I'm late to this excellent thread by @CER_Grant - with which I fully concur. Senior EU, German & French officials I've spoken with also acknowledge relations between the two are "unusually tense." A few additional thoughts based on my own chats 1/
Senior German officials I've spoken to believe that Macron's experience of working as Economy minister for Francois Hollande has greatly informed his stance as President - in 2 ways 2/
First, in recognising that none of Hollande's initiatives for EU/Eurozone reform were taken seriously in Berlin, Macron concluded that he must "first initiate and master internal reforms in France" before he can seek Germany's cooperation 3/
Second, that Macron saw Hollande's inability to argue "conceptually" as a key weakness. Macron therefore developed a much more strategic idea of Europe "and gave her a narrative with the speech at the Sorbonne: a Europe that protects." 4/
Senior officials in Berlin readily acknowledge that Macron did demonstrate his "inner readiness" to reform - evidenced by the fact he was willing "to accept considerable conflicts" (eg the yellow vest movement). They also acknowledge they've let Macron down 5/
"It is clearly the fault of Germany, in the last three years, to not have worked more offensively with France. Too little too late was the method here. Another senior German official argues Macron "did not receive any real support from Germany, but only minimal concessions." 6/
This is compounded by the lack of strategic thinking in Berlin. One very senior player in the German Govt tells me: "the last time we had a German idea for Europe was under the chancellorship of Helmut Kohl." 7/
Many senior officials in Berlin now believe that "Macron has decided to push forward with European reforms that he considers necessary, alone and without Germany." 8/
More cynically, other German officials believe "Macron wants to replace the economic leadership of Germany in Europe with the foreign and security policy leadership of France." 9/
Here, Macron is seen to have classic Gaullist conceptions of Europe: "the more independent Europe is from the US, the stronger the role of France as the EU's most important military power - with traditionally far deeper ties to many regions of the world..
But Germany must always have two shoulders: one European (French) and one transatlantic (American). That's the fate of a central power." 10/
Will the Franco-German dynamic improve anytime soon? Macron has managed to install allies in all the key posts in Bxl; & presides over an absolute majority in a hyper-centralised system that will likely last until 2027 (though his majority may drop a tad in elections in 2022) 11/
Most politicians & officials in Berlin I speak to believe the Grand Coalition - despite its wobbles - will continue until elections in 2021. But the longer Merkel limps on and the more drawn out her succession, the harder and less likely it will be that @AKK replaces her 12/
So Macron's dominance in France is only going to be matched by political uncertainty in Germany. Franco-German tensions aren't structural - yet - but they could still prove to be. What's clearer is they look set to characterise EU decision-making for much of the next 2 yrs ENDS
