Thread by @AfghanHistorian

In 2009 dozens of Afghan war veterans carrying nearly a decade of lessons helped GEN McChrystal to reset the Afghan war strategy and worked in key positions around the nation and with the Afghan government to put the changes in place...it wouldn’t be their last tour yet
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The shift in resources & ideas would bring a big shift in professionalism to the ANA
By 2008 the ANA was growing, but also losing too many men to desertion. Professionalism lagged. Leaders were not being promoted on merit enough. Morale was not high enough.
The enemy knew this
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In DC there was a lot of pressure being placed on LTG McChrystal to fix it all. I was his ADC as he moved thru senate confirmation. The expectations were high. We talked often about the ANA as we prepped for his introductions to the Afghan government in May 2009.
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GEN M saw the ANDSF as the long term security solution. He knew the investments must be swift and creative. We talked about temporary local forces to help push back the Taliban. About shifting the trainer models to fight beside the ANA at the lowest levels.
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We discussed increasing the capabilities of the Afghan SOF, aviation, logistics, & intelligence teams.
Upon arrival in Kabul and after a multi week tour of the nation the ISAF HQs and the MOD/ANA Chief talked about possible solutions-we hoped we would get enough forces to do it
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One of the key discussions in Kabul was about how to better mentor the ANA. We talked of creating mentor units similar to what would become the current SFAB model. we wanted to have multiple US leaders down at the Company and platoon level as necessary.
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One of the most instrumental decisions would be to put our combat force in direct operations beside the ANA, to mentor while we fight. This would help mentoring teams and the ANA by increasing the number of ANA in direct daily contact with their NATO war fighting forces.
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Shoulder to Shoulder would become the mantra for all forces in Afghanistan
The idea was that if the ANA was going to be ready to take over the fight, they must be in the fight daily beside the NATO team, and not let NATO fight separately
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As I look at the total sweep of ANA development since 2002, the shoulder to shoulder commitment was another game changer

Until then the ANA was learning to fight, which made them vastly better than the communist era Army.
But now they would learn to fight well.
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To increase morale and professionalism, the two factors that success in war often hinge on, the ANA needed to fight well and see that turned into victories

Good fighting allows great leaders to be spotted and promoted
This started to happen
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To increase the ANA capacity and size (now people were Talking 200k again)
NATO needed more trainers and war-fighting forces to push back the taliban and train at the lowest level.
Multiple 3star HQs were created or expanded.
CSTC-A would become a 3star HQ with LTG Caldwell
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The IJC was created under LTG Rodriguez to assume the larger and more complex mission to conduct all fights with the ANA beside them
Bringing in 2 former commanders of the US Army’s premier 82d Airborne Divsion wasn’t by chance. @82ndABNDiv
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A 3 star counter corruption command was created under a Navy SEAL to look at the other enemy in Afghanistan

Another 3 star SEAL would turn a premier SOF unit’s attention from Iraq back to Afghanistan
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Another 3 star would be brought in civilian clothes as he was retiring to work with the Afghans to create a reintegration and peace policy that would allow the Afghans to peel fighters off the Taliban rosters and help them rejoin society
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That program would crack open the door for the Afghan government to allow officially sanctioned peace talks after the 2010 peace jirga approved the policy.
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All of this investment was needed to turn back the taliban momentum and to shift it to the ANDSF. The ANA would reap the benefits of this surge of ideas and talented forces from across NATO and the coalition
Not all requested forces arrived, but NATO ISAF launched anyways
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Earlier this year I assessed the ANA and AFG-SOF for centcom and we discovered that many of the planned benefits of the 2009 concept took hold
The ANDSF would increase in size by 2014 to be able to take the lead in fighting the war.
It was marked by the NATO ISAF shift to RS
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The rise in the morale of the ANA, promotion of talented leaders, confidence that they could fight well, and the increase in retention rates—in the face of rising casualties, are all signs that the investment is paying off
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I’ve spent 17 years now reading reports like this, classified and unclassified, and yet somehow the ANA has defied the odds.

The ANA continue to improve every year.
This force was built anew in 2002. It is young.
It is still growing in size and professionalism
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Jch