see Iraqi armoured

formations filling their scopes. They frantically began telephoning their generals out in the field, ordering a mobilisation to meet the Iraqi threat but they weren’t ready.
It took 35th Bde almost 8 hours to load up with ammunition & supplies before it could move from camp /17

To the north, the Iraqi RGFC’s Hammurabi Division lead by Colonel Raad Hammdani’s 17th Armoured Bde moved across the border at 03:00.

The RGFC suffered from poor radio communications, only having a vague idea of the positions of other friendly units. The surroundings were so

quiet that his staff officers questioned if they were indeed the only Iraqis who had crossed into Kuwait & maybe the invasion had been called off.

These doubts were quashed when Iraqi Mi-25 helicopters containing special forces roared overhead on their way to Kuwait City /19

The column of old Iraqi T55 tanks rolled along at a swift 30kph along Kuwait’s Highway 80 towards the Mutlaa Ridge. For Colonel Hammdani, the tempo of the advance was key to the success of the invasion. Atop the ridge, the lightly armoured 6th Mechanized Bde waited for them /20

At 05:00, the 6th Mechanized sighted the Iraqi 17th Armoured Bde approaching the Mutlaa Ridge.

The Kuwaitis engaged & destroyed the lead Iraqi tank at a distance of 300m but the Iraqis didn’t stop & deploy, taking the Kuwaiti commander by surprise /21

Iraqi T55s returned heavy fire towards the Kuwaiti lines, destroying several armoured vehicles.

Hopelessly outnumbered & outgunned, the 6th Mechanized scrambled backwards towards Jahra, at one point driving in parallel with the advancing Iraqi tanks /22

THE BATTLE OF THE BRIDGES

By 06:00 the Kuwaiti 35th Armoured, had gathered together enough supplies & makeshift crews to move out of camp & proceed east along the Salmi Road, towards the cloverleaf intersection of the 6th Ring Road at Jahra to wait for the oncoming Iraqis /23

The Iraqi 17th Bde was sighted by 7th Tank Company at 06:45 & opened fire. The gunners had yet to correct the laser sights on their turrets, resulting in an inconclusive exchange with no hits.

The lead elements of the Iraqi 17th drove past the Kuwaitis & on to Kuwait City /24

Follow on Iraqi units were not so lucky. The 17th Bde couldn’t radio back to subsequent units to warn them of the Kuwaiti threat, the unsuspecting Iraqis were thus coasting along the 6th Ring Road still in column.

This time, the 35th Bde’s tanks were primed & ready to fire /25

Kuwaiti Chieftain tanks opened up at a range of 1500m, destroying several Iraqi tanks & taking the column completely by surprise. An Iraqi command vehicle sauntering under the bridge was blown into the roof, the burn marks from which are still in evidence today /26

Captain Ali al Kandaeri of the Kuwaiti 8th Company had just positioned his 10 Chieftains south of the Salmi Road when a black Chevrolet drove up alongside him. It was Mani Gannas, the company’s best gunner, who had been on leave but had driven up at speed to join in the fight /27

Despite taking casualties, Iraqi units continued to move unaware up the 6th Ring Road & into the fire of the waiting 35th Bde’s tanks. One Iraqi 2S1 self-propelled howitzer was destroyed whilst still mounted on its transport. /28

Iraqi troops disembarked from their trucks after being fired on by 8 Coy but instead of fighting, they simply sat down by the side of the road to watch events unfold. Others attempted to surrender but were turned back by the Kuwaitis who didn’t have the facility to take them /29

At around 11:00, another column of tanks flying green flags was observed by 51st Artillery - setup opposite Ali al Salem airbase - moving in from the west along the Salmi Road. Assuming they were Saudi, Cpt Dawud Khasan wandered over alone to question their movements, they were

in fact lead elements of the Iraqi Republican Guard Medina Division. Amazingly, the Iraqis responded & proceeded along the Salmi Road towards the 6th Ring Road intersection & the 35th Bde’s positions. Cpt Khasan walked back unscathed to his unit /31

Cpt Khasan began shelling the Medina Division & 35th Bde opened fire with their Chieftains. At the same time, a Kuwaiti Skyhawk appeared overhead & attacked the Medina with 5 Mk.82 bombs & strafing cannon fire before being damaged by a shoulder launched anti air missile /32

The Medina Division faltered & withdrew back along the Salmi Road. Meanwhile, the Iraqis set up their own artillery positions although under the shade of trees to avoid the merciless Kuwaiti summer sun, rather than optimal firing positions against the Kuwaitis /33

Nevertheless, the Iraqi shelling began to take its toll on the Kuwaitis. By 16:00 the Kuwaitis, now low on ammunition, withdrew towards the Saudi border.Thirsty after the battle, Iraqi & Kuwaiti troops took it in turns queueing to buy water from the same Kuwaiti roadside kiosk/34

At around 05:30, Colonel Mohammed al Harmi’s 15th Bde was on its way north to assist 6th Mechanized at Mutlaa, when Land Forces Commander Colonel Abdulhamid al Taher radioed from GHQ to ask where he was going. When al Harmi explained, he was instructed to turn around to defend

Kuwait City. “Forget it, 6th Bde is already finished” al Taher shouted, “we need help at GHQ!” By 07:00 15th Bde & their 24 vehicles were on the outskirts of Kuwait City. They engaged & destroyed Iraqi vehicles advancing, oblivious to 15th Bde’s presence, along 5th Ring Road/36

At sunrise, units of 15th Bde had reached GHQ & began to prepare defences. As the Iraqis took the city around them, the Kuwaitis held out until 21:00.

Some troops managed to escape the besieged GHQ whilst others caught escaping were executed in their cars by Iraqi soldiers /37

The 35th Bde slipped across the Saudi border at 02:00 on 3rd August, returning later that day to conduct hit & run attacks on Iraqi positions before retreating again. The 35th would be among the first Coalition units back into Kuwait to liberate the country in February 1991 /38

AIR

At 04:25 on 2nd August, 90 helicopters of the Iraqi Army Aviation Corps (IrAAC) w/ 900 Republican Guard special forces aboard took off from Umm Qasr. Their 2 objectives were to secure the Mutlaa Ridge & infiltrate Dasman Palace in Kuwait City, to kill or capture the Emir/39

The IrAAC operation was an egregious calamity. Unlike RGFC ground forces, the IrAAC was not informed of the invasion until midnight on 2nd August. Iraqi pilots had barely trained to fly at night & suffered from a severe lack of night vision equipment /40

The IrAAC lost 40 helicopters during the invasion, half of which were a result of accidents or mishaps on the part of the pilots. Helicopters crashed into power lines, into each other or plunged into the ground as a result of being disoriented in the featureless desert night /41

8 helicopters were shot down at Mutlaa Ridge by 2 KAF Mirages. In Kuwait City, 9 helos were claimed by an I-HAWK SAM protecting the capital with 5 more shot down by KAF Mirage jets from Ali al Salem airbase. Nevertheless, about 16 Iraqi helos landed safely, deploying their troops

into Dasman Palace. The Emir, most of his family & the Kuwaiti Cabinet escaped into a convoy of limousines with moments to spare. The convoy drove at speed to Ali al Salem to a waiting KAF SA.342 Gazelle helicopter which then evacuated them to the safety of Saudi Arabia /43

This same Gazelle piloted by Lt-Col Fayez ar-Rasheedi, who had earlier shot down an Iraqi helicopter at al-Dourmi, returned to al Salem to continue the fight.

The Amiri Guard commandos still at the Palace inflicted up to 60 casualties on the Iraqis, holding out until 14:00 /44

The Emir’s younger brother, the popular Sheikh Fahd al Ahmad, arrived at the Palace gates in his car around 30 minutes after the Emir had fled.

He was shot in the head whilst still in his vehicle by a stray bullet. The Iraqis had no idea who they had killed /45

The IrAF jets were still grounded on their runways in Iraq due to fog. Consequently, they didn’t join the fight until about 06:00.

Their first task was to bomb the runways of Ali al Salem & al Jaber & deny them to the KAF which they did at 06:25, 12:20 & again at 16:00 /46

In spite of this, a KAF Mirages & Skyhawks were still able to land on the narrow 4.5m wide taxiway at al-Jaber airbase, allowing the ground crew to refuel, re-arm & return them into the fray, much to the chagrin of the IrAF. Two aircraft were lost as they overshot the taxiway /47

Over at Ali al Salem, despite now being under siege by Iraqi ground forces, a ground controller was still holding out inside the control tower, directing 2 Skyhawks onto the Iraqi columns battling the 35th Bde below to devastating effect /48

Also at Ali al Salem, Lt-Col Ar-Rasheedi had jumped out of his Gazelle & into a Super Puma with 4 others with the intention of flying over to al Jaber to rescue officers trapped there.

Sadly, a KAF I-HAWK SAM mistakenly engaged the Puma, killing everyone on board /49

KAF sorties carried on throughout the afternoon of 2 August before the surviving aircraft made their escape to bases in Saudi Arabia & Bahrain. Total losses were 21 aircraft, 10 to enemy action in exchange for 20 enemy shoot downs, not including hits from KAF I-HAWK batteries /50

SEA

At 04:00 the 440th Iraqi Naval Bde departed from al-Bakr. The force consisted of 2 Soviet Osa missile boats & 160 embarked Iraqi marines. Their objectives were to seize Kuwait’s 2 main islands, Failaka & Bubiyan & then onto the Kuwaiti Naval Base at al Qulayah,100km away/51

At around 04:30, the patrol vessel Sanbouk, the one vessel out on patrol, sent an urgent message to al Qulayah reporting Iraqi vessels & helicopters on her radar scope. Frustratingly, Sanbouk was unable to immediately engage the targets as all vessels had previously

seen their anti ship Exocet missiles removed. The Kuwaiti government had wished to avoid a further increase in tensions between the two nations. Without Exocets, the Kuwaiti vessels could only bring their guns to bear when the Iraqis came within 16km range /53

Back at al Qulayah, Major Jassim al Ansari was hastily putting together a crew to operate Istiqlal, the only other vessel on standby from the skeleton staff at the base.

He could muster just 3 officers & 7 crew for a vessel that required a normal complement of 45 sailors /54

The Iraqi 440th Bde was suffering its own problems, navigation & weapons systems on both boats were malfunctioning. Soviet technicians who were onboard to train the crews worked to fix the issues but the missiles on one boat & the radar on the other were now out of action /55

Istiqlal had now put to sea & had caught up with Sanbouk near Kubbar Island.

At around 06:00 the two Osa boats came into range & Sanbouk opened up with its 76mm cannon, shattering the command cabin of one of the boats & injuring Iraqi sailors inside /56

The second Iraqi Osa zig zagged to avoid the fire from the two Kuwaiti vessels & pressed on towards al Qulayah. Istiqlal manoeuvred and gave chase leaving Sanbouk to deal with the other Osa. At this moment, Sanbouk suffered system failures of its own & had to withdraw /57

Istiqlal pursued the Iraqi Osa all the way back to al Qulayah, where the Osa weaved its way through jetties & rocks to find safe, shallow water & disperse its marines onto the beach. By now, Istiqlal could do little else than hold back & observe /58

Another 2 Kuwaiti vessels, Al Ahmadi & Al Abdaly, had been trying to form crews of their own & put to sea but were now caught by the Iraqi marines & forced to surrender.
Marines now breached the control room of the base & were ordering the Kuwaitis to radio Istiqlal & Sanbouk to

return to base & surrender. The Kuwaitis were trying to discreetly signal to the 2 vessels to head south to Saudi Arabia. The senior officer of the Kuwaiti Navy, Colonel Qais al Saleh, had spent all morning attempting to reach the base, having done so just as the Osa arrived /60

Colonel al Saleh recognised his Iraqi counterpart, Colonel Muzahim Mustafa from a recent joint naval exercise. “What the hell are you doing here?” Saleh shouted.

Mustafa saluted & replied “Good morning Sir. We are here on a training mission.” /61

Colonel al Saleh was then loaded onto the Osa to be taken to Iraq as a POW.

Later in the morning at 07:25, the Iraqis sent forces via helicopters to reinforce the captured base. A still operational Kuwaiti I-HAWK battery fired 3 missiles & blew one helo out of the sky /62

Istiqlal & Sanbouk, still at sea, hatched a plan to attack the Iraqi marines at al Qulayah & try to rescue other Kuwaiti boats still moored there.

With ammunition low on both vessels & Istiqlal’s gun jammed, the plan was abandoned & the vessels withdrew to Saudi waters /63

CONCLUSION

The invasion had left the Iraqis with some 660 casualties, of which 300 were killed. The Kuwaitis suffered 420 killed during the invasion. Thousands more were taken prisoner by the Iraqis, with 600 disappearing into Iraq /64

Some 7,000 Kuwaiti military personnel escaped to Saudi Arabia to form the Free Kuwait Armed Forces.

They would have the honour of leading the Coalition back into Kuwait 7 months later to liberate their homeland /65

About 1,000 Kuwaiti civilians were to die in the subsequent occupation of their country.

The Kuwaitis did not stand passively by, quickly forming an extremely effective & lethal resistance movement which we will explore in a subsequent thread /66 END.