We broke down their scheme in detail in this week's episode of @AssetPodcast, "Scheming:" theassetpodcast.org/episode/extort…
They reportedly knew about it as far back as early August—and this morning's witnesses confirmed that it was the first thing on Zelensky's mind:
That's hard to believe, given how Giuliani drew the connection in the press. nytimes.com/2019/05/09/us/…
Trump's efforts to extort Ukraine threatened to undermine all of that progress.
That's not what his text messages show. themoscowproject.org/dispatch/anato…
The question is how he can claim he missed that obvious implication for so long.
Giuliani and Trump went right on pushing his allegations regardless.
A: "It is not what—it is not what we recommended the president discuss."
You don't go to lawyers with political concerns.
You go with legal concerns.
So then why did Volker turn around and ... talk to Rudy?
themoscowproject.org/dispatch/timel…
Even by themselves, they clearly show how Trump extorted Ukraine.
themoscowproject.org/dispatch/timel…
That sure sounds like a condition.
That's not how the law works.
This was in response to the line of questioning meant to *help* Trump.
themoscowproject.org/dispatch/debun…
themoscowproject.org/dispatch/anato…
Some words they did use a lot: "Burisma," "Biden," "2016," "investigate."
So why does he still say that he only had the July 25 call hidden out of political concerns?
Volker: No.
Morrison: No.
That's not how this works.
That's not how any of this works.
His advisers wanted him to raise the issue with Zelensky.
So why can't anybody name a single time he did so?
So why did he work so hard to coordinate with Giuliani, including connecting him to Ukrainian officials who could deliver his desired investigations, even though they weren't official US policy?
None of them—not a single one—outlined anything remotely similar to Jordan's timeline of Trump's decision to release the aid.
What they have confirmed is that the release came right after Congress began investigating. themoscowproject.org/dispatch/debun…
They didn't discuss anti-corruption reforms.
They didn't discuss Ukrainian courts.
They discussed the quid pro quo.
themoscowproject.org/dispatch/timel…
People Giuliani considers good people: Corrupt former prosecutor general Yuriy Lutsenko, Lev Parnas
Just one problem: Multiple witnesses—including those who have testified today—said Trump's demands actually contradicted and even undermined U.S. policy toward Ukraine.
A Ukrainian official made that connection *extremely* clear in late August.
Clearly she hasn't been listening to @AssetPodcast.
theassetpodcast.org/episode/extort…
That's as clear a sign as any that Morrison recognized that what Trump was demanding was wrong—not just bad politically, but potentially illegal as well.
So why has Trump met multiple times with corrupt autocrats like Putin and Erdogan?
Why was he so dead-set on making Zelensky the exception?
That's be news to Zelensky, who, according to the White House, responded to Trump bringing up the Bidens by saying he'd investigate "the company that you mentioned"—which we now know meant Burisma.
So why does he maintain that his only concern about the July 25 call was that it might look bad politically?
They don't seem to be raising the same objections to Morrison's decision to do the same.
Why might that be?
Those are the components of the extortion scheme.
Thankfully, that was explained very clearly in last week's hearings: