We are raising our % of a Tory majority from 40 to 45%. Our other probabilities are: Labour minority Govt (30%); Tory minority Govt (15%) or deadlock (10%). Throwing it forward, to what extent is Johnson’s post-election Brexit strategy being shaped by his campaign? Short thread
Without any real Cabinet discussion, @BorisJohnson has committed himself to a “super Canada plus” FTA with the EU “not based on any kind of political alignment” and promised not to extend the transition period beyond Dec 2020. Are these now hard constraints? 1/
Yes & no. These pledges were designed to persuade @Nigel_Farage to stand down his Brexit Party candidates but were only partially successful. Farage now hopes to land some Labour-held seats so his party holds balance of power in hung parliament to “keep Boris honest” on Brexit 2/
So Farage’s reaction to Tory manifesto - expected at end of this week - will be important. Johnson had originally intended to rule out a no-deal/WTO scenario in Dec 2020 to woo 4m Tory supporters who backed Remain in 2016 Ref 3/
But his promise not to extend the transition has allowed his opponents to claim no-deal would be back on the table. Johnson therefore has a dilemma over the manifesto’s wording 4/
Reassuring noises opposing no-deal might limit the Lib Dems success in winning over Tory voters in the South. But it would alienate Farage and might persuade some Leave voters—Johnson’s primary target—to back the Brexit Party in the critical Lab-Con marginals 5/
How will BJ play it? Probably a fudge, saying he's confident FTA could be agreed by Dec 2020, as UK & EU start negotiations in full alignment, so no extension would be needed. Of course such deadline will be impossible to meet. One in Bxl tells me: “Absolutely zero chance” 6/
Expectation among EU officials is that FTA will take 3yrs & Johnson would need to take advantage of 2yr extension allowed by WA. By that time, need to keep Farage onside will have passed, so don't think Govt will be as constrained in asking for extension as it is today 7/
But it's not that straightforward. The centre of gravity among Tory backbenchers will have shifted further to the Eurosceptic free market right after election. Only 4/21 Tories who lost the whip are standing as Tory candidates; other rebels have been replaced by Johnson allies 8/
They will constrain BJ's room for manoeuvre on length of any extension. Ministers will also act as a pressure point on @BorisJohnson 9/
Many ministers insist a deal is doable in 12 months, with one saying: “It’s just a question of how far we de-align, and the trade-off with access to the EU market.” Yet ministers admit Cabinet has *barely discussed* this *absolutely critical* issue 10/
Whitehall officials tell me Johnson is likely to get a “wake-up call” when he begins to addresses this question, as they rightly believe he is being over-optimistic about EU's willingness to grant tariff & quota free access while allowing the UK to diverge from EU regulations 11/
My basecase, taking all these factors into consideration, is that the Tory maj Govt (if that's what we get) will extend transition by 1 *not* 2yrs. Political constraints don't prevent the extension, but do prevent one being sought for the optimal/most sensible length of time 12/
So more realistic cliff edge will therefore be Dec 2021; not Dec 2020 & certainly not 31 Jan 2020 13/
Johnson is also going to struggle to turn his election rhetoric about “super Canada plus” into reality. If he dilutes it, he will come under real pressure from same Tory backbenchers not to concede level playing field. But *much more difficult* to map how this plays out ENDS
