THREAD: Trump’s clumsy decision to pull out of Syria has given rise to innumerable assessments Russia is now replacing the US as the Mideast’s main power broker. But, setting aside all misgivings about a spectacular act of national security malpractice, is that actually true? 1/ 
My Carnegie colleague Eugene Rumer is not so sure. Check out his in-depth survey of the interplay between US disengagement from the region and Russia’s more assertive approach: “Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades, Master of None” 2/ ceip.org/p-80233
We often lose sight of the fact that Russian ties to Middle East go back centuries. Moscow’s post-1991 withdrawal from the region was more of an aberration than the norm. This video walks you through a couple hundred years of history. 3/
By reversing the course of the Syrian civil war and saving an old client, Moscow sent a message to other Middle Eastern regimes that it was a more reliable partner than the US. The Syria intervention gave Russia a springboard to expand its influence throughout the Middle East. 4/
Since then Russia has exploited regional instability, geopolitical realignments, and US disengagement in the region to rebuild old relationships and launch new ones. 5/
But in a region torn by fierce rivalries, the ability to talk to everyone without taking sides has limited utility. Absent major capabilities for power projection or hefty economic resources, Russia’s clout is not sufficient to resolve any of the region’s myriad problems. 6/
Remember: the US still has 200,000 troops in the region and a thicket of crucial security and economic relationships. Russian troop numbers in Syria have never exceed 4,000-6,000 plus what one US official memorably called “their 30 [expletive deleted] airplanes”. 7/
Also bear in mind that Russia’s central relationships in the Middle East are with three non-Arab states—Iran, Turkey, and Israel. Russia has little to offer to the region’s Arab societies, which need security, stability & opportunities for political and economic modernization. 8/
The dramatic turnaround in Russian-Israeli relations is largely a product of personal diplomacy between Putin and Netanyahu and the fact that Russia’s role in Syria means that it is now effectively Israel’s “neighbor.” 9/
“Russian-Iranian ties since the 1990s were at least in part a reflection of Russia’s weakness rather than strength. They were less a product of active Russian diplomacy than of Iran’s international pariah status and need for partners.” 10/
Russian-Turkish relations benefit from a shared sense of alienation from the West on the part of both Erdogan and Putin. “However, the relationship remains well short of a real partnership given the geopolitical, cultural, and historical differences that divide them.” 11/
“Much like Turkey, Saudi Arabia has no choice but to upgrade its ties with Russia.” The Saudis are keen on coordinating oil production policy with Russia amid a surge in US production but have made little headway in getting Putin to back away from his partnership with Iran. 12/
Make no mistake: Putin has been punching well above his weight and is savoring his successes. Yet much of what he has accomplished in Mideast owes a great deal to the US reconsidering its commitments there. 13/
The US must define and defend its interests in the region, get a better handle on Russian policy drivers, and explore the extent to which US, Russian interests truly clash. Full paper here: ceip.org/p-80233 #GlobalRussia END/
