Beyond rhetoric, how rational is No.10 strategy? Consider the threat, for instance, to countries who support delay moving “to the bottom of the queue”. An extension can ONLY be agreed unanimously, putting all EU27 bottom of the queue, which automatically also becomes the top. 1/ 
Again, Cummings’s poor grasp of Game Theory is key. His opening Do-Or-Die gambit was a comic misunderstanding of the “Game of Chicken” scenario. A strategy of ripping out the steering wheel only works with two players in equal jeopardy and only if you’re in the driver’s seat. 2/
He soon discovered that a) he faced multiple opponents, so threatening to crash into all of them was not a credible threat; b) the EU rightly considers the peril of no-deal less dangerous to it than to the UK; and c) that Parliament is in charge of the vehicle. A multi-fail. 3/
He’s now comically misreading “Prisoners’ Dilemma” strategies - offering inducements to players who turn on each other. An absolute precondition for success is those parties’ inability to communicate or signal strategy. In this case, they can chat and make a joint decision. END/
